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THE

METAMORPHOSES OF A CREED.

AN ESSAY

IN

PRESENT DAY THEOLOGY.

BY

FRANK WAKELEY GUNSAULUS.

"That each who seems a separate whole,
Should move his rounds, and fusing all
The skirts of self again, should fall
Remerging in the general soul,

"Is faith as vague as all unsweet.
Eternal form shall still divide
The eternal soul from all beside,
And I shall know him when we meet."

—TENNYSON.

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FRANK WAKELEY GUNSAULUS.

1879.

TO

MY MOTHER,

THE LOGIC OF WHOSE LIFE

HAS BEEN

AN ENNOBLING ILLUSTRATION

OF A TRUE

SYSTEM OF THEOLOGY.

F. W. G.

PREFACE.

This small volume had its origin in the religious experience of the author. Its character is, in some sense, that of his theological life. Its logic, if it have such a good thing, has come from the heart before it found expression from the head. It is offered as a faithful record, from an intellectual point of view, of the author's relation to some questions in theology. It claims a right to existence, first, like "From Traditional to Rational Faith," because it has its basis in a religious experience; secondly, like "Bluffton," because he who underwent such changes of opinion, believes he has made desirable progress.

The author, however, lays no claim to such "heroism" as seems the labored characteristic of the one, and is certain, that

he has not such absurd faith in himself as distinguishes the principal character in the other.

One religious experience, as honestly noted, is as valuable as another. And if it may be said that the fact, as here recorded, of one's leaving a creed, because under its influence, his religious life seemed dying, has no significance, the author has to reply, that granting this—which would be a most unwarrantable concession—the epics of liberalism can be no more acceptable.

The author has no reason for disguising the fact that, while before a small and cultivated congregation, the matter of the volume has been given in the form of lectures, it would not have been put in this form had not those who have left orthodoxy for liberalism been so anxious about giving the world "the reasons" for such steps. He is also free to say that he prefers the style of treating the subject, which he has adopted, because a statement of reasons is better made by argument and induction than by cataloguing dates, the names of towns, and detailing the cor-

onation of heroes. The question on which this book, as well as those from the liberal schools, is engaged, is serious, comprehensive, and to be treated with philosophic candor.

The author is profoundly convinced that as once William Ellery Channing preached on "The Great Purpose of Christianity," and wrote eloquent words to state "The Moral Argument against Calvanism," so now the Great Purpose of Christianity is to be declared, and that in the Moral Argument against Unitarianism. Unless we desire a great Brook Farm Community we must avoid the reduction of God's universal politics to the constitution of that West Roxbury experiment, as given by Mr. Frothingham. Far more, if we desire not the binding of every human soul with shackles so strong that the warm light of the Sun of Righteousness shall not melt them, if we wish not the crushing of every noble purpose that has moved the hearts of men to be so complete that He, who said to Lazarus, "Come Forth!" shall not reach into the silence of its death, let the

science of theology re-assert her claims with sound reason; and with a re-enthroned Christ, the gates of history shall ask, and the Church of God shall answer: "Who is this King of Glory? The Lord of Hosts, he is the King of Glory."

At one time, the author was in belief, a faithful Unitarian—though for lack of opportunity never a member of this church—at a later time, through faithfulness to the spirit of this theology, as he thinks, and without the helps of congenial association, he found himself advocating, as best he could, to friends who remember his zeal, a higher and purer form of this philosophy; which form he has since found was that known in 1842 as Transcendentalism. Sooner than seemed desirable these notions took a finer form, and as he thought faithfulness to the marrow of Unitarian theology led him into Transcendentalism, so he thinks faithfulness to Transcendentalism made him a Pantheist. Instead, therefore, of going from what Mr. Griffin would call the "Traditional Faith"—because he flew in horror from Pantheism—he went from

what he would call the "Rational" faith; and they have each arrived, in some degree at least, at the point whence the other started. Instead then, of an epic on one who has left "these meshes of orthodoxy," for the "clear stream of liberalism," the author of this small volume offers it as a sincere account of the steps of that weary journey from Liberalism to Orthodoxy.

To avoid making a large book, he has taken advantage of abundant citation and large reference. Those who do not care for the references would not care for the publication of a large quotation. He has no fear that those who read the volume will regret the fullness of his notes.

And, with its incompleteness, if any one unsatisfied with half-views, and conscious that the inevitable tendency of a human Christianity is to the adoration of Pan, shall find his way out into "the faith once delivered to the saints," if any seeking soul shall find the remotest gleam of light for the hours of darkness and doubt, if any one shall be emboldened to a more courageous and devoted service to the truth,

if, in any way, the air about may be made clearer and purer by these pages, the author rejoices in their existence.

It is, perhaps, an encroachment upon such solitude as is often sought by gentlemen of such fine taste and accurate scholarship, to mention the obligations to the Hon. James E. Wright and A. W. Lincoln, Esq., under which the author comes to his readers, but he feels that he owes to his sense of gratitude, this privilege.

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INTRODUCTION.

THE CHARACTER OF THE ARGUMENT.

"*Criticism, guided by a true philosophy, is the key to revelation.*"—FREDERIC H. HEDGE.

"*No difficulty emerges in theology which had not previously emerged in philosophy.*"—SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON.

"*Give me a boy in philosophy, and I care not who has him in theology.*"—NATHANIEL TAYLOR.

"*The cure for a bad theology is mother-wit.*"—R. W. EMERSON.

"*The dialectic, or method of the mind, constitutes the basis of all culture. . . . The knowledge of the mind is the beginning of all knowledge: without this a theology is baseless, the knowledge of God is impossible.*"—A. BRONSON ALCOTT.

"*I have long thought that without an eternal Logos you must have an eternal Kosmos; and I therefore suspect that a monopersonal Theism (the Theism of the Unitarian, the Deist, the Mohammedan) is impotent against the Pantheist. So that, since the controversy has passed from its old Atheistic phases, I doubt if either Deist, Socinian, or Mohammedan will be able to cope with the Pantheist. In short, I doubt if any but a Trinitarian can do so adequately.*"—JOHN DUNCAN.

INTRODUCTION.

"Like those who repair old clothes, the heretics are giving an air of novelty to what is most worn out in Paganism."—ST. HIPPOLYTE.

THE human spirit has expressed its idea-life in various forms. The most scientific of these, with respect to the facts of religion, is the confession of faith, or what we term the *creed*. These forms have dependencies, each upon each, also life, death, and resurrection; and there is no more interesting study than that of finding the relative strength of forces within and forces without influencing the character of all systems of belief. Even if we are not allowed to regard them as spheres of our spiritual activity, creeds are useful as definitive, preservative, and aggressive of the underlying life. And

yet every one who has thought at all on the subject has felt the possibly evanescent character of all creeds, as it is plain that the dearest have been broken.

> "One after one they left us—
> The sweet birds out of our breasts
> Went flying away in the morning.
> Will they come again to our nests?"

Confessedly not because of our proffered hospitality, which, to most of us, does not appear to be the aim of our being, the hint of Mr. Emerson to the contrary notwithstanding.[1]

The experience of finding one's creed broken, as knowledge grows "from more to more," as the circle of one's living widens, is a common one. It is only one side of the experience of feeling one's bark on different waves; for also as spiritual life contracts there is often a wreck of its precious burden because of the pressure of purely outside forces. The secret of success here evidently is, to think through one into a larger, if any change be desirable. Creeds are to the soul what the

[1] Works, Vol. I., p. 158.

water is to the boatman, when out on the Atlantic, farewell to the Hudson and the Bay; and growth means the getting out at the mouth of the Hudson, and out of the Bay into the sea.

It is not numerical Unitarianism which has most changed, and whose transformations invite attention. A more fundamental fact appears. For the metamorphoses of the spirit it embodies are most illustrative of profound truth to the scholar and the theologian. Whether the spirit of Unitarianism in Emerson, as it embodied itself later in Transcendentalism, and to-day echoes the music of the most ideal Pantheism, has gone into finer robes or not, this is not the place to say. But that this philosophy has been professed by those who, being Pantheists now, were once Unitarians, and afterwards Transcendentalists, is as plain as any fact in history. There are facts of biography which by their prominence demand an explanation in philosophy, and it is to the study of these facts that this essay asks attention; believing that the thought and the life of men who "think"

and "live" so intensely, and with whom these words are so synonymous, ought to be, in some degree at least, mutually explanative.

But Unitarianism objects to such a word as "creed," and seeks in finely written tracts to demolish these existences. It is a battle, as is plain, that Unitarianism has been fighting in, and, for a long while, alone; and the prospects are that as long as the Unitarian Publishing Association continues to issue tracts on "What do Unitarians Believe" (*credo*),[1] and to cry loudly for the orthodox dog-

[1] Is it not a little incongruous, that, in the same bundle with this published tract by Samuel J. May, as sent out to do work for the cause, by the American Unitarian Association, William E. Channing should appear, speaking in pointed objection to "creeds," saying many such sentences as these: "I can but look on human creeds with feelings approaching contempt." (P. 5.) "They impair self-respect." (P. 8.) "Skeletons, fragments, freezing abstractions." (P. 5.) "If they who wear the chains of creeds once knew the happiness of breathing the air of freedom, and of moving with an unincumbered spirit, no wealth or power in the world's gift would bribe them to part with their spiritual liberty." (P. 8 of Remarks on Creeds, etc., A. U. A.)?

mas, and all else in fact but the Unitarian, yea even—since lately Unitarianism has become so *Unit-arian* that each man is oracle[1]—all else but the keenest writer's view of those dogmas, to die; in fact, so long as this church continues to demonstrate, by this or any other means, that what is known among them as "liberalism" is the most intolerant narrowness,

[1] "The creed of Unitarians must be studied as one would take soundings at sea. The measurement in one place is no guaranty of the depth in another. What was believed twenty years ago may not be indorsed by the leaders of to-day. One writer of their fold says: 'Unitarianism is loose, vague, general, indeterminate in its elements and formularies.' (Ellis' Half Century of Unitarianism, p. 34.) When George Putnam installed Mr. Fosdick over the Hollis Street Church, he said, with commendable candor: 'There is no other Christian body of which it is so impossible to tell where it begins and where it ends. We have no recognized principles by which any man who chooses to be a Christian disciple, and desires to be numbered with us, whatever he believes or denies, can be excluded.'" (Hurst's History of Rationalism, p. 544.)

"I prefer to speak in the first person, on account of diversities of opinion existing in our Unitarian fellowship, pledged, as it is, to a broad-thoughted large-hearted liberality." (Rev. Wm. C. Tenney's Tract, "Ten Points of Difference," p. 1.)

the battle will be waxing fiercer. Creed or no creed, it is what one believes (*credo*) that gives him ballast; and it is what Unitarianism has clung to, as credible dogma, that gives her such authority in advising others to suicide. No man thinks without a creed. He must somehow know this from that; and the sum-total of this knowledge with its philosophy will formulate itself. Written creeds are few as systems of philosophy are few in comparison with the population of the globe. Unitarianism has a creed and a history, and, written or unwritten, they must illustrate each other.

Unitarian history has not been written, though every library has books on the subject. Sketches, volumes, essays, and accounts of all sorts are before us, which have taken dates and names, and with true statistical genius have left us without any account of the spiritual record (of which so much is made) of the church of Channing and Parker.[1] Some data one

[1] Every orthodox reader of Unitarian literature will admire the candor and critical acumen of Dr. Bellows, when, from a New York platform. he de-

ought to take into consideration, in any view of this system, and especially in such a view as we attempt, which identifies its spirit with that of one of the most subtle, fast-increasing, and erroneous theories of life and being. We expect to write of some of the phases of Unitarianism in its inside life, as expressed from within and without, in its affiliations with systems antagonistic to the Bible, "the faith once delivered to the saints," and to right reason; avoiding, as little as possible, the consideration of this theology as

clares the identity of the spirit which animated these two men, as against the saintly sentimentality of the one side, and the licentious intellectualism of the other. "Let me add, too, that to put Dr. Channing and Theodore Parker, differ as they did in theology, into opposite categories, is a mistake in every way. In his lifetime, Dr. Channing was the friend of Theodore Parker, and was far less afraid of his opinions and influence than most conservative Unitarians were. I do not doubt that, if both of them were alive to-day, they would not only scout any plan of distrust and separation between the two schools in the Unitarian body, but would confess that the more radical element in our denomination was as vitally necessary to its usefulness and success as the more conservative one." (Christian Examiner, November, 1866, p. 303.)

through various channels, and under various names, it meets the student of the past,[1] using it only as it illustrates the present, and agreeing that the issue is even now clearly defined, and that the "genius of liberal Christianity" desires supremacy at the present—willing to take this system for all that it signifies in positive teaching and tendency, as these are

[1] Cf.—

Farrar, Critical History of Free Thought, p. 391.
Geo. E. Ellis, D.D., Half Century of the Unitarian Controversy.
Christian Examiner (to which we have referred only as the numbers for 1865, 1866, 1867 happened to be in our hands, and as these must be taken as specimens).
Christian Register.
Unitarian Review.
Christian Inquirer, and other Unitarian periodicals.

For list of Unitarian publications, which the historian will consult, see Hurst's History of Rationalism, Appendix, p. 606.

Add to these—

Belsham, Review of Mr. Wilberforce's Enquiry.
Magee, Appendix to "The Atonement."
Review of the above, and
Present Day Unitarianism (the publication of which see in Association Catalogue).

expressed in its present day missionary tracts, its translations of Scripture and of approved foreign theology, its works in examination of orthodoxy, its commentaries, its copious literature, its present influence, and its prospects—with whatever light the past shall give us in interpretation of these, we shall attempt a chronicle of its relation to other intellectual movements. which, while it will lack the dates of Mr. Ellis' "remarkable book," and the severity of Preistly's "History," may be more candid than either, and so, not less near the truth.

Not more complete is the history of Transcendentalism. Scarcely touched until Mr. Frothingham's delightful book was printed, it suddenly became a theme, and from the highest grounds one was allowed the delicacy of tasting the fruit of the Brook Farm, the pleasures of beholding some of the faces of that company, and the joy of hearing from those of close acquaintance and deep friendship—the very tones, amusing and interesting, of their voices, as they spoke to the cows, and broke the primeval silence with high

philosophy, or, like the ignorant Hawthorne, asked Mr. George Ripley laughable questions. Hawthorne himself had given us a few notes, it is true, and precious they were to all of us; while Dr. Hedge[1] and others,[2] with one,[3] who has since become somewhat distasteful to some of this

> "Small transfigured band
> Which the world can not tame,"

gave us short accounts of days spent pleasantly, and briefly written impressions of the West Roxbury home.

Nathaniel Hawthorne, by the very fact of his constitution, could have written in no other strain than that in which he begins his second volume of American Notes. He was a Transcendentalist by nature. He found the "letter" of Transcendentalism at Brook Farm, and his

[1] Christian Examiner, January, 1867, "The Destinies of Ecclesiastical Religion," p. 12 et seq.

[2] Notably Dr. Samuel Osgood, International Review, Vol. 3, No. 6.

[3] Questions of the Soul, 5th ed., 1864; Isaac T. Hecker. Christian Examiner, January, 1865.

recollections of days lived with that band of men, and in that literalness, against which his nimble spirit chafed, are another testimony to the fact that of this new religion as of the old, this one thing is true, "the letter killeth, the spirit giveth life." There is far more of the salt which hath not "lost its savor" in Hawthorne, who, in dismal gloom, gave to Mr. Fields that manuscript, than in the Hawthorne, who, on the Brook Farm, "went out to the barn before breakfast and began to chop hay for the cattle, and who labored with such righteous vehemence," as Mr. Ripley said, "that, in the space of ten minutes, he broke the machine;" who had to hear Mr. Ripley explain, when he had put a four-pronged instrument into his hands, that he had given him "a fork;"[1] and who seems to have realized the height of this philosophy in such severe literalism as he found it here, when he wrote April 16, "I have milked a cow!" Certainly, Hawthorne was right when he wrote of his stay at Brook Farm,

[1] American Note Books.

"The real *me* was never an associate of the community. There had been a spectral appearance there, sounding the horn at day-break, and milking the cows, and hoeing the potatoes, and raking hay, toiling in the sun, and doing me the honor to assume my name; but the spectre was not myself."[1]

Mr. Frothingham has left much of the history of Transcendentalism unwritten. He has not told us much about it as a system. And one can know from this book he has written but little about the principles which came into its constitution, as it was *in imperio* at West Roxbury and in Boston. Probably he thought, as some do, that it is entirely too nebulous a thing to define; or, with others, that for all speculative purposes, as well as to practical ends, the present knowledge is sufficient. He writes five very interesting chapters about it elsewhere, and disappoints all the hopes of the student of philosophy, as when treating its appearance in this country, he entertains the

[1] American Note Books.

curious about its professors, rather than satisfies the scholar of its pedigree and constitution. Every writer on this subject may adopt his words with some understanding that the lines are clear and that there is no dispute:

"Ancient idealism, whether Eastern or Western, may be left undisturbed. Platonism and Neo-Platonism may be excused from further torture on the witness-stand. The speculations of the mystics, Romanist or Protestant, need not be re-examined. The idealism of Gale, More, Pordage, of Cudworth, and the later Berkeley, in England, do not immediately concern us. We need not even submit John Locke to fresh cross-examination, or describe the effect of his writings on the thinkers who came after him."[1] So that we are left just here. No; Mr. Frothingham adds what is surprisingly loose philosophy:

"The Transcendental Philosophy, so-called, had a distinct origin in Immanuel Kant, whose 'Critique of Pure Reason'

[1] Transcendentalism in New England, p. 1.

was published in 1781, and opened a new epoch in metaphysical thought;"[1] and which becomes more surprising as a statement in philosophical history, as Mr. Frothingham proceeds to explain it; and as, in after pages, he gets very much nearer the truth.

Leaving out the definitions of Parker, Mr. Emerson would have us understand what Transcendentalism is, in so far as a single lecture and much writing on the subject can explain it. We look at things, according to his description, and after we have discovered "that we exist," which discovery "is called the fall of man," we inspect our instruments:

"We have learned that we do not see directly, but mediately, and that we have no means of correcting these colored and distorting lenses which we are, or of computing the amount of their errors. Perhaps these subject lenses have a creative power; perhaps there are no objects. Once we lived in what we saw; now, the rapaciousness of this new power, which

[1] Transcendentalism in New England, p. 1.

threatens to absorb all things, engages us. Nature, art, persons, letters, religions—objects, successively tumble in, and God is but one of its ideas. Nature and literature are subjective phenomena; every evil and every good thing is a shadow which we cast."

He adds to this: "General ideas are essences. They are our gods; they round and ennoble the most partial and sordid way of living. Our proclivity to details can not quite degrade our life, and divest it of poetry. The day-laborer is reckoned as standing at the foot of the social scale, yet he is saturated with the laws of the world.[1] . . . A noble doubt perpetually suggests itself, whether this end be not the Final Cause of the Universe; and whether nature outwardly exists. . . . Whether nature enjoy a substantial existence without, or is only in the apocalypse of the mind, it is alike useful and alike venerable to me. Be it what it may, it is ideal to me, so long as I can not try the accuracy of my senses. . . . In my

[1] Osgood's Ed. Works, Vol. 1, Essay on "Experience," also "Nature," pp. 27, 452.

utter impotence to test the authenticity of the report of my senses, to know whether the impressions they make on me correspond with outlying objects, what difference does it make, whether Orion is up there in heaven, or some god paints the image in the firmament of the soul?"[1]

Now, if Mr. Frothingham is to be believed, that Mr. Emerson is "the finest interpreter of the Transcendental movement,"[2] and if there is force in these and a hundred other passages like them, we must believe that Transcendentalism had antiquity behind the "Critique of Pure Reason;" indeed, that the philosophy is much older than its name, and that whatever Mr. Frothingham may think of the witnesses whose testimony he excuses, Neo-Platonism, Mysticism, the sorts of Idealism mentioned, and the protests to John Locke's physical Metaphysics—they are inseparably bound up with the ideas of the chief of New England Transcendentalism. We do believe Mr. Frothingham,

[1] Osgood's ed. Works, Vol. 1, Essay on "Nominalist and Realist," p. 528; cf. also p. 31.

[2] Transcendentalism in New England, p. 142.

here, and we believe him so truly that we think Mr. Emerson has said its spirit forcefully and definitely:

"What is popularly called Transcendentalism among us, is Idealism; Idealism as it appears in 1842."[1]

"This way of thinking, falling on Roman times, made Stoic philosophers; falling on despotic times, made patriot Catos and Brutuses; falling on superstitious times, made prophets and apostles; on popish times, made protestants and ascetic monks, preachers of Faith against the preachers of Works; on prelatical times, made Puritans and Quakers; and falling on Unitarian and commercial times, makes the peculiar shades of Idealism which we know."[2]

Mr. Frothingham might be consulted in various places,[3] where he unintentionally breaks faith with this first statement. It is the truth, however, and not the inconsistencies of this writer which we seek.

[1] Works, Vol. 1, p. 180.

[2] Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 184.

[3] Transcendentalism in New England, pp. 108, 104, 115.

It is well known that to quote the Idealism of Transcendentalism would be to quote the literature of Transcendentalism entire; and that, despite the statement of Mr. Frothingham, perhaps no finer expression of these principles exists than is contained in the four volumes of the "Dial."

We have neither disposition nor need to discuss philosophical Idealism;[1] and hope, by liberal quotation, to show, without any analysis or elaboration of ours, "the genius of its appearance in 1842." All we say is this, that while Mr. Froth-

[1] Consult especially, besides the works on the subject:

Mr. Lowell's Essays on Carlyle, Thoreau, Emerson, the Lecturer, } In "My Study Windows."

Princeton Essays, ed. of 1846, p. 608, "Transcendentalism."

Prof. Prentice's Articles on Emerson, in Methodist Quarterly, for 1875.

North American Review, July, 1839, "Kant and his Philosophy."

Biblical Repertory, January, 1845, "The Teutonic Metaphysics, or Modern Transcendentalism," by Calvin E. Stowe.

ingham has said that he "was once a pure Transcendentalist"—which his present day readers will not doubt—and, as if to hint his special fitness for the task of writing the history, by this fact, he adds that his "ardor may have cooled," he has touched upon a very interesting question, —and only touched upon it—a question which, since the missionary efforts of Unitarianism are as earnest as ever, while the "Higher Pantheism" counts its devotees among peasants and kings, dreamers, magicians, and philosophers, is of *supreme* importance to any soul who will be hospitable to great spiritual movements:—the question, how is Idealism related on the one side to the Unitarian theology, and on the other to Pantheism. Dogmatism does not approach it as food for her speculative organs. Criticism does not catch at straws, except as the flood's bosom carries them on by its significant currents. But history, for whose arbitrament the school of theology under consideration professes great respect, has written some opinions as it has given the lives of men to its readers; which opin-

ions, because of the fundamental nature of the science of theology, have a phase rendering them important since thus invested with a doubly dogmatic character. Civilization bends its form to theology, to catch the inspiration of the coming time. The children of men are interested in every stroke of science, as she postulates her "thus far and no farther," or puts, in blazing characters, the highest utterance of saints as her noblest reach of vision. Every system of theology moreover is accountable to the human race; and the judgment-day for systems has its date in the past, and in all the present, and the future; and its test is the making of men after God's image, as well as dependence upon another mode of revelation.

In such a presence we assert, that, if history has one lesson to teach about Pantheism, in its relations to Idealism, and through Idealism to Unitarian theology, it is, that certain principles which have been the life of the root, Unitarianism, have shot up through the soil in healthy Transcendentalism, blooming and fruiting in Pantheism.

It is not our intention to deflect from this historical dogma in either direction. We are as certain of its foundation in fact, as of the reliability of history. We select among the ranks, which crowd upon the serious investigator, some representative names.

Of such theologians and philosophers of an early age, one may be said to be representative;[1] and though there was no Brook Farm to call the spirits of the dead and the living into a practical exhibition of their philosophy, and even if from Tatian to Spinoza, none of that band knew the other, early Christian literature will not forget the life that expressed itself in history, through Hippolytus, Amalrich of Bena, David of Dianto, Eckhart, and Silesius, and, in prophetic or dying tones, through a multitude of other voices,—while history will recognize as the most acute and strong-minded of this

[1] Cf. Ueberweg's History of Philosophy, Vol. 1, p. 359 et seq.
Shedd, History of Christian Doctrine, Vol. 1, pp. 177, 226; Vol. 2, p. 377,
With Church History Accounts of Erigena.

brilliant *coterie*, the follower of Dionysius the Areopagite, Johannes Scotus.

He began with Neo-Platonism in its application to the theology of his day. He applied it to the idea of creation, and to the belief and idea of God. With as much genius as shone in any single face of that age, and with more pertinacity than genius, he used this philosophy in his theological investigations, to the total subversion of any clearly defined outline of Christian dogma. He was even more earnest in the defense of the idea that Neo-Platonic conceptions were at the base of primitive Christianity, than those who consciously and unconsciously follow him in our day. He was an Idealist.

He openly rejected the authority of anything but that of these principles, and with splendid learning, affirmed that true philosophy and true religion were identical. Nothing but God truly existed to him. The Son was the unfolding of his wisdom;[1] the Holy Ghost the unfold-

[1] This, of course, is no Trinitarianism, and, like all other Sabellianism, is possible only on the soil of Idealism. Praxeas, Nœtus, Beryl, and the famous

ing of his life; "the uncreated but creating nature was the source of all created things." Creation was the modification of God consequent on his proceeding through the "Primordiales Causas" (which were contained in the Divine Wisdom, the Son), into invisible and visible creature life. God was the basis-substance of all finite things. Man's knowledge was theophany; since our life is God's life in us, and, as a part of this being, all things have a relation to God. His ideas of the Eucharist were in perfect harmony with those of Mr. Emerson's famous sermon.[1]

Presbyter of Ptolemais, by a free use of the same principles, are Unitarian figures in theological history, although they "did not deny the Trinity altogether, and in flat terms, like the ancient Theodotian and the modern Socinian." (Shedd, History of Christian Doctrine, Vol. 2, p. 435 et seq.; also Winer's Confessions of Christendom.) Dr. Shedd is not prone, we think, to accept more than one Trinity; and certainly the *a Trinity*, which is kindly touched as the antidote to *no Trinity*, was not the ever-blessed Trinity, nor have any Nicæno-Constantinopolitan councils changed the nature of things so thoroughly as to absolve Sabellianism from the direct charge of Socinianism. (Cf. Shedd, Vol. 1, p. 255.)

[1] Transcendentalism in New England, p. 363.

His idea of man would find expression in Mr. Emerson's

"I am owner of the sphere,
Of the seven stars and the solar year,
Of Cæsar's hand and Plato's brain,
Of Lord Christ's heart, and Shakespeare's strain,"[1]

since he needs no grace, and openness to the proceeding God is all. The theophanies of the books of Genesis and Exodus are not richer than those of this day, since all ideas are God-emanations, and all thoughts signalize the entrance of the Eternal into man. His philosophy climaxes in its desire to enrobe man and the world with Deity, and to identify the consciousness of the former with the self-consciousness of God, as the latter is coeval with him. He was a Pantheist.

A fact which is both a force and a figure in English literature, is Samuel Taylor Coleridge. And this same personage is a fact and figure in theological history; while he is, perhaps, from the very fact that upon its face the truth does not appear, as representative a spirit as any of

[1] Prologue to Essay on History, Vol. 1, p. 218.

this growth from Unitarianism through Transcendentalism to Pantheism.

"The inspired charity boy, to whom the casual passer through the cloisters listened entranced with admiration, as he unfolded in deep and sweet intonations the mysteries of Iamblichus or Plotinus, or recited the Greek of Homer or Pindar,"[1] has so impressed the theology of his own, and, through that, the Christian philosophy of all time, that any sketch of the life of Unitarianism, written from any point of view, much more any account of Transcendentalism or Pantheism, without his name, would be manifestly incomplete. Such history is not our work. But if, in the present task, due mention at least of this force and its operations were not made, the mistake would be far less excusable, since the opinions of Coleridge are spoken by prophets to-day from pulpits of all sorts, with well nigh as much eloquence as belonged to the seer of High-gate; these opinions were, and yet are the outcome of a par-

[1] Charles Lamb.

ticular philosophy; and if one man of native clearness, depth, and learning, illustrates the idea of this essay in explanation, that man is the imaginative and philosophic dreamer who wrote "The Rime of the Ancient Mariner."

Not that Coleridge[1] was a Pantheist except by an analysis of his philosophy; but that this rare spirit found himself with one foot lifted, about to set it over the line, into a philosophy which was Pantheism by confession, that, seeing the Impersonal and the natural only before him, he rushed to the arms of the Personal and Spiritual, whence he drew salvation.

He stands in the history of theological speculation and belief, as a theist pronounced in his faith, and intense in his conviction. His views of responsibility, which had crystallized only after his escape from Pantheism, are in happy contrast to the philosophy he once loved; and his ideas of creation, which suffered such a mighty revolution, stand in full

[1] Cf. Shairp, J. C., Essay on Coleridge, in "Studies in Poetry and Philosophy," which has an important bearing on this subject.

antagonism to those of the school of whose number he was about to become such an ornament. Coleridge, in the Unitarian chapel at Bath, whence he had gone with Cottle, in Birmingham in January, 1798, before the delighted Hazlitt, who "had not been more delighted" had he "heard the music of the spheres," "since Poetry and Philosophy had met together, Truth and Genius had embraced under the eye and sanction of religion;" in Shrewsbury, declining the charge of a congregation, because, as he said, "active zeal for Unitarian Christianity, not indolence or indifference, has been the motive of my declining a local and solid settlement as a preacher of it;"[1] in Germany, in 1798, hearing eagerly and believingly the Idealists and Pantheists—*this Coleridge* is not the Coleridge of a later date, after his oscillations from Schelling to Kant, who, having lifted his foot to pass over to Pantheism, saw those spectres, and, having fled, sat down and wrote: "Spite of all the superior airs of the *Na-*

[1] Letter to Mr. Isaac Wood, January 19, 1798.

tur-Philosophie, I confess that, in the perusal of Kant, I breathe the air of good sense and logical understanding, with the light of reason shining in and through it; while in the physics of Schelling I am amused with happy conjectures, and in his theology I am bewildered by positions, which, in their first sense, are Transcendental (*Überfliegend*), and in their literal sense, scandalous;"[1] nor is it the Coleridge of the fifth of August, 1833, who sent a verbal message to America's Transcedentalist, who, at one o'clock, "with bright blue eyes and a fine, clear complexion, leaning on his cane," met Ralph Waldo Emerson—told him that Mr. Channing's "turning out a Unitarian" was "an unspeakable misfortune," who, "on this," "burst into a declaration on the folly of Unitarianism—its high unreasonableness," and, while Emerson felt bound to tell him that he was a Unitarian born and bred, persisted in hurling Trinitarianism of all sorts at him; who told our philosopher that he himself was

[1] Page 709, Appendix 3, Biographia Literaria, Shedd's ed.

once called "the rising star of Unitarianism," and punished him with his baptismal ode, beginning,

"Born unto God in Christ."

The first is Samuel Taylor Coleridge, the Unitarian, on his way from his first professions, through a higher form of those first principles, Transcendentalism, to the highest, Pantheism. The second is the same personage holding to enough of Theism to save him, at least in his own estimation, from Pantheism, and so, loving it dearly, believing in it intensely, preaching about it continually.

Mr. Frothingham remarks that "the prophet of the new philosophy in England was Samuel Taylor Coleridge,"[2] "who was a born Idealist,"[3] and who, he informs us in another place, "was a pure Transcendentalist, of the Schelling school."[4] This

[1] Emerson, English Traits, Works, Vol. 2, pp. 162, 163, 164.

[2] Transcendentalism in New England, p. 76.

[3] Ibid., p. 80.

[4] Ibid., p, 82.

Coleridge was Coleridge before he knowingly came to Pantheism.

We hear of Coleridge, the theologian, with his large and respectable following in his own country, and in ours, and read the lines of Aubrey de Vere, that we may see him when

"Mighty voices from afar came to him;
Converse of trumpets held by cloudy forms,
And speech of choral storms;
Spirits of night and noontide bent to woo him.
He stood the while, lonely and desolate,
As Adam when he ruled a world, yet found no mate."

This is Coleridge after he saw the grim Impersonal, and had thought to have escaped from his sight, clinging still to the path of Idealism upon which he had advanced for so many years, and upon which then he retreated.

It is because Coleridge had such an instinctive protest within him against Pantheism, and further, because of a philosophy from which he never got so entirely free, that he was wholly out of danger of the more *Ideal* (which is lately called the *Higher*) Pantheism, because he thus illus-

trates the proposition, that the soul of Unitarianism is Idealism, and that Idealism has its legitimate results in Pantheism, that so much attention has here been given to his name [1]

He who wrote

> " Here once the embattled farmers stood,
> And fired the shot heard round the world."

needs no chronicle to Americans. Men like Ralph Waldo Emerson live in civilizations not in figures. The true chronology of his life is to be found in the books of wisdom, in the pages of large and sinewy error he has written. His life and our literature are so related as that few dates will suffice. Eight generations of preachers were behind him. His father was pastor of the second Unitarian Society in Boston. He was reared in Unitarian influences, and when a small boy was the Champion of Unitarian ideas among his school fellows. When he was graduated, Harvard was a Unitarian College. He studied theology at the feet of

[1] Cf. a long extract made by Mr. Frothingham, pp. 82–87, valuable for the connection in which it is quoted.

the highest-minded Unitarians. With great friendship among the Unitarians, he was "approbated to preach" in a Unitarian Church. He left the Church of his association and choice, but, as a study of his Letter[1] and sermon will show, with full faith in its principles. He asserted himself a Transcendentalist. He became a member of the Brook Farm Community. With any analysis of his works he must be pronounced an earnest Pantheist of the *Ideal* type.

This is a simple statement of facts, which appears in another form in that in 1832 he preached about Jesus as mediator, "in that only sense in which possibly any being can mediate between God and man, that is as an instructor of man. He teaches us how to become like God,"[2] in 1836, he wrote:

"Turgot said, 'He that has never doubted the existence of matter may be assured he has no aptitude for metaphysical inquiries.' It fastens the attention upon immortal, necessary, uncreated na-

[1] Transcendentalism in New England, p. 234.
[2] Ibid., p. 378.

tures, that is, upon Ideas; and in their presence, we feel that the outward circumstance is a dream and a shade. Whilst we wait in this Olympus of gods, we think of nature as an appendix to the soul. We ascend into their region, and know that these are the thoughts of the Supreme Being;"[1] and "The world proceeds from the same spirit as the body of man. It is a remoter and inferior incarnation of God a projection of God in the unconscious,"[2] and that, since 1841, the date of "The Method of Nature," he has ever been questioning with affirmative assent, as he thus has given deeper and finer expression to his vision, "are there not moments in the history of heaven when the human race was not counted by individuals, but was only the influenced, was God in distribution, God rushing into multiform benefit?"[3]

[1] Essay on Nature, Vol. 1, p. 31.

[2] Ibid., p. 36.

[3] Vol. 1, p. 114.

The Essay of this distinguished writer, in a late number of the North American Review, "The Sovereignty of Ethics," in which he seems to assent to the personality of God, has no relation to these

But there is little need of going to the apostates of this communion for examples, and the heretics may be excused from further testimony.

We shall meet no more interesting life fact in American theological history than one of the present-day forces in the Unitarian Church; and we know of no one who better illustrates in life the theory of this essay than he, who, upon writing "*Reason in Religion*," was hailed as "the Unitiarian Chief," and who has lately given the world a much more masculine work—"The Ways of The Spirit."

The antecedence of Frederic Henry Hedge is so well known as to require no reproduction of names here; and whatever of testimony to his theological life is given will be taken from journals and writers whose authority to speak on the subject can not be doubted, in view of often declared conviction or well known

facts, except as it thus appears that his test of Pantheism has been so sympathetic and thorough as to prove, at least to himself, its insufficiency, and that to the highest soul of our civilization, the greatest light sweeps from a loftier tower.

and high standing in this communion. We take it that the fact of his being so openly declared "the Unitarian Chief" is only one side of the fact that he is regarded as a perfectly consistent and representative Unitarian, and, as such, a force in their theology.[1] Among the tracts which are sent out on their mission of converting the orthodox to Unitarianism, is one by Dr. Hedge, and as proceeding from a distinguished professor and lecturer at Harvard College can not but be regarded as a suggestive proclamation of temperate Unitarian faith.

Yet when, in 1865, his "*Reason in Religion*" found way to so many studies, and was so heartily welcomed as "original," and, for this reason, we suppose, "a literary phenomenon;" and its author was hailed as one who would, as a reward to this labor, "clear from cloud the path of duty and destiny for his fellow men," when the leading organ of this body, as controlled by one of its most conserva-

[1] Christian Examiner, March, 1867, first article.
Ibid., September, 1865, first article.
Ibid., July, 1865, p. 89.

tive elements, repeated its enthusiastic praise, and crowned him as the "unsurpassed advocate" of "Reason in Religion,"[1]—a fine scholar, George Ripley, who has not yet abandoned the creed which brought together the Transcendentalists at Brook Farm, wrote of it in the New York Tribune:

"The first American work, of any pretensions to completeness, which attempts to apply the principles of the Transcendental philosophy to religion, on conservative grounds."

In the July number of the Christian Examiner for 1865, when the conservative Henry W. Bellows was at its head, the following words appeared, which were only a preparation note to the triumphant march which was to be executed on the same page:

"Pantheism is the fascinating element in Swedenborg, in Spiritualism, in Transcendentalism, in the new forms of Christianity. Theodore Parker was as much Pantheist as Theist. He would have been

[1] Christian Examiner, July, 1865, p. 95.

wholly Pantheist, if his adamantine personality had not brought his speculation to terms whenever it threatened to carry him off his feet."[1]

And, as relative to the enthusiastic praise of Pan, we have this foot note:

"I accept the charge of Pantheism," says Professor Hedge, "not in the cheerless, impious sense of a God, all world, and a world, instead of God, but in the true and primary sense of a world, all God; *i. e.*, a God co-present to all his works, pervading and embracing all—a God, in apostolic phrase, 'in whom and through whom are all things.' If this is Pantheism, it is the Pantheism which has ever been the doctrine of the deepest piety; it is the Pantheism professed by devout men in every age of the world."—*Reason in Religion*, p. 81.

But that was in 1865. True, indeed, and *this* comes from the Harvard Lecturer at this time, as *that* then came from her professor of Ecclesiastical History.

"Our being is deeper than we know; it

[1] Page 22.

undergrounds all conscious experience."[1] This sentence is not an enigma in the light of Dr. Hedge's philosophy. Recollecting this word, we open at another essay, "On the Origin of Things;" and here, "being" and "existence" are separated, each from the other, and a relation which everybody has thought existed between them, is dissolved forever. He gives us a few scenes in the divided household: "Existence presupposes being, but being does not suppose existence." Being is the ὄντως ὄν, existence the ἄλλως ὄν, of the Platonists. Being is universal, existence is particular. Being is absolute, existence is relative. Being is eternal, existence is transient."[2]

Now, Dr. Hedge would make us think one of two things, either that he had for-

[1] Ways of The Spirit, page 357. He adds to this: "This is true of all being, not excepting, perhaps, the Divine." This is kind to give God the benefit of the doubt. But he says further: "Certainly, no finite consciousness reaches to the root from which it sprang." One can not help wondering what the Eternal God was, without consciousness; and if infinite consciousness could do no better.

[2] Ibid., p. 189.

gotten on one page what he wrote on another, or that he desires to lead us into what he does not think is very bad, though the name has been in "bad repute,"[1] as he says, Pantheism. If "our being is deeper than we know," we have being; or, to write it with full faith in his philosophy, we *are* being, or a mode of it. Then, he says that being is "absolute." We, therefore, are either "absolute," or a mode of this "absolute." So, the Unitarian "Divinity-lecturer" would transcend his most obvious Idealism—"God, the creator and ruling power of the universe, distinguished alone by reason from the universe;"[2] and have us enjoy as a feast of the Gods, our communion with Schopenhauer, "the champion of the will as absolute," in whose pages he is said to have lately "found light,"[3] and who, having followed this philosophy to its ultimate life-features, is the leading

[1] Cf. Essay on Pantheism.

[2] Ibid., p. 253.

[3] Cf. Dr. Osgood, Transcendentalism in New England, International Review, Vol. 3, No. 6, p. 758.

Pessimist of modern thought;[1] while Dr. Hedge himself tells us what, if his Theism were ours, we would believe—that "Pantheism and Theism are not contradictory, but complimentary, the one of the other. Theism gives us the holy Person, the Providential care, the moral rule; Pantheism gives us the diffused Presence, the all-prevading Life, the Divine nearness in the outspread landscape. To Pantheism belongs the world of nature; to Theism, the world of Spirit."[2]

This and many other such specimens of Pantheism—in fact, so many that a book of good size is made of them—are enough to give the position of this distinguished theologian and scholar. And in the use of his name, we have passed by the names of the other leaders of Unitarianism, who, taking them on confessedly Unitarian ground, might have

[1] Cf. Popular Science Monthly, Sup., No. 4, "Schopenhauer in a Nutshell," Especially Prof. Lacroix, Methodist Quarterly, 1876, and Arthur Schopenbauer and his Philosophy, by Helen Zimmern, London, 1877.

[2] Ways of the Spirit, p. 284.

been more easily shown to be Pantheists than Dr. Hedge.

We spare the reader any more sketches. One acquainted with the history of philosophy and religion, will supply this lack of mention, by the ranks of the past. Many, like Servetus, lacked life to publish what they thought. A host of Pantheists, like Hegel, thought Christianity was Unitarianism. The fertile Schliermacher has his numberless category. Cranch, Wasson, John Weiss, have as large a band to represent in the early days of Christian thought, as in this; and while Benedict Spinoza's death-day was celebrated from the lips of Renan,[1] the Unitarian pulpit and press were building their shafts of praise.

The history of Unitarian life, the chronicle of Idealism, the biography of Pantheism, are one fact, with its three sides. This one fact of life-history has an interpretation in its idea-history. With tremendous force, it sweeps upon the stu-

[1] Cf. Contemporary Review for April, 1877.

dent of philosophy, and demands some explanation.

And to us, it is clear that the outer facts have a full interpretation from the inner facts. Indeed, its only solution as a piece of history, seems to be found in this: that Unitarian theology is possible only upon the principles of Idealism; and that, as a matter of fact in evidence, both in abstract and concrete life, these principles have their foundation in Pantheism.

It shall be our work to substantiate this theory, by the serious use of quotations from Unitarian sources, upon the several doctrines of the Bible, which, by their nature, so regulate others, as that, from whatever point of these more prominent teachings we look at the minor teachings, the same philosophy must be conceded to rule.

Remembering the right and left wing of this school of Christians, we shall give no undue prominence to the one, or the other, but either by a safe middle course, or by the use of opinion from both sides, we shall hope to get at the life of Unitarianism, that all fairness may be had.

PART I.

THE DIVINITY OF JESUS CHRIST.

PROVIDENCE.

"'*T was the hour when One in Sion*
Hung for love's sake on a cross—
When His brow was chill with dying,
And His soul was faint with loss!
When His priestly blood dropped downward,
And His kingly eyes looked thronewards,
Then Pan was dead.

* * * * * * *

"*Oh brave poets, keep back nothing;*
Nor mix falsehood with the whole!
Look up Godward: speak the truth in
Worthy song from earnest soul!
Hold in high poetic duty
Truest Truth the fairest Beauty!
Pan, Pan is dead."

—ELIZABETH BARRETT BROWNING.

THE

METAMORPHOSES OF A CREED.

PART I.

CHAPTER I.

THE DIVINITY OF CHRIST.

"Divine persons are character born, or, to borrow a phrase from Napoleon, they are victory organized."

R. W. Emerson.

Perhaps the distinctive theological position of the Unitarian Church is the denial of Deity to our Lord Christ. It is manifest to the most cursory thought that nowhere in all the miscellaneous work of the spirit of Idealism, do its tremendous potencies of destruction and construction appear at a better advantage. If it longed for a subject worthy its genius, it is henceforth satisfied. Its unconcealed aim here is to dethrone Jesus Christ, and if splendid equipments and great faculties can do anything, here, too, is its crowning

success. It seems to be entirely confident of its transcendent ability, and of its general adaptation as an agency to this result; never doubting of success. That its efforts are often strategic, is of no serious difference in the exhibit, since such are only declarations of its inherent vitality. It seizes prophecy, as it pushes it aside as a reminiscence of the night-time, to show its cloud-like nature, and even to declare that from the sea whence this arose, others like it may come,[1] and that it will do, by some strange chemistry, what the sum of all its parts could not do. When Jesus crystallizes it into Himself (as He is not always allowed to do), we confront a man; and, honest enough to admit, that, as a mere man, He is a problem of the profoundest sort, even if He were to say nothing, that, as He speaks, He becomes more and more the "WONDERFUL," we are introduced to

[1] That another Jesus, in answer to another set of prophecies, may come, is preached by many beside the Apostle of "Aberglaube," Mr. Arnold, and Mr. Stedman's hero-seer. (Octavius Brooks Frothingham, Galaxy, Vol. 22, No. 4, p. 478.)

Him as such. When we begin to ask questions about His relation to certain words of an olden time, the accommodating nature of published Unitarianism is conspicuously at hand. Into these questions come some records, from which, if the ideal-realism of this life be allowed to say anything, there is gathered a mighty meaning, which meaning grows in view of the necessities of human nature and the facts of Divine government.

There is that wonderful "Let *us* make man;"[1] and, after a significant piece of human history, which, if Idealism blot out of Genesis, can not be blotted out of the soul of man, where he will read it evermore—there is also the promise "The seed of the woman shall bruise the Serpent's head."[2]

When Unitarian translators of the Bible produce their results before the race, they make Christ say that Moses spoke of Him;[3] and when we hunt up the reference, we find that Moses made men-

[1] Genesis, i: 26.

[2] Genesis, iii: 16.

[3] Norton's Translation.

tion of One who had a causal relation to the salvation of the race, and being of such a nature that he spoke of Him as of GOD. Hagar called the Angel *Jehovah*.[1] It was *Jehovah* that appeared to Abraham in the plain of Mamre,[2] if we are to believe anything about the affair at all. Abraham talks to *Adonaï*, in behalf of the cities of the plain,[3] as afterward he called a place *Jehovah-Jireh*.[4] *Jehovah* stood above the ladder in Jacob's vision and spake,[5] and is identified with the *Jehovah* of the Abrahamic promise. Jacob wrestled with an Angel who blessed him, and when Jacob saw Him, he said: "I have seen GOD face to face."[6] Hosea talks of it as a place where "even *Jehovah*, GOD *of Hosts*, spake with us."[7] The angel which met Moses at Horeb, turned out to be one who said: "I am the GOD

[1] Genesis, xvi: 7, et seq.

[2] Genesis, xviii: 1. Cf. Dr. Hedge, Primeval World of Hebrew Tradition, p. 243.

[3] Genesis, xviii: 23.

[4] Genesis, xxii: 14.

[5] Genesis, xxviii: 10.

[6] Genesis, xxxii: 24.

[7] Hosea, xiii: 3.

of thy father, the God of Abraham, etc., and Moses hid his face, for he was afraid to look upon God.[1] The *Prince of the Host of the Lord*[2] met Joshua, *Jehovah* spake to Gideon,[3] and, like Manoah, Gideon feared because he had seen God.[4]

We can not think Bible Poetry such a chaos,as the critic of Oxford does; and that it means nothing definitely. Mr. Arnold would not want us to treat his theological odes, and those scraps of beautifully versified metaphysics, as he advises us to treat the Bible.[5] And so we can not help finding that David, with all the rest of Psalm-writers, meant something. This *Messiah* is unsuccessfully attacked by combined heathenism, and so, for the unfoldings of Divine purpose make Him the *Son* of *God*, give Him an absolute sceptre over the universe, set Him in clear outline as an object of adoration, and the only trust.[6] One might not think

[1] Exodus, xix: 3
[2] Joshua, i: 14.
[3] Judges, vi: 11.
[4] Judges, xvi: 31
[5] Literature and Dogma.
[6] Psalms, xlv, xxii, lxxii, cxix.

so much of the 22d Psalm, if Jesus Himself had not, in the death-scene, quoted from it with reference to Himself;[1] and thus brought it into relation to Jesus and that act. In it one can hardly help seeing a description of this same Christ, who suffered, and whose future it so definitely foretold. Paul, who, we are informed, was a "Unitarian,"[2] calls attention to the 45th Psalm by his use of a part of it in his letter to the Hebrews,[3] wherein he applies it to Jesus; and the result of this effort of attention to "plain people" would be that any person whose kingdom was everlasting and righteous,[4] and who is the object of the supreme love of all ages,[5] who, moreover, could be addressed thus: "Thy throne, Oh, God, is forever and ever,"[6]—that such a one is, as ever, *the only*

[1] Mark, xv: 34.

[2] The Apostle Paul, a Unitarian, Caleb Stetson, Boston, A. U. A.

[3] Heb. i: 8. Whatever doubt we may have about the authorship of the epistle, we are informed on the authority of the tract referred to, that "he was . . . certainly a Unitarian." Note, p. 31.

[4] Verse 6.

[5] Verse 17.

[6] Verse 6.

true God. Paul, who, because of a prejudgment from this tract, might be thought to be careless in his expressions, suggests definitely the 72d Psalm[1] also, from which we come with the impression that it is a poem about the Redeemer of the world, and, granting all that Mr. Arnold would ask for the muse,[2] that the *God of Heaven* is thus celebrated. Paul's writings are interesting enough to attract us to the 110th Psalm, and since Jesus gives an exposition of a part of this wonderful scripture, it is fraught with a twofold interest. Now it is simply impossible to get out of our minds, the Eternal God, as we read the text; and with more light from the epistle to the Hebrews,[3] we think Paul felt as we do; and since Jesus has lent

[1] Gal. iii: 16.

[2] We would not speak of Mr. Arnold in this connection, and especially as an exegete, had not Dr. Hedge authorized us, in his edition of the "Essays and Reviews" (Third ed., American Editor's Introduction, page xvi), declaring his sympathy with him in asserting that, whatever else he has done, he "has struck at the root of orthodox bigotry with his fundamental position that the Bible must be interpreted by literary and not by ecclesiastical canons."

[3] Ch. i: 13.

what that "wonderful personality," as well as some of the "greatest and most original thoughts," and 'the most direct perception of fundamental truths,"[1] might effect, as exegetical helps, and then identified the face shining through this poetry with His own lineaments,[2] we have no doubt but that He was either self-deceived, an impostor, or ALMIGHTY GOD.

We must look into another section of this "Aberglaube," "floating above" the race. And while we use Mr. Arnold's suggestive Germanism, we hope that the theological taint which he, contrary to his own expressed wishes, has given it, may grow no more perceptible. Getting away from the dogma-builders, and with the text, let us look at that "*Aberglaube Invading*" the lives of these Hebrews, and contrive, if we can, what they, "with no intention to deceive," whose lives were so full of "sweetness and light," born of a faith so "serenely Hebraic" that they could not deceive, thought and expected.

[1] The Genius of Solitude, W. R. Alger, Chapter on Jesus, p. 381, Boston ed.

[2] Matt. xxii: 41–46.

With "lucidity of mind and largeness of temper,"[1] sufficient, we hope, we feel with them, and come to our note-books with these results.

If Isaiah meant what he said, in any measure, he expected a *Branch of Jehovah*, who would do for Israel what *Jehovah* only could do.[2] John[3] has evidently the right idea of what Isaiah meant, in another place, as he seems to assert that the coming One would be, as He had been, the object of angelic adoration;[4] also that He should be born of a virgin;[5] and, as surely as he asserts this, is it plain that he thought His Kingdom would be universal and everlasting,[6] and able to accomplish what the *Omnipotent* only could effect,[7] gaining at last such clear expression of his thought as to have called Him *Immanuel*,[7] and more—"*Wonderful, Counselor, the*

[1] Cf. Arnold's Essay on "Falkland" with "Literature and Dogma."

[2] Isaiah, iv: 2.

[3] Ch. xii: 41.

[4] Isaiah, vi, 1.

[5] Isaiah, vii.

[6] Isaiah, ix.

[7] Isaiah, vii.

Mighty GOD, *the Everlasting* FATHER, *the* PRINCE OF PEACE."[1]

Micah certainly regarded Him as *the Ruler of all God's people*, and gave his ideas of Him, in saying, that His going forth had been from *everlasting*;[2] that His dominion would be *universal and productive of peace*.[2] Joel expected *a teacher of righteousness*, who should give what God alone could give, the Holy Spirit to "all flesh."[3]

He was *Jehovah* to Jeremiah,[4] while to Malachi He was to be the *Destroyer of the wicked*,[5] and to Zachariah, the *Fellow of God*.[6] Daniel gives Him an *Everlasting Kingdom*;[7] as Zachariah, *Universal dominion*,[8] and Malachi calls Him *Jehovah*.[9]

In fact, Mr. Arnold would make us so "plain," and so truly save us from soph-

[1] Isaiah, vii.
[2] Micah, vi: 5.
[3] Joel, ii: 23.
[4] Jer. xxiii: 6.
[5] Malachi, iii.
[6] Zach. iii: 1–4; also ch. **xi.**
[7] Daniel, ii: 44.
[8] Zach., xi.
[9] Malachi, iii: 1–4.

istry, that we have enjoyed hearing the thundering steps, and seeing the foregleams of Jehovah's shining feet.

But this is only prophecy and song; and prophecy is only "high living and high thinking," for which, in dogma-making, we are to have no special respect, since, we are told, one "is under no obligation whatever to accept the conclusions to which the highest intellects have arrived, if they do not appear to his own mind and heart accordant with the truth and righteousness of God"[1] (upon which idea Berkeley's theory of vision seems a pretty good parable); and so when the *Prince of Life* comes in person the problem is a far greater one.

His consciousness of His own dignity, mission, and relation to the universe is more largely expressed than that of any other "great character" in history. He talks more about Himself than about anything else; and when He touches any other subject, it is only as related to His work, and thus to Him. Everything He illustrates, or it illustrates Him.

[1] Mr. May's Tract, p. 4.

Now, we do not propose giving a resume of Mr. Liddon, Carl Ullmann, Dorner, and Young, with their large following, nor to attempt any addition to this great argument. The consciousness of Jesus concerning Himself, as it issues forth in the gospels, in His own words, or through those of His nearest friends, is its own wonderful argument; and one who has interest in these pages has a knowledge of the problem before Idealism, in which it is proposed to reduce the self-asserting God-head of Jesus to some sort of manhood; and such a knowledge as to excuse a reproduction of this New Testament dogma—thus giving us more opportunity to review the literature which disintegrates it. With this, then, we proceed.

Leaving for the present the question of the validity of the Unitarian system of hermeneutics untouched, we drop our preconceived ideas of things, and go with the leaders of this fold, finding, if possible, an answer to the question, "What think ye of Christ?" Mr. Alger,[1] after

[1] The Genius of Solitude, pp. 382, 383.

giving us a catholic view of this system of interpretation, gives us to understand that one is not ready to submit the documents of this time, even to *this* court, unless with the understanding (which we would think would be agreed to by such a lenient court) that, "whatever can not be explained by these considerations is to be rejected as spurious;"[1] and Wm. Ellery Channing, who is far enough behind the times now, had enough of this spirit to say: "I can conceive of his seating himself, in fancy, on the throne of David, and secretly pondering the means of his appointed triumphs, but that a Jew should fancy himself a Messiah, and, at the same time, should strip that character of all attributes that fired his youthful imagination and heart, that he should start aside from all the feelings and hopes of his age, and should acquire a consciousness of being destined to a wholly new career—this is exceedingly improbable."[2]

Now, what are these but admissions that

[1] The Genius of Solitude, p. 383.

[2] Works, vol. ii, p. 56.

even Unitarian hermeneutics are strained to accomplish this work of reduction; that we must flee into the denial of much that is given as historic fact; that even if after making Jesus the prince of Transcendentalists, and getting him to talk as an Oriental Idealist, and pushing Him along in conversation, he should even assert his Pantheistic faith, and above Boehme, Plotinus, and Dschelaleddin, like a Deity, should proclaim Himself a Buddha, then still would it be necessary to resort to the larger rescources of this philosophy, so available thus far, and cry out "improbable" and "impossible!" Such is the stupenduous task and such the stupenduous ability of Idealism in interpretation.

Reference would not be made to Dr. Daniel Schenkel, if the Unitarian literature of his time were not so laudatory and by such proceeding, so illustrative of its own spirit and tendency. Into the brotherhood, he has certainly a right to go, even if unwelcome. But, as was before asserted, he is received with a gusto of praise. Broad as are his principles of interpretation—such in fact as only the richest Idealism could

grow—he feels himself authorized to take far larger grounds, until indeed, he is so Transcendental and so far without the reach of evidence that he disregards the miraculous entirely; and has, on this account, a special liking for "the present revision," (for such we are told it is) "of the gospel of Mark," because it "contains no trace of the legend of infancy, nor of the appearance of Christ after his resurrection," and because "many of the incidents are less embellished with miraculous paraphernalia than the corresponding ones in the first and third gospels," though as he mentions sadly, "Mark treated the reports of Peter in a free manner, and doubtless wrote his gospel under the influence of [other] oral tradition, and of the craving for the miraculous, which was characteristic of the early churches."[1]

Such is the education one receives here, before he sees a word of the Lord Jesus, and with such a self-opinionated Idealism is he advised to go into this study.

[1] Characterbild Jesu, pp. 239, 240, 3d Ed., 1864, quoted by Prof. Christlieb, "Modern Doubt, etc.," p. 354.

His Superhuman Personality is impossible, because, according to this writer, these miracles which necessitate a superhuman personality are impossible. This is the exegesis which is courted and praised in a periodical edited by a conservative Unitarian theologian, who cries for *reason* as the test of faith.

Not less significant is the word of Mr. Alger to the student of Jesus and His words. Certainly, if He is explainable on any of the principles here hinted at, His Superhuman Personality is precluded. He says, in an advisatory way, "Most students of the history of Jesus have singularly neglected to avail themselves of this help, a competent investigation of the characters and careers of such men as Samuel, Elijah, David, Pythagoras, Appolonius, Francis of Assisi, Bernard of Clairvaux, the magnetic natures of the world—the fascinating personalities of history, the mystic souls of biography, the imperial wonder-workers of time. Abraham, Moses, Isaiah, Zoroaster, Buddha, Socrates, Mohammed, and scores of the grandest spirits of our race have communed

with God at first hand,[1] been inspired by him, felt themselves intrusted with special messages and a general mission, etc."[2]

Let us get a clear idea of Jesus and what He will say before we hear Him: this seems to be the understanding of this communion of thinkers. Not long ago the Unitarian Church at Germantown, Pa., called the Reverend Samuel Longfellow to its pastorate. His Unitarianism was thus admitted. Now, to call him a Free Religionist might seem harsh, although from the *same* platform on which he stood, Francis E. Abbot spoke, and there Mr. Ingersoll was earnestly expected. But let him pass as a Unitarian clergyman; and as one who will inform us of Jesus, while he stands to speak words of cheer to the Free Religious Association.

He, also, asserts, that Jesus is not an authority, even as Herr Schenkel and Mr. Alger see him,—adding:

"We are free in religion inasmuch as we acknowledge no authority out of our-

[1] Mr. Emerson says: "They saw God face to face." Essay on Nature, Introd.

[2] The Genius of Solitude, pp. 378, 379.

selves; no limits placed by other men to our thinking or to our acting; no limitations but those that the laws of our constitution impose upon us, obedience to which laws we count to be true freedom, —the liberty, unrestrained, to follow our own natures, as the indications of God's will for us, in thinking, in feeling, and in doing."[1]

His predecessor at Germantown will let us into the secret of this character, Jesus, as he speaks from the same platform:

"It took fifteen hundred years of Judaism to make one such as Jesus of Nazareth a possibility."

He adds, since Mr. Higginson and Lucretia Mott have spoken before him: "The word which was with God, and was God, and is God, lo, it is here. It has been pronounced in our hearing to-day. It utters itself in the sacred silentness of our solitudes. We have all heard it.

"'Why cross land or sea
To seek that which long ago has come to thee?'"[2]

[1] Proceedings at the Sixth Annual Meeting, p. 77.

[2] Proceedings at the Eighth Annual Meeting, pp. 41, 44.

But the shortest cut to the Unitarian Jesus, as a character, is *via* the indorsement of Schenkel and Furness, and the picture they give. This indorsement is such that no digest need be made.

Of Unitarians, Robert Collyer, the strongest force of this religious body in the West, has said and published the least commendatory reference we know of: "The new lives of Christ . . . we are fascinated by Renan, and bewildered by Strauss. We get a glimpse of his presence in 'Ecce Homo,' touch the hem of his garment in Schenkel, and almost see him as he was in Furness." . . .[1]

In the Christian Examiner for March, 1867, under the editorial eye of Henry W. Bellows, J. W. Chadwick, since a prominent name in Unitarian circles, reviews Schenkel and Furness. He glorifies Mr. Furness for two good enthusiasms—"one, for the redemption of the slave from his bondage; the other, to redeem the character of Jesus from the unworthy repre-

[1] The Life That Now Is, pp. 20, 21.

sentations that have disfigured it for so many centuries."[1]

The question now is with regard to his success in the latter, since the war is over; and of his two "enthusiasms," we have the information, that "in Schenkel's 'Character of Jesus' he found them melted into one. In his sympathy with the common people, Schenkel finds the root of Jesus' consecration, the key of his divinest purposes. It was probably this feature of his book that attracted Dr. Furness, and induced him, in spite of much with which he did not sympathize, to undertake the task that he has performed so handsomely."[2]

About the matter of Miracles and the accounts we have of them, the reviewer, writing in the spirit of Dr. Furness, says:—"What is natural to one man is not natural to another. How shall we know that it was natural for Jesus to arouse the dead and rise from his own grave, until it has been proved that he did so?

[1] Page 187.
[2] Ibid.

It certainly is not natural for other men, however good, to do such things. Dr. Furness says, 'the manner in which they are told' proves that these stories are trustworthy."[1]

If one seeks the "*facts in the case*," Dr Schenkel would serve him well. Our reviewer says:

"To this part of his labors Dr. Schenkel has applied himself with a great deal of fairness and ability. His result is not very different from that of M. Renan, except that he assigns the fourth Gospel to a much lower rank of authenticity. Our nearest approach to Jesus is the 'primative Mark,' of which the present Gospel by that name is an enlargement and exaggeration. This opinion is supported by various reasons, the most prominent of which, after the external testimony, are, that it has no literary aim, has much less of the legendary and miraculous, contains no fabled infancy, and no appearance after death. The estimate of Matthew is very similiar to that of Renan and Réville."[2]

[1] Page 189.
[2] Page 190.

This is obviously a splendid triumph of Idealism. But if Dr. Schenkel lacks any thing in the eyes of Mr. Chadwick, the Unitarian, it is Idealism; and, however great the deficit, Dr. Furness, another Unitarian, makes up for it.

"The third Gospel, by a fine allusion, lets us read in the soul of Jesus the moving cause of his wishing to be baptized: 'When *all the people* were baptized,' then Jesus also suffered himself to be baptized." It is a beautiful idea; but we should like it better, if, in this case, it did not seem to be a last resort, on the part of Dr. Schenkel, to save us from the supposition that Jesus had any sins to repent of. Dr. Furness does well to rebuke this prudery. From positive impurity or malice, Jesus may at this time have been free; but he was yet far short of his ideal of holiness. It was long after that he said to the young man who called him "good master," "Why callest thou me good?" [1]

In very many places, in fact, Schenkel is not up to the desire of the Unitarian,

[1] Page 192.

in Transcendentalism,[1] and it is only upon this ground that he is criticised; while, as ever, Furness, as a more free-spirited interpreter of Jesus Christ, "pleads very eloquently for a less intentional and more spontaneous conception of his character."[2]

Mr. Chadwick thinks that upon the whole, his treatment of Christ's miracles "is a great success."[3] So that, the blasting of the fig-tree is a distorted parable.

"The miracle of Cana was no miracle: Jesus had provided wine in case the first supply should be exhausted. The Transfiguration points to a private conversation, in which Jesus told a few of his disciples of his relation to Moses and the prophets. Jairus' daughter was not dead; Jesus himself said so. The raising of Lazarus is in the fourth Gospel; and the fourth Gospel is not authentic. The stilling of the sea,—it was the stilling of men's fears. The feeding of the multitude was a spiritual feast. The resurrection of Jesus,

[1] See pp. 195, 196.
[2] Page 196.
[3] Page 199.

—it was a purely internal experience, not an external fact: that his fleshly body ever rose again we have no reason to believe."[1]

In fine, to this reviewer, the book is, upon the whole, admirable, since, as he says:

"It reconciles us to a great deal of passionate attachment to the person of Jesus, to consider, that, just in proportion as the Church discovers him in his real character, it must, if it is honest, cease to believe the pernicious doctrines it has cherished in his name."[2]

Another touch of praise is given in the January number of the same periodical for 1867.[3] It has a sweep of view which comes of standing on one of the promontories of this system of philosophy, while its appearance here, and its authority is a sufficient indication of the Unitarian character of its theology. Its sound is no less clear than strong, and shows the

[1] Pages 199, 200.
[2] Page 200.
[3] Page 105.

position of a theology impossible on any other grounds.

With the loose and irreverent treatment applied to the first three gospels, with that most fanciful use he has made of the fourth, his laughable abuses of language and sentiment, his disregard of the rules of criticism, and often of his own philosophy, his arbitrary exegesis, his self-contradictory descriptions and ideas, his dogmatic pseudo-liberalism, his intense dogmatism, in all particulars—with all these, which are inevitable fruits of any intention to reduce Jesus to the stature of man, this writer has to say of the effort:[1] "The work of Dr. Schenkel, which has received this high testimony to its excellence and value, represents a style of *moderate* and *pious* liberalism."[2]

Now, if this book, with its curtailment of the power of the Supernatural, and its large deductions from Jesus as a great

[1] The Character of Jesus Portrayed: A Biblical Essay. With an Appendix. By Dr. Daniel Schenkel, Prof., etc. With Introduction, etc., by W. H. Furness, D.D., Boston.

[2] The italics are our own.

man, is at all representative of a "*moderate* liberalism," and that "*pious*," what can we expect of the radical wing, and shall we not number Jesus among the rogues of society? Surely the spirit of these brigades is the same, for we are informed by the same pen, that, with all the destruction Herr Schenkel has wrought, his work is "open, here and there, to the charge of feebleness and indecision."[1]

[1] Christian Examiner, Jan., 1867, p. 106, et seq.

CHAPTER II.

THE DIVINITY OF CHRIST.

"When Jesus declared that his truth was permanent because it was identical with the nature of God, in such texts as 'I and my Father are one,' and 'Before Abraham was I am,' he did not say a more religious thing than Frederic Douglas, when, in the depth of the hatred and enmity that almost overwhelmed the little minority of abolitionists, he said, 'One, with God, is a majority.' They took up stones to cast at him, but he passed through the midst of them, and is as safe as his truth to-day."

JOHN WEISS.

"Each morn before the dawn had lifted its pale latch,
Abroad throughout the helpless world did Buddha look,
To see what souls the net of truth that day should catch,
And his enlightening measures in accordance took,
With sweet persuading voice, to preach the truths sublime,
Whereby alone they could unto Nirwána climb."

ORIENTAL POETRY.

In our last chapter, we have cited the belief of Dr. Schenkel, and have shown

what relation Unitarianism has proclaimed between his utterances and itself. Where his work is related to Transcendentalism is plain; for it is such at the moment its existence is begun. The pages of the magazine from which the accounts have been taken are representative of the body supporting the periodical, and using it as the mouth-piece of their system of theology; and not only so, but they are related to those of the "Dial" as one form of thought is to another. For example, leaving out Mr. Emerson (the heretic of the Unitarian Church because true to its spirit), on Jesus, let us take these other steps which lead to the same goal.

When we agree that, first, "splendid ideas in the mind are the true generators of precious emotions in the soul, as seeds in the soil are fructified by the sun in the Heaven;"[1] and secondly, that "the aim of Jesus was to implant in the minds of his hearers regenerating sentiments, germs of divine truth, religious principles, which would take root and bear fruit

[1] Christian Examiner, March, 1865, p. 177.

unto eternal life;"[1] and thirdly, that "Buddha is not, as is generally supposed, the name of a man. It is a title signifying simply *the sage*—wisdom itself incarnate in man, manifesting itself on earth whenever men are so sunk in ignorance and corruption as to need its regenerating power. The world has already been visited by several Buddhas, and will yet again be visited by others,"[2]—when we take these steps we can take the next, and we are ready, not to pity, but to admire the "Walden Transcendentalist," as he expresses our heart:

"I know that some will have hard thoughts of me, when they hear their Christ named beside my Buddha; yet I am sure that I am willing they should love their Christ more than my Buddha; for the love is the main thing, and I like him too. Why need Christians be still intolerant and superstitious? The simple-minded sailors were unwilling to cast overboard Jonah at his own request."[3]

But whatever it leads to, it potentially

[1] Christian Examiner, March, 1865, p. 159.
[2] Ibid., January 1865, p. 83.
[3] Concord and Merimack, Henry D. Thoreau, p. 72.

is; and all its metamorphoses do not change its constitution. This most flagrant dethroning of Jesus Christ has its literature which extends from His birth unto His death, and many are the songs and poems which His history, as a factor among men, has inspired. In treating the history of Jesus, while it seems there is none left to read, we are advised to respect the "deep irony of God;"[1] and, proceeding with such an understanding, our way is promised to be clear. But Jesus is a problem, and no sooner is He deposed than we are to see Him idealized into a phantom, and to hear Him utter the oracles of an over-wrought and sensitive soul.

What meaning, if any, can there be in such a Jesus as is left us after all this patching and repainting has been done? Mr. May tells us that "all Unitarians believe that Jesus was one with God—*in a spiritual sense;* the sense in which he prayed (John xvii, 21–23) that all who shall be brought to believe on him might become one with him and the Father.

[1] F. H. Hedge in Christian Examiner, Jan., 1867, p. 5.

We believe he was wholly devoted to God, was led always by his Holy Spirit, and had no desire but to do his will. We all believe that Jesus was not a self-existent, but a created being, dependent upon and accountable to the one Supreme, whom he often addressed as his Father and his God."[1]

Of course, we want to know what this means? Not that we may gaze at a pile of Unitarian literature, but that, in the smallest number of strokes possible, the Jesus of the Gospels may thus appear, is the question asked.[2] Mr. May adds to our questions, when he says: "We believe him to be the great exemplar," "the most excellent person who has ever lived on earth," "that, in the highest degree, he was the Son of God;" as Dr. Peabody also does, when he says: "The exclamation of Thomas, when he recognized his risen Master, "*My Lord and my God*," is quoted as a proof-text for the doctrine under discussion, though I am surprised

[1] What do Unitarians believe? p. 6.

[2] Consult this tract on page 7, with Dr. H. W. Bellows in Christian Examiner Nov., 1866, "Unitarian Views of Christ."

that it should be. It was a mere exclamation of glad astonishment on the part of Thomas."[1]

These do not give us any light, but, on the contrary, add to the darkness; and so true is this that it may be given as a safe induction, that Unitarian theology is enigmatical or transcendental, and these in the highest degree. It is impossible to get any clear ideas of Jesus from the conservatives which are not animated with Idealism such as "appeared in 1842;" and when Unitarianism is clear, it is confessed Transcendentalism in theology. The radical wing must explain what is an enigma in the mouths of the conservatives, while, whenever self-illustrative, conservatism shall speak.

The Rev. W. R. Alger can explain what Mr. May and Dr. Peabody mean, as he gives his idea of Jesus. After giving Him such limitations as almost make Him

[1] Tract: Was Jesus Christ identical with the Almighty Creator? p. 21. On this topic consult also of the tracts published by the American Unitarian Association, 4th series No. 2; 4th series No. 14; 4th series No. 12; 4th series No. 10; 1st series No. 96; 1st series No. 221.

a self-deceived or insane man, we have the following in another strain: "He was a soul so pure as to be an organ of the Spirit of the Whole; that is, an inspired representative of God. He was a genius so fine and strong as to master by spontaneous intuition moral and religious principles and sentiments, which the wisest philosophers and poets, aided by the richest training of the schools, have apprehended only after a lifetime of toil and aspiration. His organism was so interiorly soft and deep, that fulfilling emotions of peace and bliss, such as the rarest mystics in their highest moments have known, were his effortless acquisition. The greatest and most original thoughts, the most direct perception of fundamental truths, the most beautiful and persuasive images, the most entrancing expansions of feeling, came to him so like instincts unawares, that he could not claim them as his own, but only attribute them to God, the Infinite Father, with whom the sweet simplicity of his self-renounced heart felt itself in

unison through all the loveliness and mystery of His works and ways."[1]

Mr. Alger makes Him excel the poets in "apologues" and in "dialect," and puts Him at the very head of reform. He informs us that "his receptive and responsive capacity of genius brought him into unparalleled intimacy of fellowship with humanity, nature and God, made him independent of the teachings of others, gave him a supreme authority, ingravidated his utterance as with the weight of worlds." These considerations go far to remove any difficulty many earnest students find in what seems to be "the astounding arrogance of his personal claims," or "the unapproachable egotism of many of his declarations." "First," says Mr. Alger, "there is great reason to believe that much of this self-assertory language was either not used by him at all, or was employed by him in an official sense." "Secondly, in several instances it is clear that the ostentatious assumption is only apparently such." "Thirdly," He often means not

[1] The Genius of Solitude, Essay on Jesus.

Himself, "but the divine quality in him." As an example of the application Mr. Alger makes of this last consideration, we ask attention to this: "'I and my Father are one!' here he does not sink God into himself—boundless egotism—but identifies himself with God—boundless renunciation—feels that God inspires him, lives and speaks in him, and does the works. He so surrenders and blends himself with the truth, as to represent it and say: 'I am the truth.' He found himself in possession of great moral and spiritual truths—truths far in advance of his time. He did not know how they came, but felt that he did not himself achieve them. He supposed that God had given them to him and laid on him the mission of proclaiming them. He identified the revealing spirit with God; and justly so. It is God alone who can give to the finite and perishable individual the perception of the universal and eternal. . . . Correctly understood, there is no egotism in these declarations; they are natural and dignified expressions

of the facts in the case; they are the style proper to the seer."[1]

So, then, we have Him, the seer of Judea, as Ralph Waldo Emerson is the seer of New England—a splendid specimen of the Transcendentalist.

He says: "I and my Father are one," as Mr. Emerson says: "I am owner of the sphere." Jesus cries out, "I have finished the work thou didst give me to do," as Mr. Emerson sings:

> "As a bird trims her to the gale,
> I trim me to the storm of time;"

and even as one says: "I am the light of the world," the other asserts with as sublime transcendence to any logical process, "I become a transparent eye-ball!"

Is this the idea of Jesus? Then have we not appreciated His Transcendentalism, or His moral Idealism? And if so, some of His professing disciples need this preaching:

"Not one man out of a million at this day can fathom by any direct perception the full meaning of his utterances,

[1] The Genius of Solitude, Essay on Jesus.

'Blessed are the poor,' etc. . . . How few are competent to appreciate his intense moral Idealism, as shown both in his ethics and in his doctrine of prayer; a practical Idealism far superior to the speculative Idealism of Berkeley or Fichte. His interior realization was so entrancing as to make the inner consciousness all, the outer fact nothing."

"He removed his tribunal from the outer court of words and acts, where the Rabbinical priests held theirs, and established it in the inner sanctuary of thought and affections. His expansiveness of intellectual sensibility seems competent to any greatness. When blamed for busying himself on the Sabbath, he said: . . . "My Father worketh hitherto and I work." What an unimaginable height of life such a level of thought implies."[1]

Then, He is the prince of Transcendentalists, and would have been a charm at Brook Farm, or a brilliant speaker on the Free Religious platform. He felt the "mystics rapture," and would

[1] The Genius of Solitude, Essay on Jesus

have been in league with Mahmoud, saying:

"Mine ego hid the sun, as would a mountain tall;
One ray of light quick smote the mass to atoms small,
And through the mountain shape of dust full streamed the light
Of thousand suns, all shining supersensually bright.
Within a drop of dew was chained by magic guile,
The banished, vast Euphrates, as a poor exile.
The earth before me lay, a heap of dusky clods.
One draught this beggar drank of the pure wine of God's,
And grew a Shah. Each mote a Caucasus became.
The black veil rose from round each atom's core of flame;
The welkin roof was rent, and DEITY I saw
Sole brooding o'er a world of shoreless light and awe."[1]

Since, then, he is admirable, and is so for his wonderful Idealism, we take it that a theology which thus expresses itself is another form of the same spirit.

But is there not another phase of this philosophy as applied to Jesus? Mr. Alger is not alone. As if to settle what Unitarianism means by the title, *Son of God*, says Dr. Bartol before entranced

[1] Alger's Poetry of the Orient.

Unitarian assemblages, what was afterward published in the chief periodical of that church:

"Strange that the incarnation should have been perverted from a principle into a circumstance! It is a fact of the universal order, let the degrees of it vary as they may. Wherever truth has shone, or purity lighted her lamp, or goodness kindled its flame, since the morning stars sang together, in this vase of clay there has been something of the incarnation of God. 'I and my Father are one,' said Jesus; and so it is declared Jesus was God. Yes, as the spirit of God shone through him without measure to make him the providential man of all history. But whoever the spirit of God shines through is as God, and reveals him to us. 'Beware of man-worship,' it was said to a certain ardent admirer. 'I do not worship the man, but the God in him,' was the instant and indignant reply. Let us, man and woman, worship him in one another, as the dying Bunsen said to his wife, 'In thee I have loved the Eternal.' Doubtless, of the Eternal he had seen in

her more than in the earth or the sky. In my precious brother or sister I see more of him than in sea or sun, as I childishly saw him once in my father and mother.'[1] "Immanuel, God with us and in us, discovered or unknown, is the essence of every soul, as well as the influence of any historic personage. Jesus is son of God only, and eternally begotten. But has God only one son? The notion that from everlasting he has not other children, without number, is of theological absurdities the chief."[2]

"Why find any duel between reason and Christ's authority, when Christ's authority is but reason to us answering to reason in us?"[3]

When the Unitarian ministry talk from the Free Religious Association platform, they do not lose their faith, nor is their relation to the church changed.[4] We

[1] Christian Examiner, Jan., 1865, "The Unity of the Spirit," p. 29.

[2] Ibid., p. 30.

[3] Ibid., page 43.

[4] Cf. Proceedings of Free Religious Association at sixth annual meeting, pp. 84, 85, where Rev. Henry

have Mr. Calthrop calling Jesus "the flower of the Jewish religion," while he proceeds to exempt Jesus from the charge

Blanchard, of the Unitarian Church, declares this affinity an organic one, in these strong words:

"Now, I want to say just one word concerning what seems to me a part of this Free Religious Association's splendid work. On Monday, before I came down here, thinking about your meeting, I took down one of Mr. Emerson's books, which you know we all read, and then re-read, and read again, and never get tired of reading; and I said to myself, 'I will look up that great lecture of his on the Transcendentalist;' and I read it all through. Then I said to myself, 'Now, if that Free Religious Association of ours will make that one of their tracts and send it out into the world, what a blessed thing that will be!' It seems to me that is the mission of the Free Religious Association, instead of throwing so much of its weight, as its history shows it has, in antagonism to Christianity, or so much of its weight, as I think its history, fairly and fraternally judged by its declarations and principles will prove that it has, against Unitarianism. Let Christianity and Unitarianism go down, if needs they must; there is this great work of reviving that Transcendentalism which Emerson preached so nobly in the years gone by. For what I hate, as one man looking over the world, is this lowness of aim, is this living merely in the material, is this effect of science (transitory, as I believe) in making men think merely of material things. Transcendentalism! The invisible above

of jealousy of Buddha, and exalts him, it seems, to a place with Buddha, believing that "he yearns to do for the West what Buddha longed to do for the East, and that the best results are reached if Jesus clasps hands with Buddha, and says: 'Brother, the grace of God comes to us both, anointing us for our tasks.'"[1]

At the same meeting, we have Dr. Bartol suggesting that "Jesus would not have been crucified at three score."[2]

Neither does the fact of a certain authorship detract from any significance which a work may have, if such full and free indorsement be given it as we have seen come from the Unitarian Church, for instance; to Doctor Schenkel's 'Characterbild Jesu'; and we are bound to take for what they are worth, all such ideas of Jesus and His works, as come of His errors in estimating men, His inward sinfulness,

the visible! That is the work for the Free Religious Association to accomplish."

"I pray God, therefore, to bless the Free Religious Association as much as I pray him to bless the American Unitarian Association."

[1] Proceedings at the Seventh Annual Meeting, p. 37.

[2] Ibid., p. 59.

His lack of goodness, "His psychical power of calming troubled souls," the mistaking Himself and His consciousness and the rich stream of legends about Him, in the light of the indorsement they get at the hands of this body of thinkers. That it is Idealism is admitted; that it is weak, all criticism but that of the Unitarian Church holds. No man calls Strauss' "Life of Christ" a weak book; and why? Because of the difference in spirit from Doctor Schenkel's sketch? No; for there is no difference in spirit. The difference between Strauss and Schenkel is that between an Idealist strong enough to follow the lead of his philosophy to its goal, and an Idealist lost in the first blushes of the same philosophy.

To say the least, Schenkel is an Idealist; Strauss is a Pantheist; as Schenkel is weak, and Strauss is strong. The great souls of Idealism do not stop with Schenkel, but live with Strauss, since Pantheism is Idealism at its best.

But we think that Schenkel himself did not stop there. In fact, his greatest work is proof that he could not stop

there. We agree that Orthodoxy is not fondly loved at the office of the Westminster Review; that this noble periodical is not afflicted with any passionate concern for the maintenance of her dogmas; and this being so, when the Westminster Review touches critically upon the publications of liberalism, we expect that there are grave reasons for such adverse exposition as may be found in its columns on contemporary literature. When, therefore, the Westminster Review takes up "Die Christliche Dogmatik vom Standpunkte des Gewissens aus dargestellt," von Dr. Danie Schenkel, etc., and handles it with freedom, though it seems often as if to express its fuller sympathy, we have a right to believe that there are strong reasons for so doing. The assertion that "no more valuable contribution to subjective theology has appeared since the day of Schleiermacher himself," naturally enough suggests a relation between them even more important than that of greatness or of mere similarity upon the idea of "subjective theology." We have the following:

"Religion is peculiar to man. He is distinguished from all other beings that we know of, as much by his religious consciousness as by his reason and his will. There must be some spiritual faculty, some inner organ proper to this special capacity. Strictly speaking, this must be a faculty of the spiritual, and not of the sensual soul, according to the defective conception of Schleiermacher. Moreover, if such a faculty or organ is required as shall give an immediate relation between God and man, it can be neither reason nor will; for these immediately are stimulated by and act upon that natural system of things which surrounds us. But the 'conscience' is a specific spiritual faculty testifying to the consciousness, not by inference, but immediately, of Him from whom it proceeds. 'Ought,' and 'ought not,' are imperative and unmistakable, not indirect and syllogistic.

"So far, indeed, does Professor Schenkel's doctrine contrast itself with that of Schleiermacher, that he says:

"'So little does the spirit receive from

the world its awakening to a consciousness of God, that rather is this consciousness continually darkened and oppressed by it, and the truth of the proposition is undoubted—consciousness of God and consciousness of the world are conversely related to each other; as this becomes stronger that becomes weaker, and as this becomes weaker that becomes stronger'—p. 140.

"Nevertheless the conscience has a double function; it is both the spiritual faculty whereby we are immediately conscious of the presence of God in us—this is its religious function; and it is also a regulative power, when, by reason of our relation to a sensible world, we fall away or are in danger of falling away, from God. This is its moral function. We might say of it, on the one side, that it is a witnessing spirit, and on the other, that it is a striving spirit. Religion is thus that consciousness of his own being which reveals itself to man in his conscience, and certifies him of his immediate personal union with God, whose voice the conscience is. And morality is the expres-

sion of the necessity for the restoration of that perfect union, when it has been interrupted or impaired. The religious function of the conscience is generative or productive. Its moral function is restorative, regenerating, or renewing. So there are two important distinctions between Dr. Schenkel and the school of Schleiermacher—one respecting the origin of the conception of God, which, with Dr. Schenkel, is not dependent on the external world, but internal and immediate; the other in the coincidence or inseparableness of religion and morality."[1]

This is a phenomenon. Two such souls as Schenkel and Schleiermacher beginning with the same organic principles, and ending with "two important distinctions!" It is, indeed, a greater wonder, when we find out from our critic that the trouble with the definition of Schleiermacher was that it was "defective." If these things are true, and that they are we can not question, it is a singular thing that two such "important distinctions"

[1] Westminster Review, 1858, October number, p. 310.

should arise, and especially as every scholar knows that Schleiermacher should, with great truth, be called a Pantheist, and that liberal theology should rejoice lustily in the proof Dr. Schenkel has furnished of the personality of God. But our critic quenches this astonishment by adding:

"Our learned Heidelberg professor has a great horror of Pantheism; he esteems the doctrine of Schleiermacher, to be essentially Pantheistic; and he is not content with modifying or supplementing it, but he must absolutely be rid of it. Yet if he were not frightened with that bugbear we think he would allow to Schleiermacher's dependence theory a place at least in the formation of the religious idea. Historically, as it were, the sense of forces manifested in the external world is the source to man of his conception of the superhuman, of the divine. The perception of his relation to those forces, and of his own comparative feebleness in their presence, by generating a sense of dependence, supplies a rudimentary conception of God—a God re-

garded, it is true, with awe and fear—a God not known as yet either to be good or bad.

The moral part of the conception of God supervenes; and when the moral sense has been developed, conscience plays an important part. It will appear, however, on discussion, that the appeal to the conscience as an evidence of the presence of God with the human spirit is neither conclusive against a Pantheistic scheme, nor conclusive of that presence being immediate. The Pantheist will undoubtedly admit that the phenomena of the conscience, as well as the other inward phenomena, are manifestations of the Deity. But he will demur to the assumption that the phenomena of conscience should be considered immediate manifestations of Deity, more truly than any other functions of the soul on which man can reflect; he would also have much to say on the genesis of conscience itself. Dr. Schenkel must likewise expect it to be pointed out that he has not supplied any proof of the 'personality' of God, for though the conscience be admitted as

an evidence of the presence of God with the human person, it does not thence follow that he is a person. The question of personality is, however, discussed, pp. 25–27. Further, while Dr. Schenkel attributes the disturbance of the union between the divine and human spirit to the influence upon the latter of an external world, his adversaries will probably be able to thrust him logically into the admission of a dualism."[1]

All of which is to say,–by the high authority of this periodical, so sympathetic as touching the whole work that it adds regretfully, "we can only once more cordially recommend the work to the examination of unprejudiced theologians,"[1]that to accept the idealistic theology, the theology of which "Character bild Jesu" is the healthy issue, which operates so strongly throughout this work as to edify this famous critic, and, at the same time, to save the personal God, is impossible; that the Unitarian, or any other, who may use these

[1] Westminster Review, 1858, October number. p. 310.

principles of world-interpretation, conscience-interpretation, history-interpretation, and Scripture-interpretation, is powerless in the hands of the Pantheist, whatever his "horror of Pantheism" may be.

Most sad, if anything he has said is true, is it that Dr. Bartol has not been "faithful to the grace already given;" and very strange is it, while it is a sure test of real greatness of soul, that many of this communion have not taken higher grounds. The greatest soul ever nourished by the Unitarian Church could not be satisfied with Idealism in any but its best form, and he who wrote of Jesus: "One man was true to what is in you and me. He saw that God incarnates himself in man, and evermore goes forth anew to take possession of his world. He said in this jubilee of sublime emotion: I am divine. Through me God acts; through me speaks. Would you see God, see me; or see thee, when thou also thinkest as I now think;"[1] has also sung:

"And conscious law is king of kings."

[1] Address to the Divinity Students, vol. 1, p. 69.

The fact is, there is no intellectual stopping place for any strong or active soul, from Idealism in a so-called liberalism, to Idealism in iron-handed Pantheism. Back of all this Pantheistic light-drawing which we have quoted, and to which the term *theology* has been applied, the very statements of present-day Unitarianism, which are a possibility because real on the Unitarianism of other days, are Pantheistic either by confession or in result.

Says Dr. Bartol: "Doubtless, the Trinity began as an honest attempt to express God's relationship. But why limit him to three? *Three* numerically considered as expressing God, is not a whit more, or nearer the truth than *one*. It is astonishing through what a round of metaphysical ingenuities, natural symbols, and fanciful images, a supposed necessary *threeness* has been pursued, till it has become like the puzzle of ivory pieces in a child's play. But there can be no limitation of divinity to three persons. Are not all personalities, in heaven, earth, or hell, his offspring? What, then, is the Trinity but a merely provisional and

transitory notion? Can articulate personality be predicted of deity? God is not, as distinguished from others, *a* person at all. He is the unfathomable mystery of *person* itself, the deepest fact of life and human consciousness. He is of countless personalities parental, prolific root and whole."[1]

If not personal, he is impersonal, "of all personalities parental, prolific root and whole." Whether personality be "*articulate*" or not, is far from the question; and we are left with the impersonal.

But there is another route to Pantheism well-trodden and direct. According to this doctrine and the statement of Mr. Alger, that Jesus was "not unlike others in kind, however superior in degree,"[2] that which makes the Christ different from any man is the degree of God-manifestation in Him; that, indeed, the difference between Jesus and any violet or cascade (since there is no trinity, and

[1] Christian Examiner, Jan., 1865, p. 69, "The Unity of the Spirit."

[2] The Genius of Solitude, Essay on Jesus.

personality is "articulate" or not at all) lies in degree of God-manifestation; all of which is Pantheism finer than Schelling thought: "matter is extinct mind,"[1] and as sweet as that of Mr. Emerson:

"In the divine order, intellect is primary; nature, secondary; it is the memory of the mind. That which once existed in intellect as pure law has now taken body as Nature. It existed already in the mind in solution; now, it has been precipitated, and the bright sediment is the world. We can never be quite strangers or inferiors in nature. It is flesh of our flesh, and bone of our bone."[2]

In thus treating of this dogma, the Deity of Christ, one is not satisfied with any idea he may have gained from the other writers of the Bible, until he has used due diligence to find out what Paul, who is spoken of by a tract, issued from the Unitarian publishing house, as a brave man, "of great talents, extended learning, and ardent zeal;"[3] which "give him

[1] Ueberweg's Hist. of Phil., vol. ii, p. 218.

[2] The Method of Nature, Works, vol. i, p. 108.

[3] The Apostle Paul, A Unitarian, p. 3.

a claim to the first rank among the inspired apostles of our Savior." He is commended for his "manly and fearless principles which these passages exhibit:"

"I have kept back nothing which was profitable unto you." "I have shunned not to declare unto you all the counsel of God."

We also have it stated here that "we may believe his testimony concerning the character and office of Jesus Christ, with entire confidence that it could not have been erroneous or defective in any important respect."

To one, who, on going into St. Paul's writings, has met with these tracts, these general statements are entertaining. But who can keep from the sight of the title of this publication "The Apostle Paul, A Unitarian?" After reading the first pages, with the Acts and the Epistles in hand, one begins to search for some principles of his own, and he finds this self-explanative: Paul thought that Jesus was either God or Man, as this is important, and his testimony "could not have been erroneous or defective in any important respect." One would say also, that if

Paul spoke of Jesus as Very God, while Jesus was very man, it was Pantheism; since it would be to identify human nature with the Divine. So, too, one would say that if the Bible were to be interpreted as any other book, full confidence ought to be given to Paul, as he speaks of Jesus, and especially because of Paul's positive assertion that he "kept back nothing which was profitable."

Speculating no more, then, about common sense in interpretation, and accepting the idea that Unitarianism is so glad to borrow from Mr. Jowett, "*Interpret the Scripture like any other book*," [1] let us seek Paul's idea of Christ. Is he God-man, or man only? But as this little tract declares its faith—after an examination, we have a faith too. It is that Paul was a Trinitarian; that he thought that Jesus was God; and because he could make no "important" error, Jesus was very God.

Furthermore, we think that the idea of this essay is clearly illustrated in the tract before us; that, granting Paul a Unitarian,

[1] Dr. F. H. Hedge's edition of the "Essays and Reviews," p. 416.

and that he addressed a man, and spoke of a man, he did address him and speak of him as God; that if Paul believed what he said, and we must believe it, since our rule is, "Interpret the Scripture like any other book," he believed God and man identical in nature, which, of course, is Pantheism; that Unitarianism avoids this only by a thorough application of the principles of Idealism is evident, and because Idealism has its foundation in Pantheism, in either case are we left with Pantheism as our final philosophy and creed.

We can not but take this tract as representative, while we overlook the ground of controversy, touching the fewest possible number of points. If Paul wrote as one would in ordinary life (and he could not have made an error of importance), he certainly believed Jesus to be God as well as man, when to the Romans he wrote of Him as the object of faith, the Son of God, the Author of the Infinite God's gifts, the Holy Spirit, Providence, and Judge of all; but if he wrote from such an atmosphere as that of Brook Farm, or that in which Dr. Hedge wrote "Ways of the Spirit,"

we can imagine his language to mean almost everything or nothing.

And if one would object to such an air, he would probably be informed, in the words of the former leader of the Brook Farm Community—by him who told Hawthorne the mysteries of milking cows, who "was as influential as any in planting the seeds of the Transcendental philosophy in good soil"[1]—that he was a superficial thinker, finding the suggestions of Paul and "Dr. Hedge, too refined, too subtle for his acceptance; perhaps even for his comprehension;" or a "sceptic, complaining of too urgent demands upon the sentiment of faith;" or a dogmatist, "feeling the atmosphere of thought too attenuated for his habitual breathing;" but that "the lover of contemplation, the student of divine mysteries, who delights to haunt the stream that flows fast by the oracles of God, will welcome these musings . . . as a stimulus to his faith and an aid to his communion and fellowship with the Universe."[2]

[1] Transcendentalism in New England, p. 322.

[2] Geo. Ripley in N. Y. Tribune, Jan. 4, 1878.

If Paul wrote in earnest to those Romans, when he said of Jesus, "Over all, God blessed forever,"[1] he thought Him God. Our tract[2] informs us, with a hint that it represents this school on the topic, that we are wrong in so believing; and takes us to the work of the rationalist of 1529. We are to see him on his way home, perhaps from the college of Sorbonne, after the censure which had been pronounced upon his Idealism.[3] Here is the finest specimen of the Idealism of Erasmus; and though it gives no mention of his name, and thus no credit either for his full stop after *κατὰ σάρκα*, his defense of "reason" and of "free thought," or his opinions of Luther and Scholasticism, it appropriates his punctuation, with the same spirit which made its advances to a "freer version"—all of which will not make a sound exegesis think but that, even if Paul were a Unitarian, he

[1] Ch. ix., verse 5.

[2] The Apostle Paul, A Unitarian, p. 28.

[3] Cf. Butler's Life of Erasmus. Guercke's Kirchengeschichte, vol. iii., p. 64. De Libero Arbitrio. Erasmi Stultitiæ Laus.

ought to have written more carefully. Nothing, indeed, but the highest waves of Transcendentalism in interpretation could wash away the antithesis between *κατὰ σάρκα* and *θεὸς εὐλογητος*, and only the same philosophy, whether by another feat, not impossible at all in the nature of things, it is made to fall under Mr. Jowett's rule, or not—could interrupt the manifest rising of Paul's mind to a crowning summit of belief, and make it announce so spontaneously what Unitarians would say was on a totally different subject.[1]

Here, however, so lively an Idealism has not exhausted itself. Passing over those ascriptions of Divine power to Jesus, the addresses to and sayings concerning Him as the Ruler of all things, and as very God, in the epistles to the Corinthians, Ephesians, Philippians, and Galatians, we can not help hearing Paul,

[1] Hodge, Systematic Theology, vol. i., p. 511. Van Oosterzee, Christian Dogmatics, vol. ii., p. 593. Van Oosterzee, Theology of the New Testament, p. 300. Liddon, Our Lord's Divinity, Bampton Lectures, for 1866, pp. 312, 313, 314. Moses Stuart, Letters to William E. Channing, in Christian Treasury, p. 23.

when he sets himself at giving the true doctrine of the nature of Jesus, in opposition to what had grown out of the theory of emanation, which had reached the churches of Asia Minor. And when he talks so earnestly to the Colossians,[1] if it were a friend from whom one had received a letter, one would say that he was defending, while he clearly set forth the Deity of Jesus. This '*πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως*' does not escape a disintegration. "Born before every creature" is treated by confessing Socinianism, as defining Jesus, the leader of a new dispensation; and from this, Arians give him the place of the first-born of intelligent beings.[2] Our friendly tract is even more *liberal* than most Unitarian publications and offers its exegesis as follows: "The first born of all creatures"—this obviously places him first among created beings, but still one of them, who derived his being from God. Whether this means first in time, or first in dignity, or both,

[1] Ch. I., verse 15.

[2] Hodge, vol. i., p. 515.

does not at all concern the present inquiry."[1]

Almost as finely put is the following:

"'For it *pleased the Father* that in him should all fullness dwell.' This is the doctrine of St. Paul; the blessed Savior is not a common man, as some philosophers have asserted—he is the Son and Messenger of God, with divine wisdom and power, 'for in him dwelleth all the fullness of the divinity.' He is not the Supreme God, as some Christians believe, 'for it *pleased the Father* that in him should all fullness dwell,'"[2] while the first, perhaps, illustrates more successfully the audacity of this philosophy, both in translation and comment.

And when looking for Paul's idea in the pastoral epistles we read what he wrote to Titus and Timothy, we think that certainly we have risen to so clear a zone that there can be no controversy; that especially did Paul make a complete statement in the letter to Timothy, when he said: "According to the command of

[1] The Apostle Paul, A Unitarian, p. 24.
[2] Ibid.

God our Savior, even our Lord Jesus Christ,"[1] as he spoke to Titus, "of the great God our Savior Jesus Christ."[2] But a Unitarian theology enshrouds the plain meaning of this latter scripture with a haze of Idealism, in which one can not see that not one word of the context means anything unless this is to be thus translated; nor is any one able to tell whether '*τοῦ μεγάλου Θεοῦ καὶ σωτῆρος*' has any reference at all. Natural order is reversed. Winer, DeWette, and Smith advance to help us, while our little tract gives the following, as an example of clearness and sound interpretation:

"The epistle to Titus was also a charge to a minister, whom the writer exhorted to adhere to 'sound doctrine.' Does Paul address him in the manner of a Trinitarian? Far from it. He is careful to distinguish between God and Christ as two beings. 'Looking for that blessed hope and the glorious appearing of the great God, *and* our Savior Jesus Christ.' The title, Great God, is never

[1] I. Tim. i., 1.
[2] Titus, ii., 13.

applied to Jesus Christ in the Scriptures, but frequently to the Father, and to him alone."[1]

One would suppose that its genius could perform no finer feat. But in the face of the decisions of Lachmann, Tischendorf, Wetstein, Griesbach, and Trageles,[2] with that of Ellicott and Scrivener, the large testimony of learning to the retaining of *Θεός*, and that in any case "pre-existence is signified in *ἐφανερώθη*;" in the face of the internal evidence, and in the face of the evidence that, whatever the reading, it is an assertion of the Christ's Deity, the Unitarian Church sends out, as one of its missionary statements, the following, on 1 Tim. iii., 16:

"This is perfectly intelligible; the word God is not found in the original manuscripts, but has been designedly or accidently introduced into the text. It is a triumphant exclamation of the apostle—Great is the mystery of man's regeneration from sin to holiness by the gospel; he who lived among us in hu-

[1] Tract, p. 26.

[2] Hodge, vol. i., p. 518.

man form, the representative of the divine character, and the messenger of the divine will, having accomplished the purposes of his mission, was received up by God into the bosom of his glory." [1]

It thus is evident that Unitarianism is pantheistic on the one hand, by making Paul a Pantheist, and calling him a Unitarian, and on the other, by the adoption and use of principles of interpretation which, at root, are essentially pantheistic. Thus, also, we might find in the treatment of other apostolic teaching on this subject, the same spirit in interpretation,[2] yielding the same conclusion as to its tendency.

Orthodoxy is free to assert that the

[1] Tract, p. 29.

[2] Cf. especially a tract published by the Unitarian Association; also, "The Apostle Paul a Unitarian," by Samuel Barrett, and Dr. Peabody's tract (a republication from his "Lectures on Christian Doctrine"), wherein he accuses Paul of leaving his meaning in Romans ix., 5, an open question, "since" he wrote "without stops," while Mr. Stetson continues to assert that Paul's "testimony could not have been erroneous or *defective* in any important respect" (p. 3). Also Dewey, Channing, Clarke, Eliot, and Bellows, in controversial works.

doctrine of the Deity of Jesus is not entirely dependent on the mode of Scripture interpretation, nor on Bible passages of undoubted authority. The Deity of our Lord is a fact, we think, too closely related to the religion of Jesus to thus subsist on any written word.

We hold that it is clearly seen to be a necessity from any serious view of sin and the conditions which it has brought upon the whole race; and that salvation from moral evil through any real atonement for sin, is inconceivable without the postulate of our Lord's proper God-head.

We are inclined to carry forward the investigation of Unitarian theology at this point, but since we shall find sin to be etherialized into a phantom, and the atonement made a mere fancy-sketch by this same philosophy, we shall be able, without again calling particular attention to this doctrine, to see how these necessities are met, being so easily satisfied with what is a possible growth only on Pantheistic soil.

CHAPTER III.

PROVIDENCE.

"My soul wept for joy that I could still pray to God; and the joy and the weeping, and the faith on Him were my prayer." JEAN PAUL.

"Deus Naturam derigit, prout ejus leges universales, non autem prout humanae naturae particulares leges exigunt, adeoque Deus non solius humani generis, sed totius naturae rationem habet." SPINOZA.

"Lead me, Zeus and Destiny, whithersoever I am appointed to go. I will follow without wavering; even though I turn coward and shrink, I shall have to follow all the same." EPICTETUS.

Unitarianism gives no more shelter to the orthodox Providence than to the other dogmas of the Evangelical Church. From the most prosaic expounder of this theology to the most poetic of the liberalists, as representative of this fold, there is to be gathered the same protest; and, however much the radicals may differ from the conservatives on other points, the communion here is quiet and deep. One

may, therefore, as well begin with quotations from one end as from the other.

Among the pages of published Unitarianism which one has marked, passages from representative men will serve best to show the general tendency.

Mr. Frothingham must represent the present-day thought of the rationalistic wing; and all will agree that whatever else is the matter with this famous preacher, it is not indistinctness of vision or utterance. His voice seems as clear as his "sharply-cut features," and this trumpet has no uncertain sound. His rejoicing is in One such as Mr. Emerson would have us think God is. He says that, "instead of a God to fly to, as devout persons conceive, we have a God who besets us behind and before, in life's inexorable conditions, who lays his hand upon us any moment in some adaptation of our moral necessities." [1]

One has no trouble in telling just what Schelling's philosophy means at the mention of "*world-soul*," and "*the supremacy*

[1] Discourse on "The Scientific Aspect of Prayer." G. P. Putnam's Sons.

of spirit;" and we are delivered from speculating very much about the relation of these words to such words, and in fact to the general terminology of Pantheism. These all rise before us, when he talks about "an inward working of the soul by meditation upon the great adaptations that we form around us, whereby we are led to repose trustfully *in* the bosom of an *enworlded* Deity."[1] Take a toiler on some rocky life-point, who has heard of "the faith once delivered to the saints," and has a heart-experience, which alone keeps him cheerfully at a duty that so often looks like a pledge of failure, and if, after some royal feast upon the victories of his faith, one were to read to him the teachings of this minister of Jesus, that only a "faith based upon knowledge and upon loftiness of motive is a part of true religion," and this paragraph:

"For the scientific man lives by faith in this sense: faith in the integrity of Nature, the omnipresence and inviolability of law, the equivalence of forces; faith

[1] Discourse on "The Scientific Aspect of Prayer." G. P. Putnam's Sons. The italics are our own.

that 'the universe was made at one cast,' that mechanics and mathematics are the same in all worlds, that sand grains and planets obey the same kind of impulse; faith of a truly audacious and somewhat speculative sort,"[1]—while he would accept much of it, he would probably feel, that, upon the whole, either Mr. Frothingham had not read the Bible at all, or that one or the other of them had misunderstood it. So much for this wing.

From the first word, wherein he declares that "piety is not a favorite word" with him, and that he does "not use it any oftener than" he "can help," unto the last, the address of Rev. John W. Chadwick, "minister of the Second Unitarian Society in Brooklyn," "read before the National Conference of Unitarian and other Christian Churches, held at Saratoga, September 12–15, 1876," is full of interest. Its title is the "Essential Piety of Modern Science," and its devotion to law as ruler, to the exclusion of all Providence, is almost as earnestly avowed as

[1] Galaxy for October, 1876, p. 484.

is consistent with any sort of religious faith whatever. In fact, the tract savors of Pantheism before it touches Providence. He says:

"For what is piety? It is man's sense of his relation to the informing life of everything that is—the All, the Infinite, for which we have, and need to have, no better name than God." [1]

Orthodoxy thinks that there is a category behind life; and that, at all events, what is an accurate name for "life" would not define the All. Mr. Chadwick informs us that "the idea of antagonism between science and religion could never have arisen if piety could only have been true to its own genius, to its sense of universal life and our relation thereto;" [2] also that our religious thought had concentrated its sense "around these abnormal objects;" that "science diminished these," and, then as now, is occurring "the transference of piety from the formal worships, the cults of humanity to the do-

[1] "The Essential Piety of Modern Science," New York, Chas. P. Somerby, p. 6.

[2] Ibid., p. 8.

main of science and philosophy."[1] And all this is for the better; as this is one of the phases of "the essential piety of Modern Science." But Mr. Chadwick has given us a definition of science,[2] and proceeds upon such a conception of philosophy that we are to believe them very rigid and "formal." And to their confession of faith he has exultingly given up "the domain of piety." So that piety has escaped from one formalism, (and in what respect its condition was formal we have no hint) to another formalism, "substantial and indubitable." Providence, like "the fears of timid theologians," has gone forever. For what Mr. Chadwick calls science, confessedly, has no Providence; and Mr. Chadwick informs the conference "that there is that in modern scientific thought which directly fosters all those sentiments which are the life-blood of religion."[3] Certainly, then, religion has no real Providence, and, if this is so, we are ready to

[1] The Essential Piety of Modern Science, New York, Chas. P. Somerby, pp. 8, 9.

[2] Ibid., p. 8.

[3] Ibid, p. 12.

say, with the author, that "the essential piety of modern science is every day becoming more conspicuous." [1]

"What we call mercy is no afterthought of Deity; it is the constitution of the universe. Other than law, there is no name given under heaven by which men can be saved from ignorance and helplessness. It is the everlasting faithfulness. God's providence is universal. In man only is it specialized. And law is that which makes it possible for a man to foresee and so prevent disaster; foresee and so prepare for victory. All special providence is human, and the condition of its ever-widening development is the invariability of law.

"But because the special providence is human it is not, therefore, any less divine. God's arm is not shortened that *he* can not save, because there is man here at this hither end of his almighty fingertip. There is not less of the infinite life in our humanity than in the lower forms of nature; nay, but infinitely more. That

[1] The Essential Piety of Modern Science, New York, Chas. P. Somerby, p. 11.

word of Jesus, 'I and my father are one,' was not the announcement of a solitary exception, but of a constant, an invariable unity. Had he but known it, the man Judas also could have said it. The equator is an ideal line, say the geographers. The line between the human and divine is not so much as that. Or if it is—

> 'Draw, if thou canst, the mystic line
> Rightly severing His from thine,
> Which is human, which divine.' "[1]

Objections may be urged that such confessions of Pantheism do not come from the representative men of this body, and that, being used as they are in this connection, the position of the church suffers by misrepresentation.

Let us go again to one of the great names of this religious body—the son of Levi Hedge; to him, who, in 1857, brought culture, genius, and enthusiasm to the chair of Ecclesiastical History at Cambridge; who, as author, translator, orator, editor of the Christian Examiner, and as contributor to the highest of our

[1] The Essential Piety of Modern Science, New York, Chas. P. Somerby, pp. 24, 25.

literary journals, has not only had an important influence on the religious thought of his own denomination, but has been a brilliant factor in American literature, and is now one of the forces of scholarship through his constant literary activity, as well as by his relation to Harvard College. We shall escape the charge of unfairness by thus looking at the latest of the important Unitarian utterances, as also that of over-stating any doctrine by catch-quotation from this large number of essays, as use shall be made of but one, which is none the less suited to our purpose, because its philosophy underlies the volume.

We meet, at once, this statement: "the end of all study is the discovery of law, that is, of spirit, that is, of Deity in the facts studied."[1] That this is ideally true, is, upon the first sight, granted, and the Idealism in which we see it as consistent with universal fact fully justifies the following well-defined positions of the essay on the nature and grasp which law

[1] Ways of the Spirit; Essay, "The Way of History," p. 7.

has upon life and things to the exclusion of free agency. It may seem to our readers, as it does to us, that this, after all, is the shortest cut to Pantheism; a negation of Providence, by the negation of free agency in making history. Indeed, it is our experience—that here a most clearly marked route along these facts and assumptions has been made.

Dr. Hedge proceeds: "We read history to little purpose, if we read it only as a record of facts, and see in it no demonstration of Divine method. The facts themselves are not truly apprehended unless we see them in the light of some principle or law which they illustrate." [1]

Method, then, is the goal, not a discovery of what this Divine is, in His attributes, and in the "habitation of His throne"; but, as illustrative of these, the method is

[1] Ways of the Spirit; Essay, "The Way of History," p. 8. It ought to be noticed in this connection, that the human mind does not skip so important a step in growth as lies between this utterance and the less objectionable, but, of course, earlier writings of Dr. Hedge, which fact will appear by taking, for example, the Idealist's point of view in the Christian Examiner, July, 1866, first article.

all. We are to get significance from facts "in the light of some principle or law which they illustrate." Whence this interpretive illumination, and how shall we find the significance of the principle? Leaving these questions, let us find the meaning of the facts of "the Battle of Actium," in Roman history. Dr. Hedge has cited it as an example.[1]

"I read that the forces of Octavius met those of Antonius in the Ambracian Gulf, and obtained a signal victory over them. What signifies that fact to me? What do I know of Roman history, if all I gather from it is that Octavius was the better general, or the luckier man of the two? The real fact has escaped me, if I fail to perceive its historic import. It was not valor nor luck, but historic necessity, that triumphed in that encounter. It was necessary that democracy should replace aristocratic oligarchy, like that of republican Rome. It was necessary that democratic anarchy should be replaced by an imperial head. Octavius represents in that conflict the Latin

[1] Ways of the Spirit; Essay, "The Way of History," p. 8.

or popular element in Roman history. Antonius represents the Sabine patrician. The internal history of the Roman Republic, and especially that of the previous century, had been a conflict of these two elements, the former seeking to disengage itself from the latter. The Battle of Actium was the consummation of that struggle. With the triumph of Octavius—*qui cuncta discordiis civilibus fessa nomine principis sub imperium accepit*[1]—democracy came to a head, Latin civility came to maturity, and in its turn became the matrix of its successor in empire,—the Christian Church."

We think that not only is Dr. Hedge right in saying, "An objection may be raised against the doctrine of historic necessity, on the score of human free-will," but that his treatment of the objection is, from a Scriptural and scientific point of view, singularly fallacious; while, from a Pantheistic point of view, it is singularly clear and faithful. For, to the questioner, he says: "The conduct of history lies in the hands of human

[1] Tacitus.

free agents. A glance at the course of events shows us that those revolutions which have furnished the materials and given the direction to history, have been the work of individuals following the impulse of their own wills. How, then, can we affirm them to be the operation of a law? or how can history, conducted by free will, be a necessary process? If one looks at the matter *a priori*, it seems *a priori* improbable that the destinies of humanity should be committed to individual caprice, or that able and designing men should shape the world according to their whim. But what is the fact? Free agency acts under given conditions, and those conditions are contained in the natural order of things. There is no more escape from that order in the moral world than in the physical. All the motions on the earth's surface, however arbitrary and contrary one to another, obey the parent motion of the earth, and are swept along in the spheral march. So all possible movements of the human will are comprehended in the providential sweep of the parent will which

works in each. The contradiction between freedom and necessity, so perplexing in the sphere of private life, disappears in the large dynamic of history. There freedom and necessity are seen to be different factors of one movement,—freedom the human, necessity the divine. The highest freedom is the strongest necessity, as, in chemistry, those affinities which are termed elective are precisely the most determined. Says Kant: "Whatever notion, in a metaphysical point of view, we may form to ourselves of the freedom of the will, its manifestation—*i. e.*, human actions—like every other natural event, is determined by general laws of Nature."[1]

To the eye of sense, "the river windeth at its own sweet will," but reflection knows that the valley through which it winds has been scooped by the action of unchangeable laws; and, in human life, all freedom that succeeds is free occupation of appointed paths. The course

[1] Zur Philosophie der Geschichte; Idee zu einer Allgemeinen Geschichte in Weltbürgerlichen Absicht.

of destiny is the providential channel in which human freedom elects to run. Accordingly, the great men of history—the history-makers—are the "providential men;" they are those, in the language of Hegel, "whose private purposes contain the substance of that which is willed by the spirit of the world."[1] They may not be aware of their providential function; they may not contemplate all the results they are used to effect; the ulterior consequences of their free action may not come within the scope of their design: the consequences follow none the less."[2]

Dr. Hedge is beyond criticism in the expression of his thoughts, and we can only deal with the thought as we get it. He has such an admirable style, that one can not mistake what he means, and it is so forceful that his reader is left with an abiding impression that he means just what he says. That this is a denial of Providence, in any thoroughly safe view of the thing so denominated, is, there-

[1] Philosophie der Geschichte.

[2] Ways of the Spirit, p. 11.

fore, evident. It is the doctrine stated and disproved by a Unitarian theologian, and that, with a wealth of illustration and historic allusion borne along on his clear Idealism like waves of starlight on a mountain stream. It is more—the preaching of Pantheism, and the binding of the burden of the discourse to his hearer by one of the most consistent sayings of a better-known Pantheist than even the illustrious speaker himself. His would-be apology to the human consciousness for this treatment he has given to free agency is a beautiful plea for the attention while he wrests liberty from the human will. We must accept his metaphors and similes, whether we accept his theology or not; and an illustration must be judged of as suited to its work, as a vehicle, and not as a dogma. His use of "the course of destiny," and "providential channel," and "human freedom," is a brilliant throw of the dice, but of a "dice loaded" with a denial of Providence.

To think of "human freedom," "electing" "to run" into such prepared val-

leys as Dr. Hedge finds before every great movement in history, is a task equaled only by attempting to conceive the idea of "the free occupation of appointed paths." It is not our task to discuss the idea of free agency in particular; but, if it were, we should not be able to find, in the literature of fatalism, such other accounts of fatalistic liberty, and of freedom conditioned into necessity; nor would we be able to discover another such interesting study as the harmonization of such antagonistic passages as these: "Liberty is not an original but an acquired possession; not an accident, but a product, —the product of reflection, of legislation, of scientific adjustment; in a word, the product of the State."[1] "Come, Longobards and Franks, from the depths of the Odenwald and Black Forest!—come, pour your fresh life into withered humanity; revive the perished world or bury it!"[2]

The entire essay seems to be an indirect effort (and it is, indeed, a successful

[1] Ways of the Spirit, p. 20.
[2] Ibid., p. 31.

one) to prove that a denial of Providence leads to Pantheism. One can hardly rise from this well-studied effort, without running over a full synopsis of the argument lying like a river-bed underneath its burden.

Deprive God of His holiness, and His personal character, as an object of human worship, is gone; and a denial of His providence, if any idea is attached to the word, is always a denial of His holiness. For, if God, the Omnipotent, be holy, then, indeed, is the universe rolling in a holy orbit, to a holy purpose. Surely, also, when sinful free agency lifts up its arms against it, it disturbs the crystallizing idea; and, as surely as God is holy, and His providence can counteract such results, He, by His providence, will maintain the integrity of His holy purpose.

Now when the "eternal, not ourselves, that makes for righteousness" does not make for righteousness; and when thus the very indefinite terminology of Idealism fails to give any idea of Him, we take the next step into the "higher Pantheism" (which is not far from the "lower Pantheism"), and we ask, if He is not "the

eternal, not ourselves, that makes for righteousness," what is He? "The stream of tendency by which all things fulfill the law of their being." But "tendency" to what? Certainly to nothing but Himself. So that not above nor beneath, but in everything and of everything is "the eternal, not ourselves, that makes for righteousness," while wickedness sits on thrones, sin curses, and the tears flow. What mercy is it that does not reach the race of men? What but an idea of a God is an attribute like Faithfulness, Omnipotence, Love, or Omniscience, when no human worship finds it? Surely extremes meet. God's law is always impersonal, if this rationalistic account of Him, through "His Method," be true; and Pantheism and Transcendentalism are at one in a universe controlled by impersonal law; where, instead of God's method, we have the method of God.

Having heard what the present-day Unitarian has to say about Providence, and having seen his treatment of this doctrine founded on an active Transcendentalism, as well as the obvious fact

that it is possible only on Pantheistic grounds—in fact, being brought here by Unitarianism, we are ready to see what sort of providence, if any, God has.

With Mr. Frothingham, we say: "Mr. Emerson, we find ourselves continually appealing to him as the finest interpreter of the transcendental movement."[1] And Mr. Emerson must state the matter in his own words, while others interpose. In his eye man stands to receive his education from out of eternity, and if the old have nothing else to give, "As soon as he needs a new object suddenly he beholds it."[2] He might adopt the whole song of John Burroughs'—"Waiting:"

"Serene I fold my hands and wait,
Nor care for wind, nor tide nor sea;
I rave no more 'gainst time or fate,
For lo! my own shall come to me.

I stay my haste, I make delays!
For what avails this eager pace?
I stand amid the eternal ways,
And what is mine shall know my face.

What matter if I stand alone?
I wait with joy the coming years.

[1] Transcendentalism in New England, p. 142.
[2] Works, vol. i, p. 544.

My heart shall reap where it has sown,
And garner up its fruit of tears.

The waters know their own and draw
The brook that springs in yonder heights;
So flows the good with equal law
Unto the soul of pure delights.

Yon floweret nodding in the wind
Is ready plighted to the bee;
And, maiden, why that look unkind?
For lo! thy lover seeketh thee.

The stars come nightly to the sky,
The tidal wave unto the sea;
Nor time, nor space, nor deep, nor high,
Can keep my own away from me." [1]

Well, indeed, has Mr. Joel Benton said that this breathes a sentiment which is "born of the same Transcendental quality as that which animates Mr. Wasson's rare lyric of 'All 's Well,' though it is molded in a quite different form, and can stand bravely alone." It is clear that both are so closely united to the spirit of Idealism as it appeared in 1842, that with such song-power and so fine imagination as belong to either the author of "Wake-

[1] Scribner's Monthly, Jan., 1877, In which the author of the article from which this is copied makes some very appreciative criticism of Mr. Emerson and other Transcendentalists, p. 340.

Robin" or that of "The Plover," one might paraphrase Emerson, Thoreau, or Alcott, into these verses. Any one at all familiar with either of these, and especially with the first, who is certainly the greatest, as well as the most representative of the three, will fall to quoting such passages as these, whose number is legion :

"A man who is united with his thought conceives magnificently of himself. He is conscious of a universal success, even though bought by uniform particular failures." [1]

"My friends have come to me unsought. The great God gave them to me."[2]

"Throb thine with nature's throbbing breast,
And all is clear f om East to West.
Spirit that lurks each form within
Beckons to spirit of its kin ;
Self-kindled every atom glows
And hints the future which it owes." [3]

[1] Vol. i., Works, Essay on Friendship, p. 320.

[2] Ibid, pp. 318, 319.

[3] Prologue to Essay on Nature, vol. i., p. 503. This is from one of the Sacred Books of Modern Tran-

And, then, "the face of 'this' eternal nature teaches" us a "lesson." "We miscreate over our own evils." "Our life might be much easier and simple than we make it." "We interfere with the optimism of nature; for, whenever we get the vantage ground of the past, or of a wiser mind in the present, we are able to discern that we are begirt with laws which execute themselves."

So "nature would not have us fret and fume."

"There is a soul at the center of nature, and over the will of every man, so that none of us can wrong the universe." "The whole course of things goes to teach us faith; we need only obey."

Looking especially at this "rare lyric," "All 's Well;" one reads Wasson,

> "Thy painter, Fancy, hath not force,
> To show how sweet it is to be,"

scendentalism, and this from the Sacred Book of Ancient Transcendentalism—The Prem Ságar.

> "Whatever man's destiny may be,
> His mind is changed accordingly;
> With his heart in union blends,
> And thus come God's appointed ends."
>
> Alger's Poetry of the Orient.

and sees Emerson make "badness" look bad, because "absolute badness is absolute death"—that is, non-being.

One's being is all. Mr. Emerson told the divinity students—"That is always best which gives me to myself." "That which shows God out of me makes me a wart and a wen. There is no longer any necessary reason for my being." "Virtue consists in a perpetual substitution of *being* for *seeming*, and with sublime propriety God is described as saying, I AM." "The lesson which these observations convey is, Be and not seem." And thus to the end, the identity of sight and point of view is evident, where Transcendentalism overleaps itself, and becomes tangible in its Pantheism, and which [1] Mr.

[1] Take this with Mr. Cranch's poetic treatment of what is truly an important question: "Tell me, brothers, what are we?" (quoted by Mr. Frothingham, p. 146) and we are almost, if not quite, ready to sit "in the gazelle groves near Benares," under the ministrations of Sâkya Muni, until we shall joyfully pass from out the Sansara into the Nirvâna. This is, in fact, the very sweetest expression of Buddhism we know of this side of Asia. It certainly possesses the full-orbed dogma.

"If the special character of this deliverance be in-

Wasson has put into the following form :

"All mine is thine, the sky-soul saith;
The wealth I am must those become;
Richer and richer, breath by breath,
Immortal gain, immortal room.
And since all his
Mine also is,
Life's gift outruns my fancies far,
And drowns the dream
In larger stream,
As morning drinks the morning-star."

vestigated, we find it summed up in the word Nirvăna—'extinction,' 'blowing out.' Such was the supreme felicity of the Buddha; such the goal to which he ever pointed the aspirations of his followers. It was formerly disputed whether more is meant by the expression Nirvána than 'eternal quietude.' unbroken sleep,' 'impenetrable apathy,' but the oldest literature of Buddhism will scarcely suffer us to doubt that Gautama intended by it nothing short of absolute 'annihilation,' the destruction of all elements which constitute existence." (Hardwick, Christ and Other Masters, pt. ii., p. 60.)

This, of course, is the blossom of Transcendentalism; and if Idealism, "as it appears in 1842," has, in this note of its music, struck any sound at all, it is the resultant of such a spiritual philosophy as animates the Broad Church and Unitarian Theology in our day. Pantheism once, Pantheism forever; and the denial of our Lord's proper divinity, the denial of the miraculous and the supernatural, the burial

Poor Providence has been lost long ago in all this explanatory array of record. No room for such an existence in this life, and one looks into the future, but through the lens of Transcendentalism, arranged with reference to the tube of this law—a whole can not be different from the sum of all its parts—and there is no Providence there. Cranch, the

of Providence beneath law, and that of the Holy Ghost as a Person, are possible only on such a system of world principles, while the literature will be, as it ever has been (see concluding chapter), identical with that of the Buddhist and Brahminical schools.

It will be noticed that there are two sides to this idea so felicitously thrown into verse by Mr. Cranch. There is, one may claim, an apotheosis of man into collective humanity or into God, If such be granted as the case, it is a new outburst of the oldest principle of Brahminism:

"You will not," continues the Brahmin speaker in the dialogue, "accept the term *void* as an adequate description of the mysterious nature of the soul, but . . . you will clearly apprehend soul (in the final state) to be unseen and ungrasped being, thought, knowledge, and joy, no other than very God." (Williams, Christianity and Hinduism, quoted by Dr. Mozeley, Miracles, pp. 92, 284.)

most graceful poet of Transcendentalism, gives poetic expression to this fact:

> "We, like parted drops of rain,
> Swelling till they melt and run,
> Shall be all absorbed again,
> Melting, flowing into one."[1]

If one bemoans himself of the loss, Mr. Emerson is the comforter at the sadness, and tells what each of us can be, and ought to be, without it. This must have been, to use his phraseology, either "the god of tradition" or "the God of rhetoric" (and why one is better entitled to the capital we do not know), or both, for he says: "When we have broken our

[1] "Knowing," Whittier's Songs of Three Centuries:

This is Transcendentalism, the soul of the Unitarian theology, nearly nineteen centuries after Christ; and the following is Transcendentalism, an almost dateless period before Christ, in which, if we are in spirit with this latest song, our more devoted feelings will find expression:

> "Let us in silent adoration yearn
> After the God-head—TRUE SUN—evermore;
> Who all illumes, who creates all o'er,
> From whom we came, *to whom all must return;*
> Whom we invoke to guide our minds and feet
> In our slow progress towards his holy seat."
>
> *Alger's Poetry of the Orient.*

god of tradition, and ceased from our God of rhetoric, then may God fire the heart with his presence."[1] Consolingly and in an admonitory, as well as hortatory tone, he continues:

"It inspires in man an infallible trust. He has not the conviction, but the sight, that the best is the true, and may in that thought easily dismiss all particular uncertainties and fears, and adjourn to the sure revelation of time, the solution of his private riddles. He is sure that his welfare is dear to the heart of being. In the presence of law to his mind, he is overflowed with a reliance so universal, that it sweeps away all cherished hopes and the most stable projects of mortal condition in its flood. He believes that he can not escape from his good. The things that are really for thee gravitate to thee. You are running to seek your friend. Let your feet run, but your mind need not. If you do not find him, will you not acquiesce that it is best you should not find him? for there is a power, which, as it is in you, is in him also, and could, there-

[1] Essay, "The Oversoul," p. 369, vol. i.

fore, very well bring you together, if it were for the best. You are preparing with eagerness to go and render a service to which your talent and your taste invite you, the love of men and the hope of fame. Has it not occurred to you that you have no right to go, unless you are equally willing to be prevented from going? O, believe, as thou livest, that every sound that is spoken over the round world, which thou oughtest to hear, will vibrate on thine ear! Every proverb, every book, every by-word that belongs to thee for aid or comfort, shall surely come home through open or winding passages. Every friend whom not thy fantastic will, but the great and tender heart in thee craveth, shall lock thee in his embrace. And this, because the heart in thee is the heart of all; not a valve, not a wall, not an intersection is there anywhere in nature, but one blood rolls uninterruptedly an endless circulation through all men, as the water of the globe is all one sea, and, truly seen, its tide is one."[1]

Jesus, who, at times, is very high in

[1] Vol. i, pp. 369, 370.

Mr. Emerson's estimation,[1] would have us believe that even the hairs of our heads are numbered; that no sparrow falls to the ground unnoticed; and that any sparrow is not only noticed, but that a divine account is made of it.[2] Mr. Emerson would say, *yes*, to all this, leaving such a long-drawn interrogation-point thereafter, that, if we accept what he has given, the darkest night of our grief is unillumined by a single such thought; though some angel, like that one at the bush, ought, perhaps, to remark the identity of Manhood and God-head, when man is true to himself, and that with God, as with a real man, it is true:

> "Work of his hand
> He ne'er commends or grieves;
> Pleads for itself the fact;
> As unrepenting nature leaves
> Her every act."[3]

Mr. Emerson, long ago, graduated from the primary instruction of Schleiermacher, whereat faith in religion means faith in a

[1] Vol. i, pp. 286, 301, 297, 247, 470, 473, 371, 544, 542.

[2] Matt. x., 29.

[3] Vol. i., p. 460.

"feeling of dependence upon the Absolute;"[1] and he has so far forgotten this early training that he can not think of the future of religion as essentially different from that of science.[2] Indeed, his preaching is not reliance on the Infinite, but self-reliance. To quote proof of this would be to quote all he has written. Now, how is this possible, one would say, and the answer would most assurantly attempt to satisfy us with Pantheism. If reliance on self is enough, then there is, so far as this connection is concerned, no need of God. Certainly, too, God is not, if He be a mere accident or unnecessary. Emerson stops us here before we have time to mention that Pantheism is the only shore possible, unless it be Atheism, and says:

[1] Thompson, Theolg of Christ, p. 118.

[2] He says, in his concluding address to the Divinity students: "I look for the new teacher that shall follow so far these shining laws, that he shall see them come full circle, shall see their rounding and complete grace, shall see the world to be the mirror of the soul, shall see the identity of the law of gravitation with purity of heart, and shall show that the Ought, that Duty is one thing with Science, with Beauty and with Joy.' Vol. i, p. 81.

"Ineffable is the union of man and God in every act of the soul. The simplest person, who in his integrity worships God, becomes God; yet for ever and ever the influx of this better and universal self is new and unsearchable."[1]

"The soul gives itself, alone, original, and pure, to the Lonely, Original, and Pure, who, on that condition, gladly inhabits, leads, and speaks through it. Then is it glad, young, and nimble. It is not wise, but it sees through all things. It is not called religious, but it is innocent. It calls the light its own, and feels that the grass grows and the stone falls by a law inferior to, and dependent on, its nature. Behold, it saith, I am born into the great, the universal mind. I, the imperfect, adore my own Perfect. I am somehow receptive of the great soul, and thereby I do overlook the sun and the stars, and feel them to be the fair accidents and effects which change and pass. More and more the surges of everlasting nature enter into me, and I become public and human in my regards and actions.

[1] Vol. i, page 269.

So come I to live in thoughts, and act with energies, which are immortal."[1]

Because of these facts, what could be more ridiculous than prayer. Yet, strangely, Mr. Emerson would have us say, it is something. It is not what we thought it was, no more than God is what He seems to be, and especially to us, yet, like God, the word *prayer* has a significance. It is to his mind in sublime propriety that God should be described as I AM,[2] and just as properly prayer may be said to *be*.

He says: "Prayer looks abroad and asks for some foreign addition to come through some foreign virtue, and loses itself in endless mazes of natural and supernatural, and mediatorial and miraculous. Prayer that craves a particular commodity—anything less than all good—is vicious. Prayer is the contemplation of the facts of life from the highest point of view. It is the soliloquy of a beholding and jubilant soul. It is the spirit of God pronouncing his works good. But prayer

[1] Vol. i, p. 371.
[2] Vol. i, p. 291.

as a means to effect a private end is meanness and theft." [1]

And while Emerson cries, "Insist on yourself," [2] Jesus says: "Believe on me;" and as Jesus instructs His disciple how to pray, Emerson informs us that "prayers are a disease of the will." [3] One is the wail of Pantheism through a silver trumpet; the other is the music of Heaven from out the lips of Deity.

Now, to prove this to be Transcendentalism or Pantheism, would be simply to re-state it; yet one wonders how the ascent was made. Mr. Emerson has kindly given us so much of his mental biography that he who runs may read. Here is not an explanation of the way; but see! there goes Mr. Emerson out of Unitarian philosophy, by way of Idealism, as it appeared in 1842, into Pantheism!

"The soul is the perceiver and revealer of truth. We know truth when we see it, let skeptic and scoffer say what they

[1] Vol. i., pp. 256, 257.
[2] Ibid., p. 259.
[3] Ibid., p. 257.

choose. Foolish people ask you, when you have spoken what they do not wish to hear, 'How do you know it is truth, and not an error of your own?' We know truth when we see it, from opinion, as we know when we are awake that we are awake. It was a grand sentence of Emanuel Swedenborg, which would alone indicate the greatness of that man's perception,—'It is no proof of a man's understanding to be able to confirm whatever he pleases; but to be able to discern that what is true is true, and that what is false is false, this is the mark and character of intelligence.' In the book I read, the good thought returns to me, as every truth will, the image of the whole soul. To the bad thought which I find in it, the same soul becomes a discerning, separating sword, and lops it away. We are wiser than we know. If we will not interfere with our thought, but will act entirely, or see how the thing stands in God, we know the particular thing, and everything, and every man. For the Maker of all things and all persons stands be-

hind us, and casts his dread omniscience through us over things."[1]

[1] Vol. i., p. 363.

Mr. Frothingham's philosophy gets poetical in his prayers, Mr. Stedman informs us; and one wonders if the "ask and receive" of Jesus has ever been read to the Masonic Hall congregation. Mr. Stedman says, that "in prayer the speaker's voice rises in an invocation to the Supreme Source of Law and Goodness—an address, which is an aspiration, a poem of reverence, worship, and acknowledgment, but never, by any chance, a petition to a listening Ruler for gifts, protection, or other personal and special benefits." Galaxy, October, 1876. See the "address" there given, as a specimen.

PART II.

THE ATONEMENT.

"*If John was perfect, why are you and I alive? As long as any man exists, there is some need of him; let him fight for his own.*

—R. W. EMERSON.

"δράσαντι παθεῖν
τριγέρων μῦθος τάδε φωνεῖ."

—ÆSCHYLUS.

"πρίν πᾶσαν μνηστῆρας ὑπερβασιην ἀποτῖσαι."

"*The Gods themselves, in virtue, honor, strength,*
Excelling thee, may yet be mollified;
For they, when mortals have transgress'd or failed
To do aright, by sacrifice and prayer,
Libations, and burnt offerings, may be soothed.
Prayers are the daughters of immortal Jove;
But halt and wrinkled, and of feeble sight.
They plod in Ate's track; while Ate, strong
And swift of foot, outstrips their laggard pace,
And, dealing woe to man, o'er all the earth
Before them flies: they, following, heal her wounds.
Him who with honor welcomes their approach,
They greatly aid, and hear him when he prays.
But who rejects and sternly casts them off,
To Saturn's son they go, and make their prayer,
That Ate may pursue him, and that he,
By her chastised, may for his guilt atone.
Then to the daughters of immortal Jove,
Do thou, Achilles, show the like respect,
That many another brave man's heart hath swayed."

—HOMER.

PART II.

CHAPTER I.

A GENERAL STATEMENT.

"Nun was du, Herr, erduldet, ist alles meine Last,
Ich hab' es selbst verschuldet, was du getragen hast."

PAUL GERHARDT.

"To be a finite being is no crime, and to be the infinite is not to be a creditor. As man was not consulted, he does not find himself a party in a bargain, but a child in the household of Love. Reconciliation, therefore, is not the consequence of paying a debt, or procuring atonement for an injury, but an organic process of the human life." JOHN WEISS.

"The divine bards are the friends of my virtue, of my intellect, of my strength. They admonish me that the gleams which flash across my mind are not mine, but God's; that they had the like, and were not disobedient to the heavenly vision. So I love them. Noble provocations go out from them, inviting me to resist evil; to subdue the world; and to Be. And thus by his holy thoughts, Jesus serves us, and thus only." R. W. EMERSON.

The atonement is a fact, which, if it exist, has such an intimate and organic re-

lationship to God's government and human happiness as that it would appear impossible to hide it under a false interpretation of scripture, or to make it a negation by the agencies of metaphor and simile. Such, however, is the universal infusion of an Idealism which has either formulated itself in, or in any theological analysis reduces to Unitarianism, that no doctrine is so despoiled of its simple grandeur, nor is any dogma, upon which, confessedly, so much hangs, made so utterly incapable of effort or result.

It ought to be noted as one of the most evident results of observation, that the philosophy which has all along animated the Broad Church party, and which glows in the strong appeals of the self-termed Liberal Schools, expressing itself with no uncertain sound in the "Essays and Reviews"—is as Unitarian in its God-head, in fact, as are the sermons of Theodore Parker in confession.[1]

It may also be said, that, since any philosophy, which, either by its own

[1] See Dr. Pope's excellent Introduction to Winer's Confessions of Christendom. p. LXXI.

confession or with a denial of any intention to annul its own protests, leaves us with what is no more than an abstraction, by dethroning Jesus Christ, must be adequate to the performance of its own feats: and, since the feats are such as we have noted, it is perfectly able to make such a disposition of the facts of the atonement, to secure ends which require the God-man, as renders it either impotent or impossible. It is not much of a task to make His acts valueless, and even ordinary, when the strongest expressions of His life are treated with such principles. If His life, as He saw it, was an illusion, much more is its divinest transactions susceptible of being classed with fancy's sketches and the poems of a highly imaginative race. Realism has at least some demands, but such a philosophy urges only in vain, as Idealism seizes this stupendous fact to etherealize it into a myth, or transform it into a dream. Thus it is that the richness of the forces embodied in the doctrine of the atonement and its results, has been enough to explain

the large literature of all sorts concerning it.

Looking into these products, which oftentimes hint the most dogmatic expressions of this school of philosophy, as well as by their terminology suggest an inward relationship to the Higher Pantheism, one is most interested in the numerous active protests which are given, and the constant denial, which, by such means, is made, of any intention to do harm. This large-souled philanthropy seems to have caught the spirit of the time, at least in this, that a full advertisement is to be made. Indeed, what is manly ignorance often disgraces itself by such an assumption of authority as defies respect, and defeats its own efforts. Passages without number might be quoted, which, by their incongruity, have raised many a smile from the sober readers of this theology. Not more sensible is one of this incongruity when Mr. Mathew Arnold tries to help the Infinite Personality out of the hands of bad writers of dogma, or when taking this philosophy into this field again, where its armor shines with

ten-fold splendor, demurely says, he is trying to save religion from the clutches of Mr. Bradlaugh by taking it out of the hands of the Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol—than when Dr. Hedge talks of "progress" in editing the "Essays and Reviews," or when Mr. Haweis and Mr. Brooke preach about the "nineteenth century," and the Dean of Westminister and Dr. Farrar elaborately explain the true sacrifice of Christ and eternal damnation. So close does all this protesting come to excess, that we can only think of a clown playing tricks while he cuts the windpipes of his admirers.

We take it, that while this general statement of facts may be inadequate on other grounds, that there is such a relationship between the Broad Church, the Unitarian Church, and Mr. Arnold's rather unsuccessful band of Pantheologists, as needs no proof. The fraternity, as a fact, of this literature is full and free; and while the late volumes of sermons are from another point of view, they seem none the less exposed to the criticism which is to be urged against the books of

Mathew Arnold—namely, they are born of a bad philosophy, ignorance of the subject, bad reasoning, or the spirit of the demagogue. With the principles of the Idealist on the doctrine of the atonement, as represented by either of these sections of thought, one may get ready for differences radical and important, as soon as it is agreed that Jesus had anything at all to do with the affair. But the question is as to that philosophy of things, and that theory of the universe upon which these ideas are based.

Idealism does not profess to much of scientific accuracy. However, Mr. Frothingham would have us think that when, in 1842, it was called "Transcendentalism," it had "a creed, and a very definite one."[1] But this is the opinion of a disciple rather than that of an apostle, which we accept, as must theological history, if he means that it was so definite in its results that its energy is unmistakable. As related to this general view which we are taking in this chapter, it will be noted that it is not strange that we find theo-

[1] Transcendentalism in New England, pp. 134, 136.

logical scholarship thus expressing itself with respect to the impossibility of making, for the benefit of people who have some fragments of orthodoxy clinging to them, any intermediate classification:

Prof. Smeaton, with all kindly sympathy for those who have such trouble in finding their position, mentions it as a problem he cannot solve—the making a fresh category for them, "partly," he says, "because a Trinitarian, such as Mr. Maurice and Mr. Davies, finds a place among the opponents of the Vicarious satisfaction, only by extreme inconsistency; partly because the supporters of this second opinion uniformly allow a veil to rest upon their Trinitarianism at this point; and partly because, in this matter, they Socinianize, and can not be sundered from the sentiments and opinions of the school with which they symbolize."[1]

It is a very easy matter to identify, by a quotation of the literature, the fundamental principles of these several schools of thought, which oppose the orthodox

[1] Our Lord's Doctrine of the Atonement, p. 476. Appendix.

and scriptural idea of the satisfaction of the death of Jesus Christ. It is a task as easy as the mere copying itself, to show that the spirit of the leading school is self-definded and self-asserted Idealism.

No restatement of the views of Frederic D. Maurice in the full light of authoritative Unitarian thought, on this topic, as given to the world in the tract of Dr. Furness, or in the admiring enthusiam of Dr. Noyes, is necessary to show their outward similarity and their inward identity to this philosophy. So clear is this to the historian of the subject that the work of distinguishing them has not been undertaken.

When, therefore, we find a Unitarian periodical analyzing the views of Mr. Maurice, and expressing itself in broad generalities, we set ourselves to the pleasant task of informing ourselves on the opinions of the school containing the reviewer and the reviewed, touching itself. And we think that if other people have any doubts about the Idealism of this school, it is manifest that the school itself has none, and the following is the opinion

the Christian Examiner, when in cautious hands, had of this teacher:

"He writes never in the clear, 'dry light' of science, always in the suffused and mellow light of imagination, sentiment, and conscience. He loves to melt away the edges of our sharp, dogmatic theories; and shows us the thought, as physiologists study the living organism, in solution and in germ. So he is more suggestive than instructive, and piques more curiosity than he satisfies. Always widening the horizon of our vision, he shows the object we view in the flickering, uncertain light, and in the strong refraction, that belong to the dividing-line of sky and earth. His style affects the soft, dim haze that seems to envelop his thought; and the hard, swift, positive habit of mind we are all fallen into is impatient at sentences and chapters written in a sort of unvarying potential mood."[1]

This is, indeed, as entertaining a piece of description as can be found; and its accuracy can not be dobuted. It comes

[1] Christian Examiner, January, 1867, p. 115.

with the authority of truth, while it is an expression of self-consciousness.

Another example, among so many, may be pointed to, as suggestive. And what is more suggestive, at any time, than self-assertion? In the review of Dr. Bushnell's "The Vicarious Sacrifice," by Dr. James Freeman Clarke, there is no predilection toward Transcendentalism, as the writer himself is as little afflicted, and has been, as any of the first spirits of the Unitarian Church. But there is a free expression of admiration for the work of Dr. Bushnell. Dr. Clarke says of it:

"It is the first manly, frank, declaration from the Orthodox side that the whole Orthodox creed on this subject is empty. It takes its stand, not on tradition, not on Scripture, not on the expediences of technical religion, but on the 'broad stone of honor,' the eternal instincts of right, of truth, of noble purpose, of manly generosity."[1]

Turning back a few pages we have this:

"We are amazed at his transcendental ethics, in part 3, chap. 1, in which the theo-

[1] Christian Examiner, May, 1866, p. 377.

logical muse takes a loftier *à-priori* flight than we have ever happened to observe outside of the vast abstractions of the Gnostics. It passes the flaming bounds of place and time, and reasons downward from what God might have been, till it arrives at last at what God is. It imagines what would happen to the Diety if He were to cast off moral restraint, and conceives that the shock 'would shiver the integrity of his mold, and leave him a wreck of eternal incapacity.' It tells us how God came to regard himself as elected to be Ruler, and how, when he found that moral creatures had broken the law, he instituted a government for them. So that, while our guide is thus moving before us, with supreme dominion, through the azure depths of these speculative heavens, we seem to be present at a convention called to make a constitution for the moral universe, and to be reading an indicted chapter of the book of Genesis.

"But it must, by no means, be supposed that these freaks of fancy, or flights of

transcendental metaphysics make the chief substance of the essay."[1]

So natural is it for one, who, because of an instinctive fear of the principles which give tendency to the Unitarianism of the time, lives near the line where conservative Unitarianism and Orthodoxy lie against each other, to declare the genius of his faith and outline its flight in a freer air. Certainly it would be unfair to doubt the Idealism of such literature, and then, taking these writers at their word, we may be enabled better to understand them.

From the innumerable declarations of this school of thought on this subject, which form a large portion of its utterance, one ought to select the words of at least an accredited writer; and, so, avoiding the use of a large pile of excerpts on the same topic, we select Dr. James Martineau, to give us some definitive notion of the principles which, lying at the root of Unitarian theology, determine the lines of the various dogmas, and especially those views of that doctrine

[1] Ibid, p. 373.

whose horizon, in fact and in theory, is as large as eternity—the atonement.

And Dr. Martineau believes "the prerogative of reason to apply itself to the interior as well as the exterior of revelation;" and so thoroughly does he believe this, that, with special reference to the doctrine of the Trinity and the doctrine of the Atonement, is he "prepared to maintain that if they were in the Bible, they would still be incredible; and that the natural improbability of a tenet is not to be set aside as a forbidden topic, but to be weighed as an essential part of the evidence which must determine its acceptance or rejection."[1] This is quoted here as a conservative utterance, and that this body may not suffer by misrepresentation. It is quoted for the reason that it may declare, in such unmistakable and forcible terms, the fundamental idea of this theology—which is at war with all true rules of interpretation, as acquired from the word of God, or, from the nature of things—seen to be necessary to the evolution of Christian doctrine, and in

[1] Rationale of Religious Enquiry, 2d. ed. pp. 70, 72.

particular, to the discovery of that doctrine which has so much to suggest and assert of the guilt of man, of the littleness of his plans of salvation, and of the erroneous idea, that, defiled with iniquity and warped by sin, he is able to apply tests to the utterances of Jehovah, and pass upon the rectitude of Almighty God.

It is most unnecessary to say that it is Idealism in interpretation of scripture; and it is scarcely needful to add that vegetation growing upon such a soil can not fail to portray, in a form conditioned by the laws about it, its genius and life. In fact, we doubt if this phase of Idealism has had in all the history of philosophy, so clear an exposition as this, standing in very decided contrast to the saying of Hiliary and sound thought—"he is the best reader who expects to obtain sense from the words, rather than imposes it upon them; and who carries away more than he brought; nor forces that upon the words which he had resolved to understand before he began to read;"[1] and it is certain that one who admits all that

[1] De Trinitate, Bk. 8, p. 25.

such an Idealism as this supposes and authenticates shall have no clearness of eye to behold the Lamb of God taking away the sins of the World. There is no stopping place at the last verse of the Revelation; the soul with conscience and the literature of things has no barrier between it and such a sweeping current. But why stop to prove that it is Idealism? Simply, in order that, both by admission and the evident relation of facts to each other, we may be able to look at its results in this connection, and that a large quotation and an elaborate treatment of false scripture interpretation may be avoided.

Without enlarging our little volume to re-publish much that it were well for sound theism if it had never been published, and, as preparatory to our work in succeeding chapters, we assert that the doctrine of the atonement, as held by the Unitarian church, in the various forms, has one system of principles as fundamental, and upon which alone it is possible—Idealism; and that not only because, as a general proposition, it is true

that "the logical consequences" of such "Idealism are found in the pantheistic theory of the universe,"[1] but, because of special relationships thereto, is such doctrine of the atonement another form of Pantheism.

[1] Dr. Henry B. Smith's Faith and Philosophy, p. 211.

CHAPTER II.

THE EXISTENCES INTERESTED IN THE ATONEMENT—GOD.

"Fiat justitia, pereat mundus."

"I have only one passion and that is himself, himself." COUNT ZINZENDORF.

The proof of such a statement must be given in outline only, or in folios; and it is impossible to give it in outline except by a thorough classification of matter and a somewhat systematic treatment.

We take it, that the doctrine of the atonement has reference to and power upon all our ideas of four existences, God the Father, Jesus Christ the Son, the conscience of each human being, and the race, as a whole. We are quite aware that while three of these will be admitted to come within the scope of this doctrine, much doubt will be, as the singular fact of dogmatic history appears there always has been, about the necessity of calling a fourth category as inclusive of the

relations of the race, as a whole, to the doctrine of atonement.

We think that here, conspicuously, has theology often lost its track, and that the existence of such erroneous views of the magnitude of the work of the atonement has its rationale in the fact that this existence, the race as a whole, as effected by the deluge of moral evil, has been left out of the account with reference to the Divine remedy.

We hold, that no just idea of the atonement can be gained until a just idea of what it must do to justify its name is first gained. Given certain ideas of a disease, and, if a remedy conquers it, the ideas of the remedy are as certainly and definitely given. Given sin and its consequences, and an atonement pledged in God's name to repair the breach, and to bring God and man at one, is evermore defined, as the expression of its interior life is thus declared. It is all important that we find what individual existences this atonement affects; and, because sin is not personal by limitation of consequences, though it is personal in origin,

because each sin lives and evil is self-propagative, as a potential factor in human history, because moral evil affects every man, and all moral evil affects, in a suggestive sense, each man; because, any just atonement, any atonement which justifies its own name, must have to do with the evil, which, as a whole, comes upon the race as a whole, and because God's name and character are pledged to the success of the atonement through Christ; we think that no view of this transaction is fair or complete with a knowledge of each conscience, of God, and of Christ, the Son of God, but that every full view of the atonement must have within its horizon, also, the human race as a whole.

Having, then, these four existences to deal with, as one deals with the idea of atonement, we are ready to look at them by the considerations demanding an atonement, as they come to us.

But our word is out, and it is not so much an investigation at present, as the proof of the truth of the proposition laid down, which is in order. We assert, as

under and a part of the general statement, that the doctrine of the atonement in its various forms, as approved and enumerated by the Unitarian Church, with reference to God, as the first personal existence in view, is founded in the principles of Idealism; and beside the fact that the philosophy of Idealism is impossible, except on the pantheistic theory of the universe, there are special reasons to regard its spirit as pantheistic.

We get our ideas of God from various sources, whatever proofs we use of the being of God. It makes very little difference how much bad metaphysics is lavished on the soul and its phases of life-activity; when justice, and mercy, and holiness are spoken of, in its thought as related to God or man, no new idea of these comes of it. And so it must be said of the other sources of our knowledge of God, whatever has been done to cast discredit upon them.

Consciousness has a literature of God. This atmosphere, which seems to be sight and seen, has large contributions to make. The large outlooks that come into us

when we come into being, and the necessities of ourselves can not fail of testimony. Tradition has a credibility which has become partially unquestionable. The words of the Bible, in spite of all the commentaries, have been quoted, and yet are in use on the subject.

We must travel slowly and not define too clearly, lest there be such an express declaration of principles that we quarrel; yet, we must look through the same general idea at things under it.

Now, Dr. Hedge, after having taken up the "*traditional idea of God*," and having shown that because "it is an idea of such transcendent import," it "could not fail to stimulate, in philosophic minds, the attempts to verify it by scientific demonstration,"[1] that, after all, Locke, Leibnitz, Cosmological, Physico-theological and Paley, Ontological and St. Anselm, with DesCartes and Spinoza, so far as they are names, either of people who want to prove God's existence, or of arguments to this effect, are superannuated, and that

[1] Ways of the Spirit. Critique of the Proof of the Being of God, p. 144.

there is "no proof of the existence of God in the sense of syllogistic demonstration," "none in which logic may not detect some flaw, some vulnerable point, some 'tendo Achillis' exposed to the shafts of criticism,"[1]—has given us reason, if we had none before, to look into consciousness to learn of God, by adding, that "God is his own witness, and his witnessing of himself, in every unsophisticated mind and every sound heart, is the surest and most satisfactory proof we have of this primary truth.[2] And, proceeding upon such a philosophy, Dr. Hedge, in his essay on the "God of Religion," or "the Human God,"[3] gives us some results, so that we can proceed with him on this platform: "The God of Religion must be an intelligent and moral nature."[4] "Again, we call God, moral governor, and judge, and we are right in so doing."[5]

Again, with the idea of Unitarianism,

[1] Ibid, p. 186.
[2] Ways of the Spirit, p. 188.
[3] Ibid, p. 210.
[4] Ibid, pp. 211, 219.
[5] Ibid, pp. 219, 220.

that the Bible is a trifle anthropomorphic, our thought coloring the conception of the word, just about as much as Dr. Hedge's playing with the word and idea, *person*, colors the above, we are told to go to the Bible for ideas of God in the affair of the atonement, as in everything else, since, as Unitarianism says, "we believe in the Bible as the Word of God." [1] "We profess to stand upon the same grounds as all other Christians—the Bible;" and, "Enough is it for us that the matter is divine, the doctrines true, the history authentic, the miracles real, the promises glorious, the threatenings fearful." [2]

Again, we are to hear the reason on the matter, since the Unitarian Church believes in "*Reason in Religion*," and one of her greatest has said in a book on the subject, that, "For want of counsel and concurrence of reason in times past, theology has builded her house in vain." "What a really scientific building is to a crum-

[1] What do Unitarians Believe? Dewy. A. U. A. p. 4.

[2] Ibid, pp. 5, 6.

bling Gothic edifice, such is a rational theology to the rotten systems of the past,"[1] and much else of the same sort, while Dr. Bellows begins his book, "Restatement of Christian Doctrine," with the declared hope, that in it he does something to add "to the evidence . . . that the free use of reason is compatible with hearty faith," and gives the Holy Ghost the honor of being "the friend and ally of reason, for reason came from the same fountain," calling "it the elder sister of conscience," "the original of humanity," and, reaching a climax of admiring exclamation, proclaiming: "It is always . . . rational."[2]

Accepting these sources, so devoutly believed in by the Unitarian church, we first—because every volume of this school puts it first, and above all—meet the idea of God as Father, which, in and of itself, seems hallowed by such strong defenses of love and mercy and truth, that such literature is certain to be most pleasant and devout reading; but which idea

[1] P. 215.

[2] Preface and Introduction, p. 8

of God is put out as an offset to such other conceptions of Him as come from those very sources Unitarianism has given us.

Now, if God is Father, he is such because of a more than loving heart or tender sympathy. If the paternal counsel is possible, it is possible because there is a regulative energy which molds love into forms of endurance and subsistance, into such forms as shall give to the divine gift the marks which signify what Dr. Hedge affirms we are bound to believe exist in God—morality, intelligence, and the functions of government.

According to the principles laid down by Dr. Hedge, paternity which does not use the necessary elements of the God-idea is no paternity of God. So that Law and Government, and Judgment and Righteousness are necessary to the divine paternity. It is, therefore, a magnificent feat of the Philosophy of Unitarianism which reduces the Divine righteousness to nothing, and which magnifies the Divine love into the personality of God. Idealism has not closed its eyes on a more

basic fact than that,—the lawgiving function of God as a moral governor; and it is a rare display of its exceedingly "subjective tendency," when it projects into consciousness and thought, the fatherhood of God, which abides on the righteousness of God, while this idea—the righteousness of God—we are told we can not verify, and we must not trust, though it be fundamental to what now, "God has called forth."[1] Indeed, the Fatherhood of God,[2] as taken by the Unitarian church, is a necessity from His nature, and it is fatherhood of a loving quality, because God happens to be an optimist of the Leibnitzian school. He *must* love and be merciful, we are told; we are also informed that He can not be God if He is wrathful and vindictive.

Now, if He have no will to be angry, as angry as the moral government necessitates, then He is bound. How, then, can he be the Moral Governor? And if God is Father, more because He loves

[1] Berkley.

[2] See "The Name and Idea of God," article in the Christian Examiner, March, 1865, p. 198.

the righteous than because He hates the sinful—and this by necessity—God is not Father, in any sense of value to us—He is Pan. The Idealism which transforms God, whose face we see in the Scripture, which Scripture Unitarians believe, as "angry with the wicked every day," and "of too pure eyes to behold iniquity," with such lineaments of justice, as that, in the presence of his wrath, the question, "Shall not the judge of all the earth do right?" is its own answer, expressing such a strongly founded fatherhood, that "the wicked, and Him that loveth violence, His soul hateth," while "righteousness and judgment are the habitation of His throne;" expressing also such deep fountains of love that such rock-builded sides of holiness hold them for man, as are seen in His law, His punishment, and His provisions for the salvation of men; yea, any philosophy which can resolve these expressions into anthropomorphism has set the seal of philosophic infamy upon its forehead, as it thus discloses the "pit from which it was digged."

Unitarianism seems anxious to drive the idea of God into a corner and surround it, until it is compelled to say that it is all *benevolence.*

In the authoritative tract of Dr. Furness, sent out by the Unitarian Association, among others, to do missionary work for the cause and spirit of liberal religion, we are told flatly, "God knows no wrath, not on account of His justice;" that "His justice is but another name for the Divine Attribute, which under a different aspect, in a different relation, is mercy, but because the nature of things, and nature of man, make it necessary." [1]

Now if this is true, that what we have called the attributes of God are but different aspects of one thing, everything depends on that one thing. And, if Unitarian theology is to be believed, that one thing is Benevolence. But, accepting this, the name of the thing must be changed, as well as the idea, since, with-

[1] A Brief Statement of the Christian Doctrine of the Atonement. W. H. Furness. Boston, A. U. A., p. 6.

out such change, and under the dominion of these principles, we are reduced to Pan, who has no volition, and can not *will well* to any thing or any body.

God is necessary Benevolence, if He at the center and innermost chamber of His self-hood is Benevolence simply. He is unfree, and *unfree omnipresence* is the fundamental postulate of Pantheism. "God is Love" is a larger postulate than "God is the Benevolence and its sides;" and the reaching of such a postulate as this latter is not accomplished except by the full exercise of subjective Idealism. Objectivity to an attribute of God is so far removed from the spirit of Unitarianism that a most narrow view of the Infinite is gained, and would be, if either attribute were magnified at the expense of the rest.[1]

Not even the ambitious originality of our American Unitarianism, and far less that of any other land, has seen so deeply into this phase of the subject as the Transcendentalist of the eleventh century,

[1] See, on this topic, Dr. Peabody's Tract, "God the Father."

Peter Abelard,[1] who, with a true faith in that subjective Idealism which afterward had somewhat of expression in Fichte, believed in the power of love as redemptive, and this because redemption is merely subjective. Such is the Idealism which, long before Mr. Emerson, wrote of the *World-Soul* with reference to heathen and Christian.

In the subjective theology[2] there is little room for any sort of objective Divine Government; but large room for any unfolding of the Universe. There is no room for the parties, God and man, unless by an understanding that necessity pervades things, and that, since this is so, there is no break between them.[3]

As truly, therefore, as there is love or as "God is Love," so true is it that this

[1] Shedd, History of Christian Doctrine, Vol. II., p. 287.

[2] Cf. Van Oosterzee's Christian Dogmatics, Vol. I., p. 246 et seq.

Hodge's Systematic Thology, Vol. I., p. 111.

Ueberweg's History of Philosophy. Vol. I., p. 390 et seq.

[3] Cf. Herzog's Real Encyclopedia, Article "Theism," by H. Ulrici; also Article "God" by Nitzsch.

love is freely willed and not necessitated. To dispose things, to guard Himself, to give this love to creatures—as well as that things may subsist—is government. The unfreedom of God makes government impossible. The unchangeableness of God with regard to free agents as they obey or disobey implies this unfreedom. Assuredly the Perfection of God is not His unfreedom, and God is not king but Pan if He is unfree: yet we are told that Jesus "did not come to work any change in the Divine mind, for that, being perfect, is unchangeable in love,"[1] and this is only one presentation of a general idea underlying this theology.

Without recalling and restating the only scriptural, rational, and hence, true view of the matter, it is evident and painfully so, that this short-cut to Pantheism has not been left in these latter times, but in harmony with the advances of Unitarian theology elsewhere, this road has become a common avenue. God freely declaring in every act "*I am that I am*," gives the only solution to problems of life.

[1] Tract by Dr. Furness.

He is not "bound hand and foot," except as his Infinite Free Personality subsists. He is not such, if the theology under examination is true. In fact, as said, he is only Pan. There is no moral government. Justice can easily be talked of as love, since there is none. The wrath of God as a scripture-fact is softened into love by Idealism, and Pantheism calls it one of his life-phases.

It will be noticed that even the gospel of Hedonism is not so blind to the facts in the case. Mr. Sidgwick, though so much devoted to certain assumptions, as to merit the sharpest criticism (The "Suppression" of Egoism, Alfred Barrat, Mind, 1877, p. 179. Also, Mr. Sidgwick's "Hedonism," by F. H. Bradley; Sidgwick on Bradley's Ethical Studies, Mind, 1876, p. 545; Bain on Sidgwick's Method, Mind, 1876, p. 179; Henry Calderwood's "Mr. Sidgwick on Intuitionalism," Mind, 1876, p. 197; Sidgwick's Answer to Calderwood, Mind, 1876, p. 563.), has done himself the credit of making "two Rules," "the Rule of Equity and the Rule of Benevolence," the first of which he uses as the principle of "Objectivity" (The Methods of Ethics, London, p. 358), and which, being thus used, saves his already faulty system from the most vicious Pantheism.

John Grote, to accomplish the same for his system, finds it necessary to distinguish three forms of the

moral ideal: "1. Right, or Faciendum; 2. Bonum, or the Desirable; 3. Happiness." (Treatise on the Moral Ideals, Mayor's edition, Cambridge, 1877. Noticed by Henry Sidgwick in Mind, 1877, p. 243.)

CHAPTER III.

THE EXISTENCES INFLUENCED IN THE ATONEMENT. —GOD.

"Deeply, my Daughter, hast thou sinned
Against the exalted throne of right."

SOPHOCLES.

"Glorious in holiness."

But we would learn more of God. It is a commonplace of theology that the idea of sin has to do with all our ideas of God and His operation. And, as has been remarked, the literature of the atonement has no meaning, except as the significance of this fact falls upon it. We, therefore, seek the nature of God through finding the nature of sin.

We are brought immediately into the presence of law and government. And we are met at once with a large literature from the sources which Unitarian writers have pointed out to us. If we are to pay such attention to the God who speaks in conscience with the power and clearness that this theology speaks of, we must be

ready to take decided opinions as the expressions of the necessary ideas we thus obtain of well-defined characteristics and attributes. We have been walking with Dr. Hedge, and have learned of him the sources of this knowledge. We have also, and from the same source, many expressions on sin. Besides the free outbursts on the subject in his earlier books, there are these in his later volumes, as the result of this scholar's life and thought: . . "The experience of evil is a necessary part of man's education, a necessary stage in the progress of the soul to the highest life. We can know good only through evil—only by victory over evil can good be reached."[1]

Now, what he means by this, we do not know, unless he has changed his opinion about the necessity of sin, for he certainly forgets sin when he talks of "a state where violence and fraud shall no more molest, and wars shall cease; where the law of love shall reign supreme, and

[1] The Primeval World of Hebrew Tradition, Boston edition, 1872, p. 120.

Consult also Ways of the Spirit, pp. 212, 246, 259.

shed eternal sunshine on the soul; a commonwealth of regenerate and perfected humanity, a paradise of innocence and peace." He adds that this state "for which we are to strive" "is one" wherein "whatever is false and degrading in civilization shall be done away; its fearful inequalities, the disproportion of labor and compensation, the dear-bought luxury of the few, the ill-requited service of the many, and all the crimes and distresses which spring from abject poverty on the one hand, and inordinate wealth on the other, etc.," . . . "such will be the condition of perfected man."[1]

But we must take the ripest book of the author's experience and culture as the exponent of his best thought. In this he says; "The time will never come when evil shall wholly cease from the earth, when all wrong shall be expunged, suffering unknown, and

> "Fear and sin and grief expire,
> Cast out by perfect love."

Neither in this world, nor in any future

[1] Primeval World, pp. 56, 57, 58.

world, is such a state possible. Evil there always must be. Old evils may be abolished, but new evils will spring. The health of humanity requires the existence of evil as incentive to effort and topic of action. Progress is better than perfection. Finding is good, but seeking is better, if finding is to end in rest of the found. The kingdom of heaven must be always coming; but hope would expire if it were fully come. And the saying remains forever true, that, "by hope we are saved."[1]

No one will wonder that the next essay is called "Pantheism," and that it seems an apologetical essay from this point of view as "Modern Doubt and Christian Belief" is from a theistic philosophy.

But on this topic of sin, as a way to get at the idea of God, other and as full-orbed Unitarians as Dr. Hedge have spoken in all the years of church history. To quote from them as largely as we have from Dr. Hedge, would be to fill a large volume with the Unitarian idea of sin. In order, however, that we may have a

[1] Ways of the Spirit, pp. 250, 251.

true conception, and that no one may be allowed to represent or misrepresent, we will reprint quotations from Dr. Bellows, since they come with great authority, and are historic words.

One will find that it is a very easy matter to get from the lips of the average Unitarian preacher the most pantheistic notions of sin, and especially when he fulminates before the Free Religious Association, describes Mr. Moody's ways and failures, or writes an article in criticism. It is another thing, though attended with no great effort, to get so clear an utterance as the following—clear because it is consistent with itself, and is well studied and profound Unitarianism declaring its organic relation to the pantheistic philosophy. Says Dr. Bellows:

"If you look into any work of natural history for an account of the lion, you will find him described as a powerful, ferocious animal, capable of destroying the most fierce and dangerous beasts of the forest; his height four feet, his length six or eight, his mane shaggy and copious, his roar deafening, his claws of enormous

size, sharpness, and power. But suppose the hunter, coming upon the lion's den, in the absence of the dam, finds the new-born whelps, hunts them with his hounds, and carries them home as his trophies. They are young lions! But how do they correspond with the naturalist's description? Yet they certainly have the nature of the lion, and the naturalist has described the lion truly. It is evident that the naturalist would have done no justice to the lion's nature, if he has given the whelp as a sample of it.

"Does it not at once come home to us, that the nature of a thing is described only when the perfection of which it is capable, and to which it ultimately attains, is depicted; that the whelp is not the lion; that the oaken sapling is not the oak; that the infant is not the man; that the growing, undeveloped, unregulated human creature, is not the representative of human nature?

"All lions do not come to their majestic growth; all oaks are not spreading and long-lived; but this does not make the lion less than the king of beasts, the oak

less than the monarch of the woods. It may, however, properly be asked, whether, if only here and there a lion, or an oak were found of noble proportions, we should still hold on to our lofty description of these products. I answer, perhaps not; for the ordinary and permanent circumstances in which things are placed, must be accepted as a part of their description or nature.

"If an orange-tree in a glass-house were capable of being grown to the size of an oak, we should not call this forced and unnatural product a representative of the nature of the orange-tree. But in truth such artifical circumstances are *not* capable of producing the perfection of any fruit." . . . "If the errors, sins, follies, mistakes of humanity are such as were to have been expected from the infancy of an immortal creature, made in the image of God; if they have a tendency to correct themselves; if they diminish as the race grows older; if the providence of God, natural and supernatural, is successfully directed to the education, and adapted, by ever improving methods, to

the theory of his gradual and progressive emancipation; then there is nothing in the admitted blunders, failures, or sins of the race, to discourage our hopes of it, or abate our respect for its design. If it is of the nature of humanity to grow, and to grow in alternate moral sunshine and storm; to grow amid winds that sometimes uproot it, or break its boughs, but oftener under rains that feed its roots and skies that warm its sap—then we must not adduce its ruined specimens, or its bruised and battered branches, as evidences of its worthlessness, or of the divine indignation, but acknowledge that its general trials and obstacles, and even individual overthrows, are not inconsistent with its characteristic success. Man advances, though men fall."[1]

"If Adam fell, the race rose by his fall; he fell up, and nothing happier for our final fortunes ever occurred than when the innocents of the garden learned their shame, and fled into the hardships and experiences of a disciplinary and growing

[1] Re-statements of Christian Doctrine, pp. 224, 225. 226.

humanity. Nor think me bold in saying as much as this; for the whole Christain scheme proceeds upon the popular hypothesis that 'sin abounded, that grace might more abound.' Would the Church consent to give up its Christ, to regain its unfallen Adam? But for the fallen Adam, according to its theory, we could not have had the risen Christ. As our text says of the Jews, it may be said also of our first parents—'Have they stumbled that they should fall? God forbid; but rather through their fall, salvation is come unto the Gentiles.' Has not God himself then made Adam's fall a blessing to the race? And if so, why do we inconsistently continue to call it a curse? The truth is, God's curses are only blessings in disguise, and his punishments, the strokes of his mercy and love."[1]

"And thus the life that now is, is probationary to that which is to come; as youth is to manhood, and manhood to old age. But the truer term for it is a disciplinary and educational state—in the result of which all abused, neglected or

[1] Re-statements, p. 226

perverted talents and opportunities, will give a retributive account of themselves at the bar of God, which is the eternal law of our moral constitution."[2]

Taking these, which all who know the condition of Unitarian theology will say are exceedingly conservative, and savor far less of Pantheism than the daily utterances of this body as a whole, let us look at the idea of God as we look at His idea of Sin.

The literature of conscience, "one mode of God's speech," as we are informed, is in most radical contradiction to these utterances. And if God has the aversion of sin which any accurate exegesis of conscience discloses, He has been misrepresented in one attribute by excessive attention to another. Conscience girds Him with the sacredness of law, and enrobes Him in all the terrible grandeur of *A Moral Ruler* of a universe such as this. Looking out of this "window of the soul," which we are informed conscience is, the eternal God holds the lightnings of wrath over the sinner, while on their shining

[2] Re-statements, pp. 239, 240.

blades drop the tears of pity. Every experience of conscience with sin is the experience of a traveler's eye with a crowned mountain of stone, whose overhanging summit is ready to fall upon a village below. Conscience feels the eternal self-hood of God, and such ideas of sin as we have given are annihilated. She discerns the Righteousness of God, and without fear feels that when under its protection she has found that "God is Love." Conscience discerns the anxious gaze of the Infinite One, and finds there that fatherly care speaks most eloquently through "eyes too pure to behold iniquity." She finds rest and hope —not such rest as Dr. Hedge talks of, nor such hope—but such as comes from love; and she finds them, in their finest forms, when she cries out from her innermost chamber: "Holy, Holy, Holy, Lord God Almighty, which was, and is, and is to come."

Conscience finds a law, the disobedience of which must be attended with terrible consequences. Conscience finds the lawgiver looking upon the disobe-

dient as in hostility to Him, to the Universe, and to its government. Most emphatically does God, as revealed in conscience, or, as Mr. Jowett calls it, "the moral sense," treat sin, not as a negation, a privation, a limitation, a necessity, an expedient; not "as a fall of a child learning to walk," nor as "a fall upward," but as a corruption of God-given powers, in open defiance to God, to His law, and to the best interests of the universe, and these in sight of the most fearful consequences. It is from the high point of conscience that David speaks, when he sees this vast subject, and sings, "*Thy mercy is above the heavens, and thy truth reacheth unto the clouds*," and it is in "*His salvation*" that "*mercy and truth are met together; righteousness and peace have kissed each other.*"

The Bible, "another revelation," as we are told, is clearly defined in its position with regard to God's nature as seen in His treatment of sin, both as a sadly fearful fact and as making large demands upon the infinite resources for remedy. In fact, sin appears to be an entirely dif-

ferent thing in the mind of God, and to demand much more serious treatment, in truth, a totally different treatment, than in the mind of the Unitarian Church.

The Bible, which Unitarianism is said to "stand upon," produces in the mind an idea of God the very opposite of what we would expect from the extracts we have collected, as the Unitarian consciousness of sin; and this difference is the more illustrative as Unitarianism is so professedly true to "the moral sense," "the Bible, another revelation," and "reason in religion." He hates sin because of its nature,[1] because of its relation to His government,[2] because of its relation to His creatures, made in His own image.[3] He loves the powers, whose prostitution He sees in the sinner, no more than He hates

[1] Gal. v. 19–21; Rom. viii. 1–13; Eph. ii. 3; Gen. xvi. 12; Heb. x. 26; Rom. iv. 15; Gen. xxxix. 9; 2 Cor. v. 15; John, xv. 24; Rom. iii. 19.

[2] Is. liii. 6; Is. lxiv. 6; Ps. cxliii. 2; Ps. cxxx. 3; Rom. iii. 19; 1 John, v. 19; 2 Thes. ii. 3, 4; 1 John, iii. 4; Gen. iii. 6.

[3] Ex. xxxiv. 6. 7; Jer. xxxii. 18; Rom. v. 12–21; 1 Cor. xv. 21–22; 2 Cor. xi. 14; Rom. i. 31; 2 Tim. iii. 1, 2; Mark, iv. 44–50; Rev. iv. 11 —.

his sin.[1] His provision for the salvation of all who will believe, shows the Divine opinion of sin, which is the expression of the irreconcilableness of the two.[2] This, indeed, is the intensity of that Idealism, which has its form in the theology under examination, that it reduces the plain significance of the Bible to ashes.

Not less potent is this spirit when God, as an idea, falls into the reason and His nature is thus talked of. By as clear a reduction is He made less and less interested in the affairs of sin, until, at last, sin seems to get a benediction from His very silence. When the reason protests that there can not be two moral systems in this universe, that "the moral sense" in man must agree with the moral consciousness of God, and that, therefore, what conscience demands on the ground

[1] Eccl. iv. 3; Job. xv. 14–16; Gen. vi. 5, 6; Jer. xvii. 9; Mat. xii. 33; Eccl. iv. 18; 1 Tim. v. 22; Mat. xviii. 6, 7; Luke, iii. 17, 18; Mat. vi. 20–24; Rom. viii. 19–23.

[2] 1 Cor. ii. 4; Gal. ii. 21; Gal. iii. 21; Eph. i. 10; Heb. ii. 14–16; 1 Pet. ii. 22; Rom. iii. 25; Heb. ii. 10; Heb. iv. 9; Heb. x. 14; Lev. xvii. 10; Is. liii.

of her necessities must exist for her in God, who is the moral source, that the soul has done evil in the past, and ill-desert hangs over her, that the moral sense declares that she has all she can do to meet present duty and obligation, that, therefore, she must have outside help, and that, since, as happily agree conscience and Dr. Hedge, "the evil there is in the world can be abolished only by supplanting it with good,"[1] this outside help must be a substitution, and that, because God must be its source, it must be a substitution by Him and from Him, and for the sake of conscience and the soul,—while reason thus protests, as against so much teaching, that thus there must be an AT-ONE-MENT, and a *vicarious* atonement, Unitarianism declares the non-existence of power in God, as a moral Governor, to any such desirable result. God is, therefore, bound "hand and foot," as Heine says, so far as the most important and necessary act of Deity toward humanity is concerned. Fettered as He is, sin must "work out its finer results."

[1] The Primeval World, p. 64.

But must men worship this "eternal Pan?" And what, but an

> "eternal Pan,
> Who layeth the world's incessant plan,"

is One who can neither be wronged nor injured, who seems, and is, as content when His laws are obeyed as when they are disobeyed; whose authority can not be infringed upon, and whose resources of power, as delineated by "the moral sense," are out of His reach and influence?

The truth is, what Unitarianism assumes with regard to the justice of God, moral government,[1] and the unchangeableness of God's relation to the souls of men, leads inevitably to Pantheism.[2]

[1] "Deus sine dominio, providentia, et causis finalibus, nihil aliud est quam Fatum et Natura." Newton. "Pantheism misses what is equally essential in Theism—the attribute of holiness, and with it, the related idea of a moral government exercised by God over rational moral natures." Hedge, Ways of The Spirit, p. 263.

[2] "Spinoza is the typical exponent of Pantheism." Page 263. "The weakness of Spinozism, of Pantheism as expounded by him, consists in the relaxation of the moral sense—the moral indifferentism resulting from a system which not only refers all action,

good or evil, directly to God, as the one immediate and only actor in all, but virtually denies all distinction between good and evil, by resolving, as we have seen, the notion of any such distinction into inadequate cognition." Hedge, p. 283.

CHAPTER IV.

OTHER EXISTENCES INTERESTED AND INFLUENCED.

"His hands with gore are dripping, and he holds
A sword drawn newly, and an olive branch
Chastely enwrapt with wool of whitest fleece."

ÆSCHYLUS.

"Allen sündern soll vergeben, und die
Hölle nicht mehr sein."

SCHILLER.

A like exegesis is made by the same spirit, with regard to the race as a whole. Take any view of this existence, as may be suggested by Plato, in his spiritual politico-economics, the every-day thinker, in conversation, or the pantheistic Emerson or Schelling, with the "Over-soul;" the doctrines of the essay on "History," and the theory of the "System of Transcendental Idealism"—the human race is still a largely interested individuality, and no system can afford to neglect it.

But Unitarian Idealism, as a matter of fact, stands with the late essay of Dr.

Hedge, "The Way of History," in one hand, with the Broad-church presentation of the atonement, as written by Mr. Jowett and edited by Harvard's professor of sacred literature, in the other, and while evil is propagative, the consciences of men in all the centuries past declare that they have neither ability nor opportunity to remedy the evil of the souls to which they are the "moral sense;" that this tide is gathering, and for all that the human race can do, is sweeping down the ages, also, while reason, experience, and the bible, "another revelation," declare that there is no hope, unless by substitution of good for evil, and that, as we have seen, it must come from God, and be such a substitution of good as shall be competent for all this volume of evil—that whatever it is, it must be as high as the throne of God, and as far-reaching as the remotest moment of eternity—while these are as surely the literature of that "great soul" as that it has a literature, Dr. Furness puts out his protest against a substitution of any sort, and Dr. Bellows declares the vicarious satisfaction a "blind-

ing heresy;"[1] and, as a positive statement with regard to a so-called atonement, Robert Collyer shows how Carlyle was engaged in the true one;[2] a hundred lectures and sermons show that Jesus was notDivine, and did not want to be thought even "good,"[3] while all seem to under-

[1] Re-statements of Christian Doctrine, A. U. A., p. 306.

[2] The Life that Now Is. "Vine and Branches," p. 56. "So Elijah was the Vine to Elisha, and David to Jonathan, and Paul to Timothy, and Socrates to Plato. . . . I meet men every day who feel that without Channing or Parker, or Swedenborg or Wesley, they can do nothing. . . . 'Without me, ye can do nothing.'" Ibid, p. 57.

[3] (*a.*) "William Furness writing to me once about the distinction made in a new life of Jesus, between the human and the divine, in his nature, said: 'I regret this distinction, because Jesus is the most human being that ever lived, and *therefore* the most divine. His divinity lay in his pure humanity.'" *Collyer.*

This is certainly finer than Mr. Emerson has it, and we do not remember of Pantheism putting the matter so well. But after all, does this make our anthropomorphism as culpable? We do not know which sort of anthropomorphism is the more dangerous, that which starts with God, humanizing Him, or that which begins with man, deifying him. In fact, on this platform, we know of nothing so fully anthropomorphic as Carlyle's "Hero Worship."

(*b.*) "Christ himself recoiled from the ascription

stand that after so much of this Calvary and Gethsemane, "man must deliver himself;"[1] while thus Christianity is expressing itself, this, the authentic expression of a conservative Idealism, passes into a statement of theology.

But "there is no need that it (evil) be put out of existence." Then, indeed, must it be necessary; and if necessary, we are living under a pantheistic regimé.

Thus we do not wonder that Dr. Hedge has found "peace" with Schopenhauer, who is pessimistic only by following the optimism which Dr. Hedge recommends so earnestly,[2] to its results.

Beside the facts which appear in the life of conscience, as looked at in the race as a whole, as expressive of the fact that the Idealism of Unitarian theology has been intense enough to reduce the whole

of *good*, in his own humble consciousness of heights of excellence yet to be won." Bellows, Dr., Re-statements of Christian Doctrine, p. 236.

[1] Kant, Religion Innerhalb, D. G. Vernunft, p. 88. De Wette.

Schleiermacher, Christ' Glaube, Vol. ii., p. 103.

[2] Ways of the Spirit, p. 250.

to nothing, we cite the following as related to this argument:

1. Sin is culpable while it is "bondage" and "darkness."

2. Conscience does not desire "the advent of more truth," as an offset to the sins of the past, but conscience does desire that good be substituted for them, and that she be delivered. She desires "provocation," and much else.

3. Conscience desires the maintenance of the moral law, being "the moral sense."

4. As a fact of Christian experience, the atonement, as wrought by Christ, does *not* "offend the moral sense," though it does offend an absurd philosophy, but gives bliss and hope.

We assert also, that the ideas of sin which are said by this theology to be in harmony with conscience, are pantheistic. These propositions we do not stop to argue, as they are either self-evident, and hence need no argument, or have been, or will be, set forth at length in other chapters.

But He who trod "the wine press

alone," is the central figure in the atonement, by the admission of all schools of thought. Not more clear is this, than that, as in the cases of the human race as a whole, the conscience of each human being, and God the Father, as they are affected by or concerned in the doctrine of the atonement, so, here, the spirit of Unitarian theology is Idealism, and for other reasons than that all Idealism is possible only on the pantheistic theory of the universe, is its especial manifestation in this connection pantheistic.

We do not propose, and it is certainly needless, to show from what Jesus Christ taught with regard to the atonement, that He had a totally different idea of it than that held by the Unitarian Church. To avoid the necessity of thus re-asserting the orthodox idea, with its foundation in the person of Jesus, the life and death of Christ, His abundantly expressed consciousness on the subject of sin, and the manner of His accomplishing an atonement, as between God and man: and on the other hand, that the argument may still lose no force, here, from any lack of

exhibition of the workings of Idealism as resulting in the Unitarian theory of the atonement,[1] we subjoin the following:

1. *The fact of Jesus Christ, such as history presents Him, is only justifiable on the ground of the necessity and consummation of the vicarious sacrifice.*

2. *The sayings of Jesus concerning sin and its results, are to be understood only as proceeding from Him who at the time was consciously the person by whose act such vicarious satisfaction is accomplished.*[2]

[1] Cf. Dr. Henry W. Bellows' Re-statements of Christian Doctrine, Sermon, "The Suffering Christ;" Dr. James F. Clarke's Truths and Errors of Orthodoxy, "The Orthodox Atonement," in which, after saying:—"Christ plunged into the midst of sin, to save souls, as a hero rushes into the midst of burning flames to save lives. No man like Jesus had ever felt such anguish and horror at the sight of sin; but instead of flying from it, he came into the midst of it, to save the sinner. This was the secret of his agony, the bitterness of his cup"—he gives a view of the "moral influence theory," which, while it lacks the consistency of the ordinary Unitarian statements, gains nothing new in principle from its semi-Sabellianism.

[2] John viii. 12; Mark x. 25; Matt. xi. 28, Matt. xxv. 46; Mark xiv. 21; Matt. xxiii. 27, 28; Luke xvi. 13; Matt. vi. 12; John viii. 44; John vii. 37; Matt.

3. *The sayings of Jesus concerning Himself and His works can be understood only by referring them to the person by whose act the vicarious sacrifice is made.*[1]

xvi. 24; Matt. iii. 10; Luke xiii. 2, 3, 4; Matt. iii. 2, 6; James ii. 10; John viii. 34; Matt. v. 6; John v. 29; Matt. xii. 33, 35; Mark vii. 21–23; Romans v., vi., vii.; John viii. 25; Mark ix. 43, 44; Matt. v. 21–46; Matt. ix. 12, 13; Luke xi. 39; etc.

[1] John i. 29. Cf. Livermore (A. A. Rev.) Commentary, published by A. U. A.

John xxvi. 28.

Matt. xx. 28. Compare Thompson, Theology of Christ, p. 63; Smeaton, Our Lord's Doctrine, p. 194; also Girdlestone's Synonyms of Old Testament, p. 214, on *λύτρον*.

John x. 8.

Luke xix. 10. Cf. Alford and Stier on.

John xiv. 6.

Matt. iv. 12. Cf. Morrison, Dr., Disquisitions and Notes (A. U. A.)

John iii. 16.

Mark x. 45; viii. 37. Cf. Stier (Words of Lord Jesus) on.

Matt. xiii. 1. Cf. Morrison on.

John vi. 39.

John xvii. 25. Cf. Olnhausen, with Tholuck on.

Matt. xi. 28.

John vii. 37. Cf. Meyer on.

Matt. v. 17.

Matt. v. 6.

Matt. ix. 13. } Cf. Dr. Morrison, Disquisitions
Matt. xxvi. 28. } and Notes (A. U. A.)

4. *The sayings of others concerning Jesus and His work can be understood only as re-*

John iii. 29.

Matt. ix. 15, with Lev. xxi. 4. } Cf. Smeaton, Our Lord's Doctrine. Compare with Lange.

John vi. 51. Cf. Stier with De Wette.

John xvii. 19. Cf. Lange on.

John iv. 42.

John viii. 12.

John xi. 25.

John xi. 39. Cf. Meyer and Tholuck with Alford.

John viii. 53.

John viii. 24.

John ix. 26.

John xi. 49. Cf. Tholuck on.

Luke iv. 18.

John x. 36. Cf. Stier and Olnhausen on.

John vii. 28. John iii. 17. } Cf. Lange with Tholuck on.

John x. 36.

John vii. 33.

John vi. 37–39. Cf. Meyer, Stier, and Olnhausen on.

John xvii.

John iii. 13. Cf. Smeaton, Our Lord's Doctrine, on "*Son of Man.*" Cf. Maurice on same.

John xi. 14. Cf. Smeaton, Our Lord's Doctrine, p. 37; also Lange on same.

Matt. xxvi, 36. Cf. De Wette on; quoted and treated in "Theological Essays," edited by Dr. Noyes, p. 505.

ferring to the person by whom such vicarious sacrifice was made.[1]

John xii. 27, 28. Cf. in Ibid. Dr. Noyes has inserted a translation of Lücke, pp. 509, 510.

Matt. xxvii, 46. Cf. Meyer on. Quoted also by Dr. Noyes, p. 510, "Theological Essays;" Smeaton, Our Lord's Doctrine, p. 158.

Etc.

[1] Genesis ii. 17. } Genesis iii. 15. } Consult Murphy with Keil and Delitzsch. Compare De Wette in Introduction to Old Testament.

Genesis iv. 7. See Tayler Lewis in Lange's Commentaries.

Genesis xlix. 18.

Exodus viii. 13, 15.

Exodus xxi. 30.

Exodus xxx. 12–16.

Lev. x. 17.

Lev. xv. 22.

Lev. xxv. 25–31.

2 Saml. vii. 12.

Job xxxiii. 24. Cf. Dr. Noyes' translation, with Cowles' remarks on.

Psalms ii. 7. Cf. Delitzsch on.

Psalms xvi. 10. Cf. Dr. Noyes' translation and notes.

Psalms xl. 6, 7, 8. Cf. Lange on.

Psalms xl., xxii., xlix., cix. Cf. Smeaton, Our Lord's Doctrine, with Hengstenberg on. Also cf. De Wette on reference to Matt. xxvii. 4, 6.

Psalms xlv., lxxxix., cx. 4.

Isaiah liii. Cf. Dr. Noyes' Introduction to Theo-

We submit that the ideas of sin, as brought out in the Unitarian statements on this and other subjects, as they have reference to an atonement through Christ, are pantheistic.

As is eminently evident, and as for the most part admitted, Unitarian ideas of the atonement differ as the man Christ takes an Arian, Sabellian, or Humanitarian character. There is, indeed, no view of the atonement, as given by this school,

logical Essays with Delitzsch. Also, Dr. Noyes' Hebrew Prophets.

Rom. iii. 23–26. Cf. Whedon on.

Rom. v. 6–11.

Rom. viii. 3.

Rom. v. 12.

Rom. xii. 19, xix. 9. Cf. Meyer on.

1 Cor. i. 1, 3.

1 Cor. vi. 20. Cf. Olnhausen on.

1 Cor. xv. 3. Cf. Bellows' Re-statements, p, 303.

1 Cor. xv. 45.

2 Cor. v. 14–21.

Gal. i. 4.

Gal. ii. 20–22. Cf. Jowett on.

Gal. iii. 13.

Gal. iv. 3–7.

Eph. iv. 18; Heb. i. 1–14. Cf. Smeaton, the Apostle's Doctrine of the Atonement.

Etc.

which does not depend on one of these views of Jesus.[1]

We submit that since all of these views result in Pantheism, the doctrine of the Atonement, as taught by the Unitarian Church, leads to Pantheism.

1. The Sabellian view,[2] as first enunciated, or as cast in the form of the "*Logos*-theory," leads to Pantheism, since —(*a.*) It denies the personality of Jesus, thus breaking in upon the proper idea of personality, as of consequence. (*b.*) There is no reason for thinking God confined to a trinal modalism, nor does it leave any reason for not carrying its philosophy further, and calling all things the manifestation of God under all circumstances.

[1] Socinus, Catech. Racov., pp. 45, 145.
Brevis Inst., p. 654.
Osterodt, Unterr., c. 6, p. 48.
Also, Cat. Racov., pp. 144–156.
Winer's Confessions of Christendom, pp. 115, 116, 135.
Schaff's Creeds of Christendom, vol. ii., p. 398.

[2] Dr. J. E. Dorner's "The Person of Christ," 272, 274, ff. Div. 11, vol. ii, pp. 15, 227, 304, 477.

2. The Arian view[1] leads to Pantheism, since (*a*) either *O θεός* and *θεός*[2] are identical, or there is an apotheosis of something; and this identity is denied, and since (*b*) the granting of superiority to Jesus on the ground of Pre-existence, as another manifestation of God, has simply added another category to the idea that God is manifested in various degrees, thus adding to the stock in trade of Pantheism.

3. The Humanitarian view leads to Pantheism, by calling a being to whom credence is given, and who thus is allowed to identify himself with God in the most authoritative manner, and whose speech can not be understood but as the utterance of Jehovah, *a man;* thus identifying mere human nature with the Divine.

[1] Schaff's Creeds of Christendom, vol. ii., pp. 28, 61; note 4 of appendix.

[2] Schaff's Creeds of Christendom, vol. ii., pp. 22, 23. Hodge's Systematic Theology, vol. i., p. 452.

CHAPTER V.

THE VIEWS OF DR. JAMES MARTINEAU.

Modern Unitarianism is rapidly becoming more of a fatalism than the oldest Calvinism.

DANIEL. D. WHEDON.

"Das Kreuz zu Golgotha kann dich nicht von dem Bösen,
Wenn es nicht auch in dir wird aufgerichtet, erlösen."

But let us look at Unitarianism in its best clothes, as it presents itself on this subject. And if we are to believe what critical Unitarianism has so often declared, the collection of essays called "Studies of Christianity,"[1] by Dr. James Martineau, is a representative volume. Criticism, without any Unitarian bias, would perhaps put it above this, as a work of literature, and as a task of thought. But if Unitarianism is to be judged by its best efforts, as in all truth it needs to be, this volume must have a hearing as such. We are told in the introduction, which is written in the pleasant style of the

[1] Boston. American Unitarian Association, 1867.

editor of these essays, W. R. Alger, that "the history of his (Dr. Martineau's) mind has been a broadening track of light. And now the Association feel that they can not do a greater favor to the reading public, or better aid that cause of Liberal Christianity, whose servants they are, than by printing a collection of the later writings of this gifted man, whom they first introduced to American Unitarians a quarter of a century ago." [1] The papers are a selection, and those are given which "throw light on the true nature of Christianity," [2] and we are to take the volume as "fitted to meet the wants of the time by diffusing among ministers, students of divinity, and the cultivated laity, a knowledge of the most advanced theological and religious thought yet attained," [3] and his "Endeavors After the Christian Life" as "by far the richest and noblest series of sermons in the English language." [4]

[1] Introduction, p. vii.
[2] P. viii.
[3] P. viii.
[4] P. ix.

With these ideas, which are about equally just, we open at the essay, "*Sin, what it is, what it is not*,"[1] whence we think a clear idea of the true nature of the atonement can be gained, if at all, since the problem of the eternities is human salvation from sin, and the decided cry of the race is, "Is there balm in Gilead?" which cry will not be silenced until, to use Dr. Martineau's words, "*the averted face of the Infinite has turned around upon us again, and the pure eyes look into us, with a mild and loving gaze, which we can meet with answering glances, and feel that we are at one with the universe, and reconciled with God.*"[2]

Here, we think, as we touch it, is certainly one of those out-croppings of the granite which underlies our human life. It is not a chemically-prepared rock, builded, atom to atom, in a theological laboratory. But it is natural, and owes itself to the chemistry of the greater laboratory, in which the universe was thrown down. And, if we mistake not,

[1] Studies of Christianity, p. 466.

[2] Studies, p. 477.

the secret of sound theology is the reaching after and obtaining what comes into life from life; the seeking and finding of what God has to say in his dogmatics of universal fact—while every failure in speculation and exegesis comes of taking life and things out of their own atmosphere. The "lily of the field," the crucifixion of Jesus, have one atmosphere of fact, and in that same Ideal-Realism must be interpreted, as the spirit of the New Testament and of human life is one. Dr. Martineau is inviting us into this real life-air and being-air, as he says, of sin, that, "If there is anything within the compass of heaven and earth which we can be said to know for ourselves, and to have no need that another should tell us, it is the nature of sin; there is no arrogance—there is only sorrowful confession—in protesting that this is a matter on which we can not be mistaken. It is the nearest of all things to us; the shadow which follows us where we go, and stays with us when we sit; the clinging presence that penetrates the very folds of our nature, and is known only from within,

where its fibers strike and draw their nutriment. No external observer, though he have the divination of a prophet, or the glance of an archangel, can add one iota to our insight into this sad fact, unless by sharpening our sensibility to feel and interpret it better for ourselves, or by any testimony, any miracle, take one line away of the handwriting of God that burns and flashes on the inner walls of the soul. Here at least our apprehensions are first-hand; and to trust them, to cast out as Satan what tampers with them, or contradicts them, is not scepticism, but faith—not infidelity, but faithfulness to the ever-written, living word of God. What the finger of Heaven has written, neither the tapestries of ancient theology, nor the varnish of newest philosophy can permanently hide; the light is alive, and will eat through, clearing its everlasting warning and consuming our perishable work."[1]

But it is well-nigh impossible for Dr. Martineau to leave the matter here, and much more of a task is it for him to al-

[1] Studies, pp. 468, 469.

low the soul to testify plainly, while removed to absolute impossibility is the admission of the soul's testimony on any such real life-basis, as he so clearly defines in the words which we have quoted.

What difference does it give in result, whether we have an ideal treatment of the soul, or a transcendental treatment of what she says? If Dr. Martineau treats the human spirit ever so kindly on first principles, and afterwards disregards her speech by a large use of Idealism in interpretation, it is as if nothing had been said. It seems, indeed, like the bribing of a witness with flattery, that liberal discounting may be made in the presence of the court.

And, truly, Dr. Martineau may be said to be representative here. Unitarian literature would have to be quoted almost entire, if we were thus compelled to prove, what is a most potent fact, that the staple of its theology is profession of respect and credence with reference to the soul. Oftentimes ridiculous and sounding like cant, yet for the most part eloquent and well written, the most splen-

did professions appear in every volume as the utterance of this school of theological speculation. Dr. Martineau gives his name and voice to this theme, and, with a genius for such effort, presents the reader with one of the best woven songs from these old sounds. How such songs are sung and the performance *encored* by the Unitarian press, we do not profess to understand, when, at the close, it is understood that this same hero, who is sung about, is to be informed that nobody believes what he has said or done.

True respect for the human soul is respect for its testimony, and no clear idea of honor is that which repeats "*Honor all men*," and expects to distrust all men. The human soul needs credence vastly more than eulogy, and theology has reaped far richer harvests from her fields of truth than from the songs which those, who do not reap, have sung. Gladly, and with the truth of innocence, does she walk into such an air as that of these words of Dr. Martineau, for it is the only natural one to her. And she has much to say; much about sin. She does not

care what her panegyrists say, but she wants to be heard and cares that people shall believe what she says. She expects, however, and has a right to do so, from such as Dr. Martineau, what a large and true soul will give, *respectful belief of what she feels so keenly and confesses so truly.* Dr. Martineau is indeed, so infinitely more faithful than his eulogists to what the soul says, that we feel him to have been sincere, even if he has been talking of the impossible. And when we treat of his words we feel very near to the positions of orthodoxy, and to the press of the centuries to the Throne, crying: "Is there balm in Gilead?"

But it is impossible for so consistent and devout a soul as this to adopt Unitarianism in any of its other phases, without even here being at the mercy of the spirit of Idealism which animates it, and without being also the advocate of theories of sin and salvation possible only on pantheistic grounds.

We need not to say to those who have accompanied us thus far, that this idea of sin is a negation of the ordinary Uni-

tarian expression on the subject: "For myself," says Dr. Martineau, "I can never sit at the feet of Jesus, and yield up a reverential heart to his great lessons without casting myself on the persuasion that God and evil are everlasting foes; that never and for no end did he create it; that his will is utterly against it, nor ever touches it but with annihilating force. Any other view appears to be injurious to the characteristic sentiments, and at variance with the distinguishing genius of Christian morality."[1]

But, as in the other case, what matters it if the Idealism come here or elsewhere. If it succeed in vitiating the whole significance of such a statement, by any means, it were as well that such a statement had not been made. A just view of Dr. Martineau's idea of sin as accepted in the light of these two quotations will explain how a Unitarian, whose work is republished and praised by the American Unitarian Church, can safely make such statements as fundamental; that such ideas of sin, coupled with Unitarianism,

[1] Studies, p. xxxix. of Introduction.

presuppose sufficient Idealism elsewhere in this system to render them either meaningless in and of themselves, or powerless as related to what follows.

These, then, are the facts to which the moral nature calls the attention of one that hears the testimony of conscience. Sin is "the transgression of the law." It has the three characteristics that Dr. Martineau mentions,[1] if no more.

"It is no figure of speech," as he says, "to say that God is angry with the wicked every day," and is "of purer eyes than to behold iniquity."[2] It is "unqualified opposition to his will, a literal service of the enemy."[3]

It is all that we have found sin to be, in scripture, and history, and all that in any other accounts, this trusted authority, "conscience," has called it.

Now within the same volume in which Dr. Martineau has said that this, "our conscience, is the window of heaven through which we gaze on God; and as

[1] Studies p. 470.

[2] Studies, Introduction, p. xxxvii.

[3] Ibid.

the colors perpetually change his aspect changes too;"[1] and in which he has quite liberally given a resume of what conscience says, while he thus admits that conscience cries for help, that sin is an abhorrence to God, that it separates the sinner from God, he vitiates all and destroys the force of all that this is or can be, as related to the other significant facts of the universe, by preaching what is of another spirit and result: "Christianity . . . is a religion eminently natural, eradicating no indigenous affections of our mind, distorting no primitive moral sentiment; but *simply*[2] consecrating the obligation proper to our nature, and taking up with a divine voice the whispers, scarce articulate before, of the conscience within us."[3]

But this does not satisfy; and is, in fact, only an illusion.

Suppose it is "natural," and "eminently natural," I need what I have not, and if Christianity is simply "natural,"

[1] Studies, Introduction, p. xxxvi.

[2] The italics are ours.

[3] Studies, Introduction, p. xxxix.

and only does what Dr. Martineau definitely asserts is her work, I need something else, because I may have it, and yet be estranged from God. Conscience cries to such preaching, in the name of God, to whom she is said to be related, and on the ground of such loftily proclaimed respect: "Hear me for my cause." It makes no difference whether it "eradicates indigenous affections," or not. This is not the question which engages me now. I have been made sensible that "God is angry." As you say, the "face of the Infinite" is "averted." I need no more "indigenous affections," but salvation from sin. I know that Christianity "distorts" not, and that it "consecrates obligations;" but I am confident I have broken an obligation, and what now? It is not a question of this sort; I must have salvation. I have a hope that if I can get something to still this storm, if some Christ will say to this tempest, "Be still," then, Dr. Martineau, I have no doubt but that I shall find that it takes "up with a divine voice the whispers, scarce articulate before, of the conscience

within." I can not hear the whispers now; I can hear nothing but the storm. "Is there balm in Gilead?"

Again, while Calvinism's five points are of little account to him, he has five points which seem to define his faith, and give system to his belief. Among them, "in the first place," as he says, "WE HAVE FAITH in the *Moral Perceptions* of man."[1] We might also quote other such passages of his enthusiastic recommendation of conscience, as these: "On this . . . no suspicion is to be cast; no lamentation over its fallibility; no hint of possible delusion is to pass by unrebuked. It is worthy of absolute reliance, as the authoritative oracle of our nature, supreme over all its faculties, entitled to use sense, memory, understanding, to register its decrees, without a moment's license to dispute them."[2]

"Whatever else may move, here, in creation's center of gravity, we take our everlasting stand. Whatever else may be doubtful, these (the moral perceptions)

[1] Studies, "Five Points of Christian Faith," p. 179.
[2] Studies, p. 181.

are to be simply trusted." "They are to be assumed by us as the fixed station, the grand heliocentric position whence our survey of the spiritual universe must be made, and our system of religion constructed."[1]

But what is all this worth if she lies? And if she does not lie, why seek to disbelieve her? Indeed, it may be said, no one does disbelieve. Then, we ask, why is Unitarian theology continually saying that she *ought* not to have, *can* not have, what she says she *must* have, and what, since she goes upon Dr. Martineau's second of his "Five Points,"—"the Moral Perfection of God"—is for her?

This is just the case. We believe her about sin. So we find her not *at one* with God. We believe that she must be at one, else we disbelieve what she says. We believe, for the same reason, that she has all that she can do to meet present duty and obligation. We believe, then, that she must have help, foreign to her own strength and effort. We may say the only trouble is the sins of the past,

[1] Studies, p. 181.

unremitted, or existing only as positive evil. Now, conscience demands that these should be taken away, met somehow by good, that there should be a *substitution* there. She demands some intervention of *Good* in order to at-one-ment with *God.* In short, conscience demands a *vicarious* AT-ONE-MENT. These are the demands of those "moral perceptions" of which Dr. Martineau so truthfully speaks.

But Dr. Martineau says: "Moral relations, by their very nature, exclude all vicarious agency."[1] "I know of no remission of sins, nor would Christians have retained so heathenish a notion, had they not frightfully exaggerated in the first instance the retributions of God."[2] "Nowhere in scripture do we meet with anything corresponding with the prevailing notions of vicarious redemption; everywhere, and most emphatically in the personal instruction of our Lord, do we find a doctrine of forgiveness, and an idea of salvation utterly inconsistent with it."[3]

[1] Studies, p. 475.
[2] Studies, p. 477.
[3] Studies, p. 141.

One wonders how can these things be; and is liable, out of respect to Dr. Martineau, to say that he must think Christianity not fitted to all the demands of conscience. But hundreds of eloquent passages we have marked convince us that this is not true. Is he, then, to deny conscience as a witness? For, certainly, if the "moral perceptions" are to be believed, if we say that they testify truly, and if we are to believe that the God of the universe has that to supply it—in other words, if we believe two of Dr. Martineau's "Five Points," the faithfulness of conscience and the perfection of God—there can be no difficulty. But Dr. Martineau says there is no "*vicarious satisfaction;*" and yet that is what the conscience needs, and this conscience distinctly declares for a "*vicarious satisfaction*" and "substitution."

Now we have too great faith in the fidelity of Dr. Martineau as a thinker, to believe he could break out anywhere by stealth or intentionally. He must get out by a bad philosophy, if at all. And, indeed, our speculation is philosophical

history. It is a free use of the spirit of Unitarian theology — Idealism — which applied to conscience and its testimony, or, as we might show, to the ideas of sin, God, and the universe, which gives Dr. Martineau egress to the world as an opponent to the "vicarious satisfaction."

We need not stop to prove its relation to Pantheism, and, in our own words. We need only let Dr. Martineau add this part of the discussion, as he again preaches Unitarianism, it may be—Idealism it is—in the form and almost in the terminology of Pantheism: "We must surrender ourselves to him without terms."[1] "The functions of a healthy body go on, not by the knowledge of physiology, but by the instinctive vigor of nature; and you will no more brace the spiritual faculties to noble energy and true life by study of the uses of every feeling than you can train an athlete for the race by lectures on every muscle of the limb. The mind is not voluntarily active in the acquisition of any great idea, any new inspira-

[1] Studies, Introduction, p xli.

tion of faith, but passive—fixed on the object which has dawned upon it and filled it with fresh light."[1] This is but one side of this teaching, and is offered as such. We think after such preaching, one could not ask a fitter hymn than this:

"Onward and on, the eternal Pan,
Who layeth the world's incessant plan,
Halteth never in one shape,
But forever doth escape,
Like wave or flame, into new forms,
Of gem, and air, of plants, and worms.
I, that to-day am a pine,
Yesterday was a bundle of grass.
He is free and libertine,
Pouring of his power the wine
To every age, to every race;
Unto every race and age,
He emptieth the beverage;
Unto each and unto all,
Maker and original.
The world is the ring of his spells,
And the play of his miracles.
As he giveth all to drink,
Thus or thus they are and think.
He giveth little or giveth much
To make them several or such.
With one drop sheds form and feature;
With the second a special nature;

[1] Studies, Introduction, p. xliv.

The third adds heat's indulgent spark;
The fourth gives light, which eats the dark;
Unto the fifth himself he flings,
AND CONSCIOUS LAW IS KING OF KINGS."[1]

[1] Poems, "Wood-Notes," Ralph Waldo Emerson, p. 169.

CHAPTER VI.

TRINITARIAN IDEALISM—THE CONSEQUENCES OF THESE IDEAS OF SIN.

"The brevity of his life must have some meaning."
PARKER.

So much for self-denominated Unitarianism. Opposed to the orthodox idea of the atonement, is a notion of the work of Jesus Christ, which bears just this relationship to the ideas of Unitarianism on the subject: that it denies the vicarious phase of Christ's work, and gives the whole life and death of our Lord an influential agency such as is defined by the Unitarian school of theology.

We have no space for a critical history of these views. They are, too, quite as well known as any of the expressions of this spirit. Horace Bushnell, in our own country, and Dr. John Young, of Scotland, in the east, have a wing of their own; and though they stand in clear-cut contrast with the views of less sober and

ethical natures, these eloquent and tender expressions are animated with Idealism, and form part of its literature. We make this assertion, here, notwithstanding the fact of professed Trinitarianism, because of the fact that such views of sin, God, the statements of conscience, the expressions of Jesus, and the necessities of the human family seem to us the same as those of professed Unitarianism, and above all because *in the characteristic undertaking of Jesus Christ, in the work for which He came, in the single mighty and suggestive act of that wonderful life, Jesus has no use for His Deity, and thus because the universe has no unused energy, we are led to regard Him as a Unitarian Christ.*

While, for these abundant avowals of Trinitarianism which come with them, we have respect, there are theories of the atonement obtaining in this country and Europe, unlike Mr. Jowett's, praised and paraded by Unitarian literature, but like those of Bushnell and Young, founded on the same principles, reducible to the same general propositions, without meaning, except with the same terminology,

and used with the same destructive effect on other doctrinal positions. Called by various names, they have a common origin, and accomplish a common end.

Coleridge needs no re-statement, and certainly those who have retailed his shining thought do not need mention and criticism. Sufficient use of the works of Maurice, Kingsley, Robertson, Davies, Stanley, and Brooke, as the finest expression of the spirit of Idealism, has been made to justify the assertion that the views they hold of the Atonement do not acquire such realness by contact with their professed Trinitarianism, that they need a new classification or treatment.

In general proposition we submit, as already proved by the fact of the doctrinal position of these names and their followers, and the showing which has been made of the necessary route to such a position, that the spirit of Idealism is as manifest here as in Unitarianism itself, and that if Idealism is reducible once to Pantheism, it is always.

Again, if such ideas of sin, when they prevail in the Unitarian Church, are

pantheistic, they are always pantheistic. Coleridge could not, neither can his latest disciple, get a scriptural idea of sin from an unscriptural idea of God as a Righteous Personality.[1]

Nor can the idea of sin, as we find it in Maurice, who was so largely indebted to this philosopher, or in the writings of Charles Kingsley, who sets criticism aghast by his large introduction of Coleridgian philosophy in "Alexandria and Her Schools," be reconciled to a Theism like that of Conscience and the Bible. Nothing is so plain to the readers of Mr. Davies, or even of Mr. Jowett, as that the

[1] Coleridge, Aids to Reflection, p. 180.

Coleridge, Confession of Faith.

Maurice, Theological Essays, London, 2d ed., pp. 149, 210.

Hare, J. C., Sermons on the Law of Self-sacrifice, and The Unity of The Church.

Kingsley, Charles, Sermons on National Subjects, 1st series, p. 14.

Stanley, A. P., The Epistles of St. Paul to the Corinthians. 2 vols.

Jowett, Benj., The Epistles of St. Paul to the Thessalonians, Galatians, etc., 2 vols.

Davies, St. Paul and Modern Thought, Cambridge, 1856.

latter's pantheistic idea of sin is the same philosophy which wrought the former's transcendental notion of the fact. And Mr. Jowett, as an orthodox believer, is enigmatic until he buries his orthodoxy, with all the ideas of sin and a personal God it has cherished, in his essay, "Predestination and Free-will."

We submit that the idea of sin is not to be thought of as independent of the righteousness of God. Coleridge and his followers have so infringed upon this fundamental idea that their idea of sin, whatever else may be said of it, is possible only in Pantheism. Maurice has no hesitation in defining the source of his ideas on conscience and sin as the Pantheism of the German schools. And Kingsley, and Mr. Davies, as the reviewer of Mr. Jowett, vie with each other in unconsciously identifying this Neo-Platonism with the same.

Good and evil are one in God to Mr. Jowett. God is in all the activity of the race. He says, "these pairs of opposites, God and man, mind and matter, soul and body, pass into one another, and are lost

in the idea of a communion of the Creator with His creatures."[1]

It will be said, no one believes this. Yet does not Dr. Bushnell, by the grant of remission of sins without any offset to sin or reference to the necessities of God's government, grant that sin is, after all, not much of a fact, and, indeed, so inconsiderable a fact, as that with it or without it the universe gets on about the same? Does not Dr. Bushnell justify in the face of sin? And can sin be anything if this is sound Theism? And in all this, is there not an impersonal God more manifest than a personal one, as, indeed, these ideas of sin which come of necessity from his ideas of righteousness, remission of sin, and the atonement as a whole, are pantheistic?

We do think that on far more important grounds than this, Dr. Bushnell and those who either by relationship of their views on this subject, or by discipleship, are in sympathy with his idea, have failed of avoiding Pantheism. Indeed, we do not know that they tried to

[1] Vol. ii. pp. 504, 505.

avoid it, but such works as "Nature and the Supernatural," and their teachings, lead us to regard their authors as at least considering themselves under a different category from that under which the confessed students of Schleiermacher and other Pantheologists[1] must walk. In the work "Our Lord's Doctrine of the Atonement," for which, with all the venial errors of what must be called *New Collegeism* (since only Dr. Cunningham, Dr. Bannerman, Dr. Buchanan, and the rest of the faculty of the New College, Edinburgh, seem to proceed with the same principles), a sound theology should be grateful: it is asserted in the text, that "so close is the connection between the doctrine of the atonement and that of Christ's Deity, that they are always found, as history shows, to be either received together or denied together."

While with a broad significance this is true, yet if we are to make such distinctions as lead Dr. Smeaton to mention "the true church," we can have but one

[1] Wütke, Christian Ethics. Prof. Lacroix' Translation, vol. i. pp. 290, 317.

doctrine of the atonement, and since the several ideas of the atonement are so radically at variance that each excludes the other, on a close statement of dogmatic history, this is not true.

One who has read the beautiful ninth chapter of "Nature and the Supernatural" and that author's sermon on "The Christian Trinity, a Practical Truth," "The Christ of History," and passages from Stanley, Robertson, and Prof. Jowett, can do little but wonder at Horace Bushnell on the "Vicarious Sacrifice," with the large literature on the subject coming from these and other sources. Dr. Bushnell gave us the record of a "new and unexpected arrival of light" in "Forgiveness and Law," but we have no such chronicle from these who are named with him.

Catechised, the broadest of the Broad Church would refuse the name of *Unitarian*, in the sense of denying the Deity of Jesus, while a so-called *purchasing atonement* would be upbraided. These facts are obvious to Prof. Smeaton, and this statement, to which we have called

attention, is only the protest of a keen-eyed spirit against the introduction of Idealism in theology.

What are these principles, and what are their fruit? We have seen them in various forms, and we assert that here their fruit is Pantheism.

If Jesus were Divine, it were at least well, and none who claim it deny that the plea of the universe makes it a necessity. Indeed, no one who postulates the Deity of Jesus puts it on other grounds, unless that the ground of God's existence must be in Himself. We are left, in either case, with a *Divine Jesus*, whose existence as such adds to the subsistency of the universe. As a matter of fact, Trinitarians, who oppose the orthodox view of the atonement, assert the necessity of a Divine Jesus, in this work, and seeing it is THE *act for which He came*, it is justly expected that what removes Him in nature from men shall here be of positive account.

But what sort of an atonement with God does Jesus give to men? What in it, as a thing, as made by Christ, what

of it, as accomplished byHim, what about it, as the atonement is represented by this school of thought, that demands Christ the Divine, or in which Deity appears at all?

It is a spectacle—the death–scene—much like the death of a hero. It awes. It opens up the mind's sources of sympathy. The tear-glands are melted. It is an exhibit of something so wonderfully great that it overwhelms the soul. It is "the greatest moral act ever done in the world."[1] "The facts are impressive; the person is clad in wonderful dignity and beauty. The agony is eloquent of love, and the cross is a very shocking murder triumphantly met; and if then the question rises: how are we to use such a history so as to be reconciled by it? we hardly know in which way to begin. How shall we come unto God by the help of this martyrdom? How shall we turn it, or turn ourselves under it, so as to be justified and set at peace with God? Plainly there is a want here; and this want is met in giving a *thought-form* to

[1] Jowett, Epistle of St. Paul, p. 477.

the facts which are not in the facts themselves."[1] "The sacrifice was not offered by men to God, but was made by God for men, and for sin, in order that sin might be forever put down and rooted out of human nature. This stupendous act of divine sacrifice was God's method of conquering the human heart, and of subduing a revolted world, and attaching it to His Throne—pure love—self-sacrificing love—crucified dying love."[2]

It is, or ought to be, a wonderfully tragic thing, according to Dr. Bushnell. He says: "Insipid, uneventful, flat, with no great sentiments in it, no heroic side in duty, nothing heroic anywhere, nothing to condemn that touches us, nothing to forgive because we are not touched—why, such a world would even die of inanity. No; let us have tragedy, and a strong, large mixture of it.[3] He then adds rejoicingly, "Beheld in its outward human incidents, it (the life and death of

[1] Bushnell, The Vicarious Sacrifice, p. 533.

[2] John Young, L.L.D., Life and Light of Men, p. 301.

[3] Forgiveness and Law, p. 50.

Jesus) is the tragedy of the love of God."[1]

We are told that in all this, that God is unchanged. His fatherhood is just disclosed. His love to men is, by this means, revealed. But it is a "Divine Sacrifice" of what? Of Jesus as God in any sense? Yes. But why not of a man? Why not of Socrates, such as Dr. Young conceives him to have been—or of Pythagoras? And why not say an atonement or even *the* atonement came by the hand and life of some one of the apostles, since, as hinted by Prof. Smeaton, "they taught that 'God is Love,' and died martyr-deaths in consequence of this testimony?"[2] With such circumstances, suppose that Pythagoras had been crucified —give him all these potencies to send the chronicle of his fate to the remotest ages —all these opportunities to perpetuate himself as a figure of noble martyrdom— would not this have done? And why not put John on the cross instead of Christ

[1] Forgiveness and Law, p. 60.

[2] Our Lord's Doctrine, of the Atonement, Note *M*, pages 413, 495, 496.

to accomplish the atonement? Suppose Jesus to have been merely man, after all, would not the tragedy have accomplished all? To all of these, in the name of a "Divine Sacrifice," and their Trinitarianism, they say, no.

Certainly, we reply, the death of Pythagoras would have been "spectacular;" that of Socrates, "impressive;" that of Jesus, as a man, "grand and awful." And since we do not want to change God, but to produce an effect on people's feelings, either of these is sufficient. Not so, for we want an "overwhelming spectacle." [1]

Then it is not because these do not make spectacles that they are insufficient, but of either there is not *enough of a spectacle.* In kind, then, there is nothing wanting. All that is needed, accordingly, is a greater degree of the same, a larger quantity of the same quality as embodied.

[1] If we look at the atonement as the expression of the Divine sympathy, we will find use for Dr. Bushnell's statement of this phase of it, when he says: "Mere sympathy, as we commonly speak, is no great power; it must be somehow a *tremendous sympathy, to* have the true *divine* efficacy." Forgiveness and Law, p. 204.

Now, if the death of Jesus, either as the expression of his life or otherwise, makes the atonement for sin, and all we need in such an atonement is more of the same influence as would proceed from the life and passion of Socrates or John, we are brought to this—that in the fact of the Deity of Jesus lay this power. But this power is only more power of the same sort as that of Socrates, according to these descriptive sketches. Now, if the power of Socrates and Jesus are the same in quality, while we still contend for the the proper Divinity of our Lord, we are reduced to Pantheism—the identification of the human and the Divine; the crucifixion moment is henceforth the moment of the apotheosis of human nature, while God came, then, to his grandest moment of self-consciousness. So it is that the denial of expiatory agency and the denial of the Deity of our Lord walk hand in hand to the same goal.

Pantheism and negative ideas of sin are related as whole and part. As a matter of fact the history and literature of Pantheism have been especially full at

this point. And it would be a pleasant task to place side by side the utterances of the most authentic Pantheism and the large extracts a short acquaintance has prepared for this purpose from present day, and, at this time, representative Unitarianism. Our space forbids this and allows only two or three general statements.

And first, Reason, human history, the Redeemer from sin, and God the Father have a decided utterance with the best expression of Orthodoxy on the subject that "the idea of Sin can only exist where a Divine rule of life is recognized."[1] This Divine rule of life is the moral law.

"But if we could understand the true nature of sin, we must not stop at mere law. We must, first of all, inquire *what is the origin of law and the end it has in view*, for law does not appoint itself, but must be appointed. Behind every law there is a life of which it is the expres-

[1] Paul. Carl Ullmann. The Sinlessness of Jesus, p. 95 (Clark's edition), from which we prefer to quote rather than seek to formulate in our own phrase, the high water-mark of Christian doctrine on this subject.

sion, and a power of which it is the command. In the case of the moral law, the life it expresses can not be merely the life of nature, nor the power by which it is enforced merely the power of nature. The moral, from its very nature, transcends the merely natural. The unity of law has for its foundation the unity of a consciousness from which it proceeds, and only a personal will can address itself to our will with the command, Thou shalt! There must then be a personal, conscious, absolutely moral life, exalted above nature, from which the law springs."[1]

Since "conscience is not the source of moral principles, but the regulator of moral action," besides, since "the material of which it is composed is not absolutely and under all circumstances, the same, nor derived from its own resources, but rather furnished from a source external to itself, and hence differing according to the measure of religious development," since "it is not the primary function of conscience to lay down a moral law but to bear its emphatic testimony thereto in

[1] Sinlessness, p. 23.

special cases, by urgent exhortation to that which is lawful, by stern warning against its opposite, and by direct relation against all infraction," since, "moreover, it is essential to conscience, that its commands and prohibitions should be absolute, that its voice should assert its authority as a *voice of God*, . . . and . all opposition thereto should be perceived to be not merely man's opposition to his own better nature, not merely an injury done to himself, but a violation of the Divine order, and a resistance to God himself,"[1]—since a Personal God is postulated—since the moral law is necessarily derived from a personal Being, even from Him who created and governs the universe, then is the source of the moral law none other than the living, the personal God."[2]

But the Unitarian ideas of sin, to which we have called attention, are not possible in such a state of facts, as influencing

[1] Sinlessness, p. 24.
Julius Müller, Lehre Von d' Sünde ii. ch. 3.
Liddon, Some Elements of Religion, pp. 154, 155.
[2] Sinlessness, p. 25.

sin. And the ideas we have thus looked at, from this literature, do not agree with their constituent elements. Hence, because they are impossible on the score of a living and personal God, they can only be possible on the score of an impersonal God, which is but another name for the universe, and which, however much he may "tend to personality," is the first postulate and the highest assertion of Pantheism.[1]

Secondly (*a*), "the proper seat of sin is the will,"[2] and of course it is impossible except to a personality. All Unitarian translations give "Be ye holy for I am holy," and thus is a reason assigned, as well as a demand made. The only reason seems to lie in the fundamental philo-

[1] Van Oosterzee, Christain Dogmatics, vol. ii. p. 396.

[2] Compare Bibliotheca Sacra, vol. v. pp. 499, 512.
Bibliotheca Sacra, vol. vi. pp. 247, 798.
Van Oosterzee's Dogmatics, vol. ii. p. 392, et seq.
Wütke's Christian Ethics, vol. ii. p. 10.
Müller's Lehre V-d-Sünde, p. 166.
Hodge's Sys. Theology, vol. ii. ch. v.
Thompson's Theology of N. Testament, pp. 40, 83.
Van Oosterzee's Theology of N. Testament, pp. 94, 385.

sopheme—the unity of the universe. But, as we think, universal unity is a dependent existence, on the concurrence of Free Divine Personality, and Free Human Personality. "All have sinned,"[1] say the Unitarian translations. Hence all have been opponents of the unity of the universe which primarily is of God, and dependent upon Him. All have, in other words, set up their wills against God's will. Sin in one will against holiness in the other! One product of personality against another product of personality!

Scripture of all sorts cries for expiation. Unitarianism denies the possibility of such expiation, and hence the existence of expiation in this universal unity. So, since there must be a break in the idea of sin and hence in personality, or an expiation,and "there is no expiation," we have a break in personality. There is no personality beneath the Unitarian idea of sin, to whose literature we have referred. And if man is not personal in

[1] Hedge's Primeval World of Hebrew Tradition, p. 36, et seq.

sin; God is not personal in holiness,[1] thus leaving us with an impersonal God, which, however much he may be "Ordo Ordinans," is the first postulate and the highest assertion of Pantheism.

(*b.*) We have heard that "sin is natural," and that "it is as much a part of the universe as the night is of the twenty-four hours." As sure as God, as Infinite, Free, and Rational Personality, exists and rules, sin is unnatural. For, by the nature of things, unless He can not will, sin is opposed to His will; unless He can not think, is sin eternally opposed to His thought. And as truly as God can feel, is the transgressing of men opposed to the infinite feeling. We are left just here: either sin is unnatural and God is personal, or sin is natural and God is impersonal.

The goal of man is taken away as soon as the personal God departs; and conversely, the personal God[2] departs as the

[1] Delitzsch, Biblical Psychology iv. i.

[2] Compare Liddon's Some Elements of Religion, p. 63.

Van Oosterzee's Christian Dogmatism, pp. 245, 253, vol. i.

goal of man is taken away. Now how is the goal taken? Truly, if we are to believe the conscience, the Bible, and the Universe, we are to accept the moral life as this goal.[1] But we are told that sin is right enough in its genesis, purpose, and end, while conscience lashes our soul with an agony, the universe about us seems a hell, and Scripture stretches over our head the curses of the law. Now, if sin is natural, this is no moral government, and God is no moral governor; so that "Be ye holy, for I am holy" is impossible, and if we are to believe what Dr. Martineau says, that "there is no possibility of moral character unless on the moral character of God,"[2] there is no moral character at all.

But it appears that there is something

Bowen's Metaphysics and Ethics, p. 321 (Boston ed.)

Wütke's Christian Ethics, Lacroix, vol. ii. p. 276.

Pantheism and the Christian Faith, p. 64 et seq.

[1] See, for sake of clearest statement—

Wütke,
Martensen,
Von Harless,
Gregory,
} Christian Ethics.

[2] Hours of Thought with Sacred Things, 1876.

that Dr. Martineau calls moral character. It must, therefore, be this natural life he speaks of, which comes of Christianity, a religion "eminently natural," leaving us just where we were with the most radical Unitarianism, and in spite of Dr. Martineau's famous word about sin, quoted in another place—with a God whose finer lineaments we find in the gospel of Pantheism.[1]

[1] Compare Dr. Hedge's Essay, "Dualism and Optimism," with its marvelous "fast and loose" playing; the saying that, "Either there is no God such as we figure him, or there is no evil. Believing in a God on the strength of his idea in my mind, independently of the argument from Nature, I say there is no evil." And the assertions that, "All the darkness of 'Life' is indispensable to constitute its bright side;" "The time will never come when evil shall wholly cease from the earth," with a larger generalization as set forth by Dorner, "The Person of Christ," note DDDD to p. 224 of div. i. vol. i. p. 250, Ibid, and by Liddon, Some Elements, p. 150.

PART III.

THE TESTIMONY OF POETRY.

CHRISTIAN THEISM.

"*Channing did much to encourage the Trancendentalists in their search for truth, and he gladly attended private conferences at which they predominated; and he held these sometimes at his own house. The last time that I remember seeing him was at one of these meetings in the parlor of his worthy parishioner, Jonathan Phillips, at the Tremont House, Boston; and I can recall the fervor with which he there argued against the Pantheist theory, with its fatalism and its denial of the rise of evil in perverse will, and its treatment of evil as merely the absence of good.*"—SAMUEL OSGOOD.

"*The right of judging if a doctrine be scriptural depends upon the capacity to discern if scripture itself be reasonable. So that the Bible itself is subject to the ideas which the Bible is supposed to embody. It is of no consequence how far Criticism may go in this direction after Reason has assumed her right. She, herself alone, can regulate the extent of her applicability. This is legitimate Unitarianism, and it is also Transcendentalism properly defined. Thus there arose a new school of Unitarianism.*"—JOHN WEISS.

"*On the somewhat stunted stock of Unitarianism—whose characteristic dogma was trust in individual reason as correlative to Supreme Wisdom—had been grafted German Idealism, as taught by masters of most various schools—by Kant and Jacobi, Fichte and Novalis, Schelling and Hegel, Schleiermacher and De Wette; by Madame De Stael, Cousin, Coleridge, and Carlyle; and the result was a vague yet exalted conception of the God-like nature of the human spirit.*"—WILLIAM H. CHANNING.

"*Every Theist who is an Idealist, is also a Pantheist to this extent.*

"*It is but the combination of the two principles of Theism and Idealism.*

"*In its positive aspects, as recognizing the immanence of God in Nature, and affirming them to be the real substratum and ground of the phenomenal world, Pantheism is not irreconcilable with Theism—in fact coincides with the Theism of Theistic Idealists.*"
FREDERIC HENRY HEDGE.

"*The meanest and worst is as dear to God as the One we call His only begotten.*

"*Jesus is of no other order nor a class all by himself, but the supreme instance thus far, in the verdict of history, of this common life with Deity.*

"*Nothing actual in Jesus that is not possible in you and in the feeblest babe in the crib.*

"*God, who is my cause, is my causeway. Prayer is his inhalation and exhalation in my breast.*

"*There is no such thing as a* thing, *but everything is a part of something and of everything else.*

"*No Nature distinct from God.*

"*Matter is the mind's decayed self, buried for a while and awaiting a resurrection.*

"*A good editor tells me my God is Brahma.*

"*I never have been able to pronounce his name.*"—CYRUS AUGUSTUS BARTOL.

"*But, truly, it is beautiful to see the brutish Empire of Mammon cracking everywhere, giving sure promise of dying or of being changed. A strange, chill, almost ghastly dayspring strikes up in Yankeeland itself; my Transcendental friends announce there, in a distinct though somewhat lank-haired, ungainly manner, that the Demiurgus Dollar is dethroned; that new unheard-of Demiurgusships, Priesthoods, Aristocracies, Growths, and Destructions are already visible in the grey of coming Time. Chronos is dethroned by Jove; Odin by St. Olaf; the Dollar can not rule in heaven forever. No: I reckon not. Locinian preachers quit their pulpits in Yankeeland, saying, 'Friends, this is all gone to a coloured cobweb. regret to say!'—and retire into the fields to cultivate onion-beds, and live frugally on vegetables. It is very notable. Old god-like Calvinism declares that its old body is now fallen to tatters and done; and its mournful ghost, disembodied, seeking new embodiment, pipes again in the winds;—a ghost and spirit as yet, but heralding new Spirit-worlds, and better Dynasties than the Dollar One.*"—THOMAS CARLYLE.

PART III.

CHAPTER I.

WORDSWORTH—THE CHRISTIAN THEIST.

"Poetry is a thing more philosophical and mightier than history." ARISTOTLE.

"Pantheism, in one shape or another, may be predicated of all Trancendentalism; but rationalistic Pantheism, pure and simple, is of quite another affinity. Transcendentalism, as we now understand it, may be said to begin from the infinite nature of Duty (however the law may be interpreted), and the coalescence of Deity with the moral sentiment in man. This may tend, *when 'produced' in rationalized forms*, to Antinomianism—it has done so more than once in history; but pure rationalistic Pantheism has no room for the conception of duty, at all; it is essentially and of necessity unmoral. In reading Mr. Emerson, however, and writers of the same school, we might sometimes fancy we had Eckart, or even Thomas à Kempis, before us. Transcendentalism begins from a sense of the immanence of God in the universe. The soul feels that God is not here or there, or thus and thus, this being holy ground and *that* profane ground, but everywhere. His love, yea, and His holiness, are in the lilies of the field, in the rocks and the trees, in the clouds and the

stars; unconscious of themselves, they are there, but in the soul of man they are conscious. The moral sentiment in man is, when we distinguish dialectically, the *voice* of God; but in the moments of absolute communion, God and the soul are one. There is one great ocean of Being, and in that all distinction ends. Whatever is is right, and God is all and in all." HENRY HOLBEACH.

The dogmatism of literature is manifest to all who study, not only the signs of the times, but also the signs of eternity. Literature which lasts has the authority of the best and noblest souls behind it. Human nature, to which much appeal is sometimes made, by this means gives strong utterance to its opinions, which opinions, when examined, are the declaration of its constitution, the exhibition of its truth, the publication of its message. Scholarly critics of the greatest figure in English literature have been at pains to discuss, elaborately, the poetry of Shakespeare, as, in this sense, conspicuous; and, it may be said that Shakespeare has been known to give the foes of sound theology serious trouble, as he has been found as utterly unmanageable by the liberalists as by those who assail human nature through systems

of theology. This prince of poets is the prince of dogmatists; and demolishes at once all the gratuitous assumptions of heretic and bigot. He has the authority now of many years of admiring criticism, spoken from all of life's points of view, and is thus doubly strong. All this, because the nature of man is a fixed quantity; because he who exhibits it deals in marketable ware; because he who builds upon it has builded upon what is immortal and in God's own image. Thus it comes that poets such as he live in the ever-increasing esteem of mankind; and it may be said again, without fear of its becoming distasteful, unless to those who have illy-considered systems of theology to preserve, that he who finds in such literature, as a leading and organic idea, any principle, which in other fields of thought seems disputable, takes with him into that controversy a strong argument for its truth—that human nature, in its sanest moods, has affixed thereto its sign and seal.

Because the school of thought with which this essay has to do seeks no appeal

from human nature, but rather, in high spirit, asks a final decision at this court, there is no need of further and more extended statement.

Lest it may be said, however, that the bible-ideas are poetic, and not to be treated as severely-thought maxims, but rather as the out-gushings of the imaginative soul, and that, therefore, little dogmatic account is to be made of them, it ought to be understood that if other poetry to which the ages give a hearing persists in perpetuating them, and holding them up in all the rich coloring that the finest spirits can shed upon them, it is only the more certain assurance that human nature gets life from them, and declines to lose them. Because of these facts, and that they may be made more evident by illustration, as well as because his name has been associated with the very theory of being against which human nature protests, is attention called to William Wordsworth, as a Christian Theist.

The name has been redeemed from the aspersions of criticism, and blessed with

affectionate praise. Jeffrey, who thought him the most stupid of poets, and who grew petulant under what he took for weariness and inanity, has been hushed by human nature, which wakes at his mighty tread, and sees the world grow significant under his lustrous eyes, thinking him the most thoughtful of poets. "But human nature is Pantheistic, if Wordsworth is admired!" "Human nature is a Transcendentalist, if his poetry is perpetuated!" Because these are the assertions of those who do not understand Theism, and the philosophy which underlies it; because, also, these statements fall from lips which have never repeated Wordsworth understandingly; because, as we believe, some even confuse the truth of Jesus with Pantheism itself—is his name brought into this essay.

Most persons will grant that the assertion of the greatness of the soul can not be too loud or long. Mr. Emerson may say that "the remedy for our defects is, first, soul; and second, soul; and evermore, soul," if he desires. That claim can not be made too often. But he may only see

one side of this "soul;" then is his statement exclusive of other truth. Then does it cease to be truth. The edges of truths coalesce; they never overlap or hide each other. Mr. Emerson ought, perhaps, to say this, and mean more than we think he does. For he may say "evermore, soul," and mean "evermore, intuitions." He may mean to preach Idealism, and that alone. Then the assertion defeats itself, against the nature of things, against universal order, against the most low as well as the "Most High." All Idealism needs to be realized. All Realism needs to be idealized. Philosophy demands a mutual interpenetration of the facts in the case—that our dualism be at root and top monism. Then shall the most logical theory be the best in practice.

We are quite aware that the word Transcendentalist has fallen into bad odor; but it is a good word nevertheless. All true souls are, not in the sense of the New England Idealists, but in the sense of Jesus and Paul, Transcendentalists. What is the earth without the sky?

Yonderness, the unseen, the unrealized, the edge of the ideal which the real postulates—these every one who lives through and through knows and believes in. But we stand on the earth to gaze at the section of deepest blue. We are here before we are there. Yonder is beyond, and only what we see is seen. Yet our very Descendentalism, as Carlyle calls it, calls loudly for enough Trancendentalism to preserve the whole. And the soul finds itself often saying, "there is an America on the other side to balance."

The term Transcendentalism was used long before Kant, by Duns Scotus. It is as absurd to date its birth with the great German thinker, as to suppose, with Mr. Frothingham, that the philosophy had a "distinct origin" with him. That, like many other fine words, it has been abused, no one can doubt. Those who have seen this have been most shy of it. On the high authority of Mr. Emerson, as well as for the reason that we desired the lines to be clear, have we used it up to this point as synonymous with Idealism, such

as was found on Brook Farm in 1842, such as was more highly developed in the religious philosophy of the East. This is conceding a good word to bad use. It is like the giving up of Deism to Herbert and Shaftesbury. Deism may be gone, and it may be useful to have that abuse made of it, to distinguish it from the basic idea of the New Testament and life—Theism. But Theism, which, if left in the hands of Richard Watson and many others, will go also, must be preserved. Is not Transcendentalism worthy of more enduring associations? Transcendentalism has been exaggerated, in that its distinctive characteristic—faith in the constitution of the soul as a light in investigation—has been magnified at the expense of other no less eminently worthy traits: faith in the marks of spirit anywhere, faith in God as what the soul desires. Theism has been exaggerated, in that its distinctive and characteristic belief in the Personality of God has been magnified at the expense of other characteristics, not less worthy, such as what Des Cartes called "the

Immanence of God," and that to which Paul calls attention, when he says: "For we also are His offspring." Indeed, as the faith in the soul, to which Transcendentalism is pledged, has been made to be faith in only one set of the faculties of the soul; so has the belief in God, as Sovereign, distinct from what He rules over, to which Theism clings, been taken as belief in One absolutely removed from His universe, to which He has given motion and a farewell. The upshot of the matter is, Transcendentalism passes for Idealism; Theism for Deism. Emerson has sanctioned this use of the one, Watson logically assents to that of the other. Both terms ought to be redeemed.

In this true sense of the words, we must agree with one who has said much upon this subject, that "pure Theism can not stand unless it is of a Transcendental quality."[1] We must say more, pure Theism is not possible, unless it is of such a quality. Such Theism as is not, is only

[1] Transcendentalism in England, New England, and India. By Henry Holbeach. Contemporary Review, January, 1877.

Deism. It closes up all the avenues to perpetual enlightenment. To any soul under the dominion of such a creed, truth is dead; and truth is nothing, if it is not life. There *may* be a God to the soul who can not be trusted at all, but there is no consciousness that there is. When the soul is trusted, on the other hand, as her nature suggests—*trusted*, not required to invent—then God reigns consciously to the race of men. Transcendentalism, such as was that of Jesus and Wordsworth, is faith in the intuitions to *test*, not to *produce*, what is said to be true; and when, to a soul thus comparisoned by nature, it is hinted that *God is*, the reply of the whole man is, *yea and even here.* The Salvation of Theism is faith in first truths. All faith involves *use*, not *abuse.* While, on the one hand, it is as false intellectual policy and as much a negation of universal order to reject the testimony of these intuitions as it would be foolish to ask a salesman to sell exactly ten yards of silk without ever having measured silk, much less this piece, it would, on the other hand, be as false intellectual policy and

as much a negation of universal order to force these intuitions to discover truth or to formulate a system of life-politics, as it would be to require the finest landscape painter to manufacture, for the academy, a picture out of his ideas. *Transcendental* has been made to mean *subjective*, as *empiric* has been made to mean *objective*. And the Transcendentalism of 1842 and of Brahminism is the very antithesis of the Sensationalism of John Locke and the eighteenth century. The former culminates with absolute spirit with its forms of star and brain; the latter, with absolute matter, with its final evolution of thought. The one is the genius of Pantheism; the other is that of Atheism.

In the face of this, we plead for a restoration of the word to philosophy. As the matter now stands, it is not definitive of anything, but of the abuse of a fragment of the whole nature, and that so magnified into absurdity as to render its oracular sayings obsolete so soon as uttered.

To the out-and-out Idealist, there was nothing gained in leaving the eighteenth century Sensationalism, so far as reaching

the whole truth was concerned. It was leaving one authority to adore another. It was only a change of half-truths, which are the seeds of whole errors. Both were, and yet are, false gods. The lordship, in each case, is excessive, and greatness of outlook, which can never come except of that least narrow of all things—liberty—could not be here. It might have been an appeal from the Understanding to the Reason, as Coleridge thought, but that could not bring a full view. One might use Wordsworth's word and substitute in the equation of Coleridge, "Imaginative faith" for "Reason," and the tyranny is the same. There is no gain in the exchange of narrowness for narrowness, absolutism for absolutism. But there is gain in opening the whole soul. There is no overloading faith in man as a whole. There is always success in the line of nature and universal order. There is victory and accession of strength to him who enters in with his total self. Truth lies before the soul who may use the word of Jesus, as a principle of activity: "Except

ye become as children ye can not enter into the kingdom of heaven."

In this truer sense was Wordsworth a Transcendentalist. He is the chief, among later English poets, of those who use their intuitions. He believes them so fully that their influence is always dominative. If three-fourths of life is conduct, as Mr. Arnold suggests, we must say that three-fourths of this conduct in Wordsworth sprung from his faith in these tell-tales of the Divinity. The first truths are also the last truths to him. No difficulties of the sylogism could dispossess him. He felt them to be his best and ultimate possession, and what they brought when they came was his most valuable intellectual capital. His poetry is so woven on this idea that it stands as the testimonial of a high spirit to the nature of things as perceived by it. But his poetry is in marked contradistinction to the literature in which the intuitions are asked to work alone. In such cases, as the effort is fragmentary, the result is fragmentary. Nature and life are on the side of wholeness. He who looks at the nature of

things without in the light of the nature of things within sees the whole truth. "As ye measure so shall it be measured to you."

When the eye is filled with an unbelief which comes of faith in the intuitions and in them only; when the ear is clogged with a trust in something else to the exclusion of trust in it; when the sentiments and passions, the desires and perceptions, the memory and judgment, are called upon not to follow but to remain at home, while the intuitions, which alone are said to be trustworthy, go out to catch glimpses of the whole; when what is to dictate does not dictate to anything but itself; when what is inner is made outer; then the result will be nothing. The spirit is not the richer. She has just what she had before. The intuitions brought back what they took. Thought has not even been allowed to attach itself to something phenomenal. It may be imposed upon the thing, it is not gathered from it. The mountains are the language of the spirit which spake. The flower is the mirror

of one's idea. The whole affair is a soliloquy. And this is Idealism.

When, on the other hand, the soul is told to hush, that length and breadth and thickness may be had; when she is said to be unworthy of reliance; when she speaks about what is a fact of her own existence, that the ear may discover the march of nations; when the imagination is called insane and pronounced an inventor of vagaries and superstitions, as the brain of Shakespeare is weighed with reference to King Lear and Hamlet; when the intuitions are said to be wild theorists and weak but self-deceived thoughts, which can not be helped, as the grave of Jesus is investigated and the cross of Calvary tested for the discovery of blood; when this is our mode of faith, the sky is full of bright, yellow, shining things; the earth is a geologic formation; the flowers are multiplex cells; "Aurora Leigh" is the result of a peculiar modification of the matter within the skull; the census is taken; graveyards are only fertilizers. And this is Realism.

When, however, the whole soul is

aroused to the privilege of expression and of receiving the gift of the universe; when faith in all the avenues of being kindles anew the life therein; when eye and ear and sense are surcharged with the eager spirit; when these messengers of the eternal truth—the intuitions—are all aglow with the contagion which possesses the soul; when the world without and the world within meet, each with each, the barriers fall, thought and the thing thought of enter into knowledge by that strange transmutation; the imagination lights it up with an unearthly radiance; Tintern Abbey is transfigured. And this is Ideal-Realism.

The theological phase of the first is Pantheism; of the second, Atheism; of the third, Theism.

The late critics of Wordsworth have called him a Transcendentalist. If, by this, it is meant that he believed in what Aristotle called "the testimony of first truths," the term is always applicable. If it is meant that he accepted these primal instincts as the complete outfit of the soul, it is never applicable. It is known

that people who read Wordsworth incautiously think him to have been an Idealist and Pantheist once—that it was like Noah's intoxication, and only once. But any one who will look into the matter one word's depth will see that his "imaginative faith" was in the soul, as such, and that, being a devout nature, his spirit was transcendental, as we are told all "deeply devout natures are."[1] He was a thoughtful nature; and, being a thoughtful soul, he was transcendental, as indeed, also, all deeply thoughtful natures are. Mr. Frothingham would persist in calling him a Transcendentalist, in the vicious sense.[2] But it ought to be remembered that Wordsworth never felt that glow of sympathy which accepted all that he heard of Idealism, as did Coleridge, when, together, they went to its leading advocates. Wordsworth did not learn the language, and, as Mr. Shairp says, he "gave the world instead immortal poems." Coleridge went alone to Göttingen, learned German, dived for the rest of his life deep

[1] Holbeach, Transcendantalism.

[2] Transcendantalism in New England, p. 96.

into transcendental metaphysics, and the world got no more "Ancient Mariners." Mr. Frothingham acknowledges that, in spite of the five chapters devoted to it, Coleridge was unsuccessful in his attempt "to bring Wordsworth's psychological faith into sympathy with his own." He then proceeds to say: "Wordsworth's genius has furnished critics with materials for speculation that must be sought in their proper places. We have no fresh analysis to offer. That the secret of his power over the ingenuous and believing minds of his age is to be found in the sentiment with which he invested homely scenes and characters is a superficial conjecture. What led him to invest homely scenes and characters with sentiment, and what made the circumstance interesting to precisely that class of minds? What, but the same latent Idealism that came to deliberate and formal expression in Coleridge, and suggested in the one what was proclaimed by the other! For Wordsworth was a metaphysician, though he did not clearly suspect it; at least, if he did, he was careful not to betray himself

by the usual signs. The philosophers recognized him and paid to him their acknowledgments." [1]

All of which, the reader will notice, is an admission that there was enough of some other element to keep his faith in the intuitions from running wild; that he had Idealism, as all true poets have, and as all thinkers have. He had much more—enough of something to keep him from being classed with one that nothing but a reality could make him differ from. He was so natural a metaphysician that he did not suspect it. So are all the true souls. Until one has the dyspepsia he is unconscious of having a stomach; but then he thinks he has little else. So of false and unnatural metaphysics. Things go so easy with the Ideal-Realist that he dreams not of any possession. He simply possesses himself in the truth. "Ye shall know the truth," said the most conspicuous of them; "and the truth shall make you free."

Wordsworth's faith in Imagination was only the realization he had of the poet's aim and work. He knew that poetry was

[1] Transcendentalism in New England, p. 97.

spiritual life in the atmosphere of the imagination. When Mr. Frothingham quotes him, and then asks, "Was this an echo from the German Jacobi, whose doctrine of faith had sometime been abroad in the intellectual world?[1]" he asks what the words of Wordsworth will answer by a strong negative. For, says the poet, "the imagination is conscious of an indistructible dominion; the soul may fall away from it, not being able to sustain its grandeur; but if once felt and acknowledged, by no act of any other faculty of the mind can it be relaxed, impaired, or diminished. Fancy is given to quicken and to beguile the temporal part of our nature; Imagination to incite and support the internal." "Faith was given to man, that his affections, detached from the treasures of time, might be inclined to settle on that of eternity; the elevation of his nature, which this habit produces on earth, being to him a presumptive evidence of a future state of existence, and giving him title to partake of its holiness. The religious man values what

[1] Transcendentalism in New England, p. 151.

he sees, chiefly as an imperfect shaddowing forth of what he is incapable of seeing."[1]

As we shall see presently, whether the famous "Ode" is or is not a "clear reminiscence of Platonism," Theism, which postulates the "immanence" of God, as Deism does not, which also clings to Personality, as Pantheism can not, desires no loftier strain. If the Transcendentalists of New England loved it, not less do those of the Wordsworthian school love it. If it is to Emerson, "the best modern essay on the subject," and "the high-water mark of English Poetry," so would it be to Paul; so also to Ueberweg. If this passage suggests Fichte[2]—

> "This is the genuine course, the aim, the end
> Of prescient reason; all conclusions else
> Are abject, vain, presumptuous, and perverse,
> The faith partaking of those holy times.
>
> "Life, I repeat, is energy of Love,
> Divine or human; exercised in pain,
> In strife, or tribulation, and ordained,
> If so approved and satisfied, to pass
> Through shades and silent rest, to endless joy"—

[1] Transcendentalism in New England, p. 100.
[2] Ibid, p. 102.

it also suggests one who said: "In him we live, and move, and have our being," as also, his master, saying: "God is Love," "The kingdom of God is within you," "God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten son," "Father, forgive them for they know not what they do."

If this passage is like the "Pantheism" of Schelling[1]—

"Thou, who did'st wrap the cloud
Of infancy around us, that Thyself
Therein, with our simplicity, awhile
Might'st hold, on earth, communion undisturbed;
Who, from the anarchy of dreaming sleep,
Or from the death-like void, with punctual care,
And touch as gentle as the morning light,
Restorest us, daily, to the powers of sense
And reason's steadfast rule. Thou, Thou alone
Art everlasting, and the blessed Spirits,
Which Thou includest, as the sea her waves.
For adoration Thou endurest; endure
For consciousness the motion of Thy will;
For apprehension those transcendent truths
Of the pure Intellect that stand as laws;
Submission, constituting strength and power,
Even to Thy Being's infinite Majesty"—

it is like the Theism of David, also. It is

[1] Transcendentalism in New England, p. 102.

taken from a copy of Wordsworth's poems, "once the possession of an earnest Transcendentalist," with these lines "underlined."[1] Now, it must be admitted, that so far as this goes as a claim for its being Pantheism, the first two lines are as far from Pantheism as they could be, and the rest of the passage is only the poetic touch he has given to the fact that God is not only *over all* but *in all*. There is no fatalism here. All is balanced with the idea of personality, and, so far from saying that the "Spirits" of men are God, as waves are the sea, he only says that God includes them thus. It is a vision of a universe filled with life, and has no strain in which Christian Theism does not join.

"It can not be denied," says Mr. Shairp, "that in pure, but perhaps too confident youth, the Naturalistic Spirit, so to call it, is stronger in his poetry than the Christian. He expected more from the teachings of nature, combined with the moral intuitions of his soul, than these in

[1] Transcendentalism in New England, p. 103.

themselves, and unaided, can give."[1] Yet, it may be asked, did he not realize his greatest expectations? We have no record of his disappointment. On the other hand, it is said, in truth, that from no one has the literature of nature gained so much. He says of himself, that to him came

"Gleams like the flashing of a shield; the earth
And common face of Nature spake to him
Rememberable things."

He had moments of great joy.

"Oft in these moments such a holy calm
Would overspread my soul, that bodily eyes
Were entirely forgotten, and what I saw
Appeared like something in myself, a dream,
A prospect of the mind."

His life was an undying memorial of the fact he declared:

"To me the meanest flower that blows can give
Thoughts that do often lie too deep for tears."

Wordsworth is the apostle of the fact that God *is*, not *was*, and that, not only *over all*, but *in all*. This is Theism.

But even if Mr. Shairp has the truth, he has said nothing which exhibits a vulnerable side of Theism. If Pantheism

[1] The Poetic Interpretation of Nature, p. 269.

reveals the presence of God, by making Him impersonal, Theism reveals it none the less, by holding to His personality. What can be the presence of an impersonal? Leaving this as only a suggestion, how can the impersonal one be nearer than the Personal One? Theism is impossible without a perpetual omnipresence. To hold that it is personal is not to remove it. It is to make it real. The best side of Pantheism is a dream after what is a fact to consciousness in Theism, *the everywhereness of God.* Theism is just the statement that the constantly Present One is. The worst side of Pantheism is also a dream, but in the opposite direction, of what is impossible in Theism—the abolition of duty, the destruction of personalty, the denial of freedom, and thus of the moral life, the loss of both nature and the supernatural by their identification. Theism is also just the statement that the Personal God is. Such a Theist was Wordsworth. It is absurd, because he believed in the presence of God, to call him a Pantheist. As well might those who know him to have

believed in the personality of God, call him a Deist. "*Θεός*" "*Theism*" are words which suggest both. To Theism, as to Wordsworth, God is Personal Presence. Wordsworth exhibited the the truth of the paradox that when the soul sees God truly, it sees nature truly. Nature and the supernatural are ways to each other. The vision of God transfigures Nature. Then it is seen that the God over things and above things is also God in things and through things.

Wordsworth himself tells us that he was visited with streaks of Idealism. He says: "I was often unable to think of external things as having external existence, and I communed with all I saw as something not apart from, but inherent in, my own immaterial nature. Many times, while going to school, have I grasped at a wall or tree to recall myself from the abyss of Idealism to reality. At that time I was afraid of such processes. In later periods of life I have deplored, as we all have reason to do, a subjugation of an opposite character, and have rejoiced over these remembrances."

This Idealism is like that of Johnson's antagonist, which he refuted by striking a "solid fact"—that is, it is no Idealism at all. Here is Idealism:

"Sankára Atcharcya held the wise man's faith,
That nought is real here, but empty as a wraith.
One day a hostile Brahmin to his friends observes:
'Drive we an elephant towards him, and if he swerves,
He is a hypocrite, if not, he is a saint.'
Accordingly, to ride him down they made a feint;
Sankára fled aside at once. They ask, 'O, why
Before a mere illusion did you stoop to fly?'
Sankára says: 'There was no elephant, no flight;
The whole was nothing but a dream's deceptive sight.'"[1]

The truth is, Wordsworth's power is manifest, in that he made vast additions to this spirit, and Mr. Shairp is right when, in speaking of his Idealism, which was the true Transcendentalism, he says: "The ideal light he sheds is a true light, and the more ideal it is, the more true."[2] Such is Ideal-Realism, the philosophy which underlies Theism.

Idealism itself is disintegrating to all the facts which come to man from the world without; and even though within him

[1] From Alger's Poetry of the Orient, p. 241.
[2] Studies in Poetry and Philosophy, p. 54.

there may be strong wants which the facts without, as presented to him, desire to meet and propose to satisfy, if his Idealism is of the pure, uncompromising sort, it melts them into the general mirage. The Idealist is logically only conscious of himself. To this phase of himself he looks as the radical fact, and when he is presented with something which, as yet, has been unincorporated (as his system suggests) into his knowledge of himself, which is foreign to his consciousness, though not to his wants, if he be logical, he views it as unsubstantialized by this principle. It was a new phase of self-conscious life. He fuses the objective into the subjective. The without is lost in the within, since all *extra*-ness is *intra*-ness. Idealists, in spite of this, lay great claim to the exposition they give of belief in the being of God. But, admitting that God is, to every Idealist—however much he may stand in need of such an existence to gratify and to satisfy his own existence—God can not be a fact without him as well as within him. This would outrage his principle. He is conscious of himself alone,

whatever may be the life within his life; and thus it is that he comes to say *God is* and *I am*, in the same breath. But, because such Idealism destroys the Sovereignty, the Personality, the External One as outside of him, he must say: I am God, and He has touched lofty heights of being through me, in this, my assertion, since He knows Himself in me, and we are One. This has been finely termed "Egotheism."[1] It is also Idealism pronouncing itself Pantheism.

While thus the line is clear between Theism and Pantheism, it is easy to agree with Mr. Shairp, when he says: "The invisible voice that came to him, through the visible universe, was not in him, as has been often asserted, a Pantheistic conception. Almost in the same breath he speaks of

'Nature's self, which is the breath of God.'

And—

'His pure word, by miracle revealed.'

"He tells us that he held the speaking

[1] Thomas Hill, Theology of the Sciences, p. 196.

face of earth and heaven to be an organ of intercourse with man—

> 'Established by the sovereign intellect,
> Who, through the bodily image hath diffused,
> As might appear to the eyes of fleeting time,
> A deathless spirit.'

"And, again, he says that even if the earth were to be burnt up and disappear—

> 'Yet would the living Presence still subsist
> Victorious.'

To assert this, whatever it may be, is not to preach Pantheism. It is only to make the earth not a mere piece of mechanism, but a vital entity, and to regard it as in living and intimate relation with Him who made and upholds it, and speaks to Man more or less distinctly through it."[1] He might have added that it was simply the ensphering in the same thought of the antipodes of Christian Theism.

Mr. Henry Holbeach opens his excel-

[1] The Poetic Interpretation of Nature, p. 188.

lent article on Transcendentalism[1] by quoting the favorite story of the East:

"One knocked at the Beloved's door; and a voice asked from within, 'Who is there?' And he answered, 'It is I.' Then the voice said, 'This house will not hold me and thee.' And the door was not opened. Then went the lover into the desert, and fasted and prayed in solitude. And after a year he returned, and knocked again at the door. And again the voice asked, 'Who is there?' And he said, 'It is thyself.' And the door was opened to him."

He adds: "Whoever receives with open arms this parable of the Persian poet, is, or may be, a Transcendentalist. Whoever asks what it means, should hold himself warned off from the ground occupied or traversed by Transcendental writers or thinkers."[2] Which is to say that Transcendentalism, at the best, is Pantheism, from which Wordsworth, as is evident, is a long distance.

[1] Transcendentalism in England, New England and India, Contemporary Review, Feb. 1877.

[2] Page 469.

He is right when he quotes the younger Channing approvingly:

"Transcendentalism, as viewed by its disciples, was a pilgrimage from the idolatrous world of creeds and rituals to the temple of the living God in the soul;" but it would be wrong to say that they succeeded. To trust in ritual and creed is always akin to Materialism, if not a touch of its spirit. To disregard all but the faculties believed in by them was, at least logically, Pantheism. The idolatry is the same. Both are illogical in principle. And nothing could be more absurd than to connect Cecil and Wilberforce[1] with such a theory, "at the expense of their logic," since they were too logical, as well as too practical, for such a fatal error. The Transcendentalism they professed and lived was, like that of Wordsworth, with the logic of the universe on its side.

The connection of true Transcendentalism with Christianity is manifest to all who have come thus far. Christianity, which uses all of man, has to do with every atom of this Son of God. So far, how-

[1] Page 469.

ever, is it from that of Fichte and Emerson—the one giving us a shoreless sea, the other absolving us from prayer—that it teaches the aspiration of the soul to the personal God, crying, "Our Father, who art in heaven," as it also invites to the belief, "Now are we the Sons of God, but it doth not yet appear what we shall be, but we know that when He shall appear, we shall be like Him, for we shall see Him as He is." In this sense—that Christianity is the "power of God unto salvation" for the whole man—are its ethics Transcendental, and "might be otherwise expressed in the hackneyed words of Shakespeare:"[1]

> "This, above all, to thine own self be true,
> And it must follow, as the night the day,
> Thou canst not then be false to any man."

In Christianity every private aim is human.

Mr. Edward Dowden, who has said much upon this subject, can hardly be said to have taken into account all the forces of this movement, and is thus fragmentary when he treats this phase of the

[1] Page 472.

poetry of Wordsworth. It is manifestly too much to say that Wordsworth was a Transcendentalist, in the sense we have been criticizing, for, by Mr. Dowden's own showing, to him[1] "the senses, themselves sacred, and hardly more to be named senses than soul, are ministers to what is highest in man, 'subservient still to moral purposes, auxiliar to divine.' There was for him an unceasing ritual of sensible forms appealing to the heart, the imagination, and the moral will—a grand function was in perpetual progress while seed-time and harvest and summer and winter endure."

Mr. Dowden also says: "To those who are strangers to this state of impassioned contemplation, Wordsworth's poetry, or all that is highest in it, is as a sealed book. But one who is in any true sense his disciple must yield to Wordsworth, so long as he is a disciple, the deep consent of his total being. Now what appearance will the world present to senses which are informed with spirit?

[1] Transcendental Movement and Literature, Contemporary Review, July, 1877.

It will itself appear spiritual, and as the gazer still contemplates what is around and within him, and his tranquility ascends into a calm ecstasy, he will become conscious of all things, and himself among them, as, in a state of vital interaction, God and man and nature communicating with one another, playing into and through one another:

> "And I have felt
> A presence that disturbs me with the joy
> Of elevated thoughts; a sense sublime
> Of something far more deeply interfused,
> Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,
> And the round ocean, and the living air,
> And the blue sky, and in the mind of man:
> A motion and a spirit that impels
> All thinking things, all objects of all thoughts,
> And rolls through all things."

Idealism has not to do with the "Total being." In its poetry, God and man are one, and the same, and this logically. What could be more absurd, than—even at this point, where those persons who seek a reason for calling him Idealist and Pantheist, stand triumphant—to conclude that there is any foundation for this claim?

The consideration given to this question will assist us in examining the claim of what is called "Christian Pantheism" to become the religion of the future. It will involve, also, a further discussion of Wordsworth.

CHAPTER II.

IS "CHRISTIAN PANTHEISM" THE CREED OF THE FUTURE?

I sometimes wonder that the human mind,
In searching for creation's hidden things,
Should miss that high intelligence that springs
From that which is not seen, but is divined.
Does knowing much of nature make us blind
To nature's better self? The Greek could see
A conscious life in every stream and tree—
Some nymph or god. Our broader faith should find
A life divine, whose fine pulsations roll
In endless surges through the secret veins
Of earth and sky, which hidden still remains
Save to the instinct of the reverent soul;
Should know that everything from lowest sod
To farthest star thrills with the life of God.

T. R. Bacon.

Sterling to Carlyle: "That is flat Pantheism!"
Carlyle to Sterling: "And what if it 's Pot-theism, if it 's true?"

As the result of the attention suggested in the preceding chapter, it will be allowed that Wordsworth was a Christian Theist. His poetry is impossible, except with the admission that the Personal One is also the Immanent. In him it is evident, if nowhere else, that true

Transcendentalism gives personality as well as perpetual presence. These two ideas are both ensphered by Theism.

That, logically, this Theism is opposed to that which is often heralded by those who cling tenaciously to what they call Orthodoxy, has been all along suggested. But Orthodoxy, as we have used it thus far, means only "*right doctrine*," as it means in any analysis. Allegiance to anything else is vicious. And allegiance to it will often have a serious influence upon that which uses its excellent name.

One example may suffice. And in justice to the church over which his influence extends, it ought to be said that substantially the same criticism which we urge here, has in other forms and from other points of view been mentioned, and some of the highest minds have spoken earnestly against this concession to a bad philosophy[1] and what is falsely called "Orthodoxy."

[1] See especially the article by Dr. B. F. Cocker, in Methodist Quarterly Review, April, 1862, "Metaphysics of Watson's Institutes," and his discussion of Mr. Watson's method in "Christianity and Greek Philosophy."

John Locke and Sensationalism ruled in the day of Richard Watson. The Transcendentalism of Kant had its devotees and followers here and there, but Empiricism held sway in the universities. It need scarcely be said that they were utterly opposed. On the one hand, Locke asserted, "Nihil in intellectu sed quod fuerit prius in sensu," the notion of "innate ideas" is at once absurd and vicious; the mind is like a sheet of untouched paper—it is blank; knowledge comes of sensation, or sensuous perception, apprehending external objects through the external sense, and reflection, or internal perception, apprehending the phenomena within through internal sense; the form, as well as the material of our knowledge, is external; and the external world is thus not merely the occasion of our ideas, but their cause. Color and sound belong to the subject perceiving, but extension and figure to the object perceived. We have no test of truth within. Knowledge is the perception of relationship or its opposite; and these perceptions are regulated by the four relations of identity or

diversity, relation, co-existence, and real existence. These are judgments: their truth must be made out by investigation; the cosmological argument gives us God; the materiality of the soul is conceivable; there are no ideas of right, immortality, duty, responsibility, within man; the ethical principle is happiness.[1]

On the other hand, Kant asserted what had been asserted by Leïbnitz: "Nihil in intellectu sed quod fuerit prius in sensu, —nihil sed intellectus ipse," the notion of innate ideas needs modification; there are forms into which all thoughts must fall; there is a realm of freedom open to consciousness; time and space are subjective forms; the argument for the immortality of the soul is moral; in the physico-theological argument for the existence of God there is an implication of the principle of cause and effect; certain principles are constitutive, others are regulative; experience gives the material for

[1] Ueberweg's History of Philosophy, vol. ii., pp. 80–89.

Bowen's Modern Philosophy, Introduction.

Masson's Recent British Philosophy.

Caird, the Philosophy of Kant.

some of our knowledge, the form is given from within; man is so constituted as to have ideas of duty, responsibility, freedom, and God.[1]

Watson, as is evident, is a follower of John Locke. He asserts that "all observation lies directly against the doctrine of the immortality of man;" so far as observation goes, "the excessive indulgence of appetites usually impairs health," and that nothing, save this fact, indicates "it to be the will of God that the appetites should be restrained within the rules of sobriety;" not only God can not "be demonstrated by human reason" or "defined," but He can not "*in the least be come at;*" He is "the only way to Himself;" "causality is not a necessary intuition"—it is an affair "of argument and proof;" reason, "the logical faculty," is "weak," "uncertain," "erring," and "may be the reverse of the Divine reason;" "we owe our knowledge of the

[1] Ueberweg's History of Philosophy, vol. ii., pp. 80–89.

Bowen's Modern Philosophy, Introduction.

Masson's Recent British Philosophy.

Caird's, The Philosophy of Kant.

existence of God and His attributes to *revelation alone.*"[1]

This has been shown to defeat itself. And not only as Dr. Cocker has suggested, if we reject reason in its efforts after God, who is the One revealed by the Bible and through Tradition, are we compelled to reject reason in its efforts to prove the divine character of the Bible, but also, it must be granted, that if our knowledge of the existence of God is from revelation alone, then, to prove the existence of God is impossible, and we must go further and assert that such Theism is, as we have said, only Deism.

Grant that the assumption of the existence of God is just, that the personal God exists. Now, if man, made in God's image, who is also "His offspring," depends solely upon revelation for a knowledge of this fact, is it not certain that His operation, so far as man can see, has ceased, that the universe has been set in motion, and that God has retired? Can we believe ourselves when we say that the Bible is Divine truth, and distrust

[1] Watson's Theological Institutes.

ourselves in regard to right and wrong, duty and freedom? We are left with an assumption that God is; which assumption, if held just, leaves us with the postulate, the being of God, and that only. We dare not say He is even here. Now this, it must be admitted, is Deism. It is certainly not Christian Theism.

Christian Theism is scriptural and has no such contradictions. Paul felt its significance, as he said men were "His offspring;" that "He is not far from every one of us;" that "He hath determined the bounds of their habitation, that they should seek the Lord, if haply they might feel after Him and find Him;" that what "may be known of God is manifest in them; for God hath showed it unto them. For the invisible things of Him, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even His eternal power and Godhead; so that they are without excuse." Paul felt the presence of God as he who feels His personality only can. The theology of the Bible is of this same all-embracing idea. It unites personality and immanence, calling the infinite One Je-

hovah. To show this by quotation would be to reproduce a large portion of the Bible.

From such a clear atmosphere as any serious faith in this Divine message makes, what could seem less comely than the sober prophecy, which comes from certain Unitarian and Broad-church quarters, that the creed of the future will be "Christian Pantheism;" that, indeed, the Pantheism of Christianity is every day becoming more manifest, and that of such a scheme was Wordsworth the herald and interpreter?

We are told that Goethe's word—

"In the tide of Life, in Action's storms,
A fluctuant wave,
A shuttle free,
Birth and the Grave,
An eternal sea,
A weaving, flowing
Life, all glowing,
Thus at Time's humming loom 't is my hand prepares
The garment of Life which the Deity wears"—

"is the true vision of the world to modern eyes;"[1] that Tennyson has sung the

[1] Contemporary Review, September, 1877, p. 566, "The Scientific Movement and Literature," Edward Dowden.

faith which, if it *was* not "once delivered to the saint," soon will be, when he sings:

"Flower in the crannied wall,
I pluck you out of the crannies;
Hold you there, root and all in my hand,
Little flower; but if I could understand
What you are, root and all—and all in all—
I should know what God and man is."

And—

"The sun, the moon, the stars, the sea, the hills, and the plains,
Are not they, Oh, Lord! the vision of Him who reigns?

"The ear of man can not hear and the eye of man can not see;
Yet if we could see and hear this vision—were it not He.

"Is not the vision He—*though He be not that which he seems!*"

and, by these, all are notified to prepare for it. Since this idea has serious reference to the theory of this essay, and since such preparation is a large task, let us examine two or three of the strongest of these pleas, and find if there be any real ground for this announcement.

Dr. Richard F. Littledale has furnished one side of the argument with the best considered essay bearing upon the subject.[1] Its title will be a surprise to most people. They have not thought of Pantheism as they read the gospels and epistles. Indeed they have thought of something totally different as their souls opened on the prospect of freedom, duty, immortality, and communion with a personal God. And, without further courtesy, it may be said that, so far as this learned article goes, they will not be the more certain that such a thing as Pantheism is even hinted in the literature of Christianity, or indeed has any right to exist at all.

With his assertion that "Wordsworth was personally much less a Pantheist than Goethe,"[2] all serious students, of whatsoever school, will agree. With his treatment of St. Paul[3] the satisfaction will not be so general; and with his

[1] "The Pantheistic Factor in Christian Thought," Contemporary Review, September, 1877.

[2] P. 643.

[3] P. 650.

misinterpretation of Theism, and the consequent error into which he has fallen, no clear thinker can concur.

He has tried to show—it may be to his own satisfaction—how, in Christianity, even the "seemingly contrary and incompatible notions" of the past and present meet,[1] saying, among other things: "To one class of minds, Unity is the highest conception, and the object of worship, to secure its highest reverence, must be isolated in awful and solitary majesty. To quite another, that which is only one is imperfect—lacking all that plurality and fellowship can give—and therefore comes short of the highest ideal. The monotheist of the strictest kind, and the philosophical polytheist—not to take the lower forms of either into account—can find no common ground for their ideas, no possible reconciliation of their differences, outside Christianity; but within its pale the desired accommodation presents itself, not as an ingenious compromise, but as the fundamental tenet of the creed itself, embodied from the first in

[1] Page 643.

baptismal formula, and no development of a later age."

This he calls a "crucial test," and out of it Christianity comes victorious. He adds:

"It is therefore in full accordance with analogy to expect that some cognate reconciliation may be found between the not more opposed conceptions of Pantheism and Theism, especially when in the only original evidence we possess as to the manner in which the first preachers of Christianity recommended their Gospel to cultured pagans, the harmony of the two ideas is at least implied, and that not obscurely. It is in the speech of Paul of Tarsus before the Areopagus. He asserts the fundamental principle of pure Theism, that of a Personal Creator, in the words, "God that made the world and all things therein, seeing He is Lord of heaven and earth." He asserts no less clearly the fundamental principle of at least one aspect of Pantheism, by adding "In Him we live, and move, and have our being," which points to that view which maintains, not the absorption of

the infinite in the finite, which is the expression of the lower and impersonal type of Pantheism, but that of the finite in the infinite, which is at least consistent with a very elevated and ardent Theism."[1]

Now, all depends upon Dr. Littledale's conception of Theism. If that is false, any argument he may erect upon it will be falsely established, and can have no weight. What, therefore, is his doctrine of Theism? It is clear that there is no point where Pantheism and Theism are one. Personality can never shade off into the Impersonal. Duty is, or is not. The highest freedom may be called necessity, but it is never *fate*. His Theism, to his own eye, has at least a decided opposition to what he calls "the lower and impersonal type of Pantheism." He would not object, certainly, to calling it Pantheistic Theism or Christian Pantheism. From what qualities spring this antagonism? Dr. Littledale shall be granted his own language, that we may be able to see them. We may be able best to find them from the following:

[1] Page 644.

I. Wordsworth was its "chief exponent," in one of the two respects—that of "æsthetic delight in scenery."[1]

II. It has a religious history. "It has been found practically united with it in a very fervid combination, and that not merely in Platonizing Christians, like St. Clement of Alexandria, and the far more illustrious Origen, but in the man who stands out to all time as perhaps the noblest figure in post-apostolic church history, and as the received type of fearless yet charitable orthodoxy, Athanasius himself."[2]

III. The Theism which opposes it is distinguished only for its being helpful to church distinction. We have the following account of it:

"That sober, common-sense, unemotional, anti-mysterious type of religion, in no wise inconsistent with the Zwinglian aspect of modern Puritanism, which is the joy of archbishops and premiers, which ensures safeness and merits preferment, which never tumbles into the

[1] Page 643.
[2] Page 647.

pitfalls of indiscretion and unpopularity, gaping at the feet of enthusiasts and zealots, who, like Thales of Miletus, are gazing up toward the heavens, and not looking downward to their steps, but which contrariwise receives the English equivalent of canonization, the approval of the *Times*, is divided from mechanical Deism by the merest film of ice, which a tepid breath may at any moment cause to disappear. It has no affinity with Pantheism, but it also has no answer for the questions which the present generation insists on putting to those who pose as teachers." [1]

IV. It is only in the mystical theology of Alexandria, which was logically related, as we shall see, to what is called the "lower" Pantheism, that any case can be had. This is Dr. Littledale's statement:

"On the other hand, it is in mystical theology, beginning with the Alexandrine exposition of the doctrine of the Logos, and developing in the Hierarchies of Dionysius, that the antidote to this subtle

[1] Page 647.

form of unbelief can alone be found, and that some answer, which shall not be a mere evasion or a restatement of the question itself in equivalent terms, can be found for the spiritual queries prompted by the new conquests of the human intellect in the domain of physical science. It is only in it that any adequate recognition of that infinite Unity in diversity which forces itself alike on the divine and the physicist can be found; only in it that an intelligible relation between the Absolute and the conditioned can be traced." [1]

V. It supplies a rule of conduct, as Mr. Picton points out, in his "thoughtful essay" on Christian Pantheism.

VI. The first great Pantheistic principle it will contain is the universal Fatherhood of God. Dr. Littledale holds that this is not only "compatible with Christianity," but is "an inseparable integer of it." Marcus Aurelius did not perceive it as he should, else he had believed in missions. "But St. Paul, in that same speech at Athens, adopts and amplifies that saying,

[1] Page 646.

whether of Aratus or of Cleanthes, 'For we also are His offspring,' and justifies thereby missionary enterprise amongst even the most degraded of mankind, whether racially or morally, as being capable of being made, to use the significant words of another apostolic writer, 'partakers of the Divine nature.' (2 Pet. i. 4.)" [1]

VII. "Next comes the Incarnation as the reconciliation of the antinomy between God and matter, as the satisfaction of the irrepressible longing of man, not merely to understand God, but to *be* God, if not individually, yet by representation and union. This aspect of the central dogma of Christianity has received much illustration from the brilliant though erratic intellect of Hegel, little as his Christology can be accepted as a whole, but he has hardly pushed his conclusions so far as two weighty paragraphs of Pauline argument seem to justify. The first is that deep saying in Romans viii : 19–23, where the whole of created nature, and not merely its human portion, is depicted

[1] Page 650.

as having a direct interest in the final consummation of the Divine economy, and as awaiting deliverance 'from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God.' The second is the not less important declaration as to the functions of the Eternal Son: 'All things were created by Him, and for Him, and He is before all things, and by Him all things consist.' It is not necessary to go the lengths of Malebranche here, and to deny the power of casualty in any real sense to men, treating them as little more than mere automata on which the Divine power is exerted; it is enough to note his recognition of the fact that the Incarnation (of which he rightly takes the Scotist view) is the final reason of all creation, and not that of the creation of man alone." [1]

VIII. "The third great Christian dogma which is capable of being expressed in the terms of the higher Pantheism, is the Omnipotent influence of the Holy Spirit of God, as the source of the cosmic order

[1] Page 651.

and beauty of the universe, whether spiritual or material."[1]

IX. Great theologians have believed it and wrote of it. God is everywhere present and operative.

"St. Augustine puts this proposition in these words: 'The power of the Creator, the omnipotence and might of the holder of all, is the cause of subsistence to every creature. And if this might were to cease at any time from ruling created things, their species would cease also, and all nature would crash.' *De Gen. ad lit.* iv, 12. And Hooker follows him almost precisely (Eccl. Pol., v. lvi, 5)."[2]

X. And yet this is not the "lower Pantheism." For, says Dr. Littledale, "the contention is not that Christianity is Pantheism, far less that Pantheism is Christianity; but that the fullest Christian dogma, especially in its devotional manifestation, supplies more adequately than any other system of religion an intelligible and satisfying answer to the de-

[1] Page 652.
[2] Page 654.

mands which the intellect makes for a solution to the problem of the relation of the finite to the infinite, and that by admitting certain ideas currently known as Pantheistic, into its domain, instead of expelling them as fundamentally incongruous with itself," so that "the Christian thinker will not be tempted into the lower Pantheism, which identifies God and Nature, but will see, with Scaliger, in all nature the traces of God—in creative energy, in sustaining might, in directing providence; and will regard all things as having acquired a certain sacredness from contact with the hem of Christ's garment as He trod the earth."[1] While it is more than Theism, it "differs from Theism, not by defect, but by addition." It is necessary for the future, because "the inquirer who sets himself to investigate the pure Theistic beliefs will soon become conscious of a remarkable fact, that they do not furnish answers to some of the most weighty questions put by Pantheism, and to which it at least offers tentative solutions. They leave

[1] Page 654.

these questions on one side, and either evade or reject them, and in not a few instances are curiously lacking in certain qualities, such as devoutness, sense of mystery, reverence, and even ideality, which notably characterize, however illogically, various Pantheistic systems."[1]

XI. It may indeed be called the "higher Pantheism," by which "is meant Theism plus all that Pantheism can teach us as to the omnipresence of God in the Universe, and as to the consequent awe and mystery in which the facts of creation are shrouded, without necessarily adopting the hypothesis that they are mere phenomena, having no real existence save as suggesting God."[2]

The reader will thus see that if the points of the essay are logically stated, they are their own answer. The essay is a thirsting cry for Christian Theism, as distinguished from a Deism bearing its name, or it is a plea for Pantheism. That another and more important plea may be considered, the attention given to these

[1] Page 658.

[2] Page 659.

propositions will be simply sufficient to exhibit their inherent lack of point and the consequent impossibility of founding any serious claim upon them.

I. In what was Wordsworth, as an entranced student of scenery, the champion of Pantheism, as distinguished from the Theism of the New Testament? Was it because he asserted that Nature seemed to him full of a Being of whose personal presence he himself was the receptacle, and yet of whom neither the circumference of things nor the nearest flower—not even spaciousness, as we can imagine or hint it—can be the sole possessor? ALL-GODISM never fell from the lips of this minstrel of the world as God appeared in it. *God in all, and over all*, is the burden of his song. One is Pantheism, the other is Theism. He felt that however much there was of God in things, that even if every atom were "saturate with deity," yet about the edges of its existence the personal God was, and that his self-contained Being beat away in infinite waves, shoreless and illimitable.

Mr. Shairp says: "Philosophers have dreamed that nature and the human soul are the two links of a double-clefted tree, springing from and united in one root; that nature is unconscious soul, and the soul is nature become conscious of itself. Some such view as this, if it were true, might account for the marvelous sympathy there is between Wordsworth's poetry and the spirit that is in his own mountains, and for the power of rendering their mute being into his solemn melodies." [1]

Obviously, if such a "dream," which is even untrue, as Mr. Shairp hints, is necessary to explain Wordsworth's poetry, then was Wordsworth, the poet of Pantheism. But it is not. Wordsworth leaves it as a mystery of reason, whereas this view makes Wordsworth leave it as a mystery of unreason. No philosopher's dream has penetrated that relationship between the God with whom we commune consciously and the life of nature. Every true life, which is hardest logic, and the deepest investigator, because it

[1] Studies in Poetry and Philosophy, p. 58.

carries the whole soul with it, has untwisted the wonder, and reconstructed it again. Wordsworth lived down to the truth, and having unfolded it in his life, his poetry gives it as a mystery of the soul. Over unconscious nature, in Wordsworth's poems, is the fond lover exhibiting her loveliness of character by drawing out her deepest treasures; to change the figure, the musician comes, with the instrument—the melody belongs to both.

"—Now o'er the soothed accordant heart we feel
A sympathetic twilight slowly steal,
And ever, as we fondly muse, we find
The soft gloom deepening o'er the tranquil mind.
Stay! pensive, sadly-pleasing visions, stay!
Ah, no! as *fades the vale, they fade away:*
Yet still the tender, vacant gloom remains;
Still the cold cheek the shuddering tear retains!"

Wordsworth never thought of nature as a finality. He cracked the shell to get the kernel. Nature was valuable to him because of what she held. He looked for and found "thoughts too deep for tears," because he saw within her "*something far more deeply interfused.*" His de-

light in scenery is impossible, on the grounds of Pantheism, as distinguished from Theism. Let him know that mechanically, and without leave, things sweep into him; that life is a fixed line of manifestation for the "underlying substance;" that the play of the emotions is only that side of the self-evolving universe; that the sharpest perception is, in no sense, his; that in it nothing of purpose or desire, as personal, goes; that there we are jesters to ourselves, while hard necessity gives form to every tear-drop of sympathy, and the uncertain but breath-seizing rapture which comes of beholding the pines cleaving in the sunshine to rock-clad heights, the sigh which seeks to fill some awful depth below; that all these responses of spirit within us to the evidences of spirit without us are but the jubilant or mournful remarks of the whole to itself; that we are not then each looking into each, but that then the All looks into itself;—let him believe this, and joy is flown, ecstasy is pronounced a fiction.

Again, let him know that once an art-

ist painted the walls and arch of the world, that out of the sky dropped upon lily and violet, heliotrope and pansy, those colors which fell from his fingers as he magically separated into its elements a shaft of light; that all having been made and decorated, motion, force, and relationship were given to the whole, that variety and life might be; that, having done this, he rested, and has not been felt, save in so-called supernatural appearances, since in this universe;—let him think this, and poetry would be a music-laden epitaph.

But let him once think and know in every action of his being that God is Jehovah indeed; "*I am that I am*" is His name; that as under and within what can not say "I am that I am," Jehovah must be, He is everywhere and here; that he who looks within is conscious of the Eternal Presence; that he who looks without finds

> "*A motion and a feeling that impels*
> *All thinking things, all objects of all thought,*
> *And rolls through all things.*"

Then, indeed, is life real, and its richest rapture is the very truth.

The first is Pantheism, from which the genius of the orient can not take the absurdity. The second is Deism, which James Thomson tried unconsciously to glorify at the expense of his poetry. The third is Theism, which is the life-stuff of Wordsworth's poetry, and the creed of the Universe.

How absurd to talk of such a Theism, as if it could do without what Dr. Littledale calls "the fundamental principle of at least one aspect of Pantheism:" "In Him we live and move and have our being," more easily than without what he says is "the fundamental principle of pure Theism." "God that made the world, is Lord of Heaven and Earth."

One is as fundamental as the other. Θεός and Theism involve the truth of both. The poetry of Wordsworth is the embodiment thereof. It was his joy that the same God of whom he sung, when in poetry he recorded his personal experience, was also the universally present One. He who was seen in nature was the known One in the soul. This Personal Presence not only enveloped, but vital-

ized the whole. The sort of God Wordsworth had was quite different from that his critics, in the face of the following words, suppose him to have had:

"O'er the wide earth, on mountain and on plain,
Dwells, in the affections and the soul of man,
A God-head, like the *universal* PAN,
But more exalted, with a brighter train.
And shall his bounty be dispensed in vain,
Showered equally on city and on field,
And neither hope nor steadfast promise yield,
In these usurping times of fear and pain?
We know the arduous strife, the eternal laws
To which the triumph of all good is given,
High sacrifice, and labor without pause,
Even to the death; *else wherefore should the eye*
Of man converse with immortality?"

II. So has the Inquisition! so has slavery! so has the burning of Servetus. Does this make them Christian?

III. For the most part, though hardly meriting the qualities of soberness and "common sense," this is Deism itself. It is not Christian Theism.

IV. We grant that Pantheism is far from Deism; that he who is affected by Pantheism will not suffer from Deism. But this does not sanctify the errors of either. This is to rush from the Atlan-

tic into the Pacific. The wild waves of both wash solid shores.

V. How can it supply rules of conduct when all conduct is fate and duty is a dream. This will seem more evident in the logical results of Mr. Picton's "thoughtful essay."

VI. What is the Fatherhood of an Impersonal Being? Or, if God attains self-consciousness in man, and there is, in some sense, personal, what need man seek for but himself? Is not "prayer," as Emerson says, "the spirit of God pronouncing His works good?" "For we are His offspring," is of Theism, unless God be Pan. Then is it God in us saying that we are forms of God. This is for Pantheism to affirm its self-conceit.

VII. Hegel is logical with his "Christology." If we admit his principles, his "Christology" is upon us, whatever Dr. Littledale's objection. But has Paul gone farther than Hegel, with the same idea? Paul then is a prince among the Pantheists; and, accepting him, we are accepting Pantheism. Again, this is the phase of Unitarianism, which has been

shown to be the nearest pure Pantheism. It is the nearest form of the old dogma of the metamorphoses of God.

VIII. What is this, logically, but Shelley's Spirit of Nature? How could "Cosmic order" come of the Impersonal? How do we know but that it is "Cosmic" confusion, as the writhing Deity seeks personality through self-consciousness? And, above all things, how absurd to connect with such a scheme, the name of William Wordsworth, who sings of the Holy Ghost of Theism:

"The prayers I make will then be sweet indeed,
If Thou, the Spirit give by which I pray;
My unassisted heart is barren clay,
Which of its native can nothing feed:
Of good and pious works Thou art the seed,
Which quickens only where Thou sayest it may:
Unless Thou show to us Thine own true way,
No man can find it. Father, Thou must lead.
Do Thou then breathe these thoughts into my mind,
By which such virtue may in me be bred,
That in Thy holy footsteps I may tread;
That I may have the power to sing of Thee,
And sound Thy praises everlastingly."

IX. So Theism believes, knowing that the Personal can be as near as the Im-

personal; believing that, in fact, "presence" without personality, is well nigh meaningless. If Dr. Littledale desires to save both ideas—personality and immanence—he has chosen a very absurd expression, *Pan-Theism*.

X.–XI. Why, then, distinguish against Theism, by pronouncing a word, which, if it mean anything else than pure Theism, is not "lower" or "higher," but *pure Pantheism*. He says that *this* does not point to the view that maintains the absorption of the Infinite into the finite, but to that which maintains the absorption of the finite into the Infinite. The first he calls "the lower or impersonal" Pantheism, the second, "the higher or personal" Pantheism. What could be more fanciful? Where is personal man in any case of "absorption?" If we have no personality, our thoughts are not our own, and the notion of Divine Personality is an evolution of necessity. The lines fall. "The simplest person who, in his integrity, worships God, becomes God," as Emerson rightly said. Finiteness is gone, having returned to infinite-

ness. Duty, immortality, personal existence, are dreams. *All is God, and God is all.*

Yet Dr. Littledale does not desire this. He says: "It is as necessary to maintain the objectivity of the Divine Personality as it is to guard against that entire abnegation of human personality as having no ethical, no mental, and no substantial existence of its own apart from God, which is common to Augustine, to Malebranche, and to Spinoza; for whenever either is denied, and men are logical, religion, which means a definite relation between God and the soul, each regarded as personal existences, capable of intercourse, becomes impossible, at any rate so far as affection and conscience are concerned." Can it be said, then, that Pantheism is the only antidote to the ills of present-day error, when it plunges into such infinite darkness? Must it not be said that Christian Theism, rightly understood, is what even this scholarly man seeks?

Consideration would be asked of Prof. Blackie's stray hints upon this subject, did they involve any new points, and did

not Dr. Littledale state them with far greater clearness and force? His assertion that the words

> "A motion and a spirit that impels
> All thinking things, all objects of all thought,
> And rolls through all things,"

"are distinctly Pantheistic," comes from a misconception of Theism, on the one hand, and the strange blunder, on the other, of not "distinctly" observing the difference between a universe providentially and naturally influenced into its path by *impulsion*, and forced into its path by *compulsion*. To Wordsworth, as to most people, the ideas are quite different.

So, also, of the essay of Robert St. J. Tyrwhitt. Its points have been treated. To all those who follow in this line of criticism, to any who may think Wordsworth a Pantheist, these words on *Duty* ought to be sufficient. Let Wordsworth himself close this discussion forever. How anybody can read them and believe this philosophic poet to be, in any sense, a Pantheist is more than we can understand:

"Stern lawgiver! Yet thou dost wear
The God-head's most benignant grace;
Nor know we anything so fair
As is the smile upon thy face;
Flowers laugh before thee on their beds;
And fragrance in thy footing treads;
Thou dost preserve the stars from wrong;
And the most ancient heavens through thee are
fresh and strong.

"To humbler functions, awful power!
I call thee; I myself commend
Unto thy guidance from this hour;
Oh! let my weakness have an end!
Give unto me, made lowly wise,
The spirit of self-sacrifice;
The confidence of reason give;
And in the light of truth thy bondman let me
live!"

CHAPTER III.

IS "CHRISTIAN PANTHEISM" THE CREED OF THE FUTURE?

"Alles was unsern Geist befreit, ohne uns Herrschaft über uns selbst zu geben, ist verderblich."

GOETHE.

"We can test the controverted questions of to-day by the analogy of other questions which common sense has already decided. These precedents constitute the common law of mankind. We try what is before us by the analogy of experience, which thus obtains (as Milton says) a certain prophetic quality."

JAMES FREEMAN CLARKE.

By the consent of all, is the essay of Mr. Allanson Picton—who gave the world a hint of his theological method in his "Seven Lectures on the Religion of Jesus," published by the English Unitarian Association—called "Christian Pantheism,"[1] the best expression of this movement. The title must be granted a misnomer, if anything has been said which

[1] "Christian Pantheism," last essay in his volume, "The Mystery of Matter and other Essays," Macmillan's, London.

exhibits the nature of Theism on the one hand, and that of Pantheism on the other. If Christianity is inclusive of the idea of continual personal existence, then no "Pantheism" can be called "Christian." If Theism has been shown to postulate the Divine presence as much as the Divine personality, it, on the other hand, is preëminently Christian. In the specific defense which is made of the title, in the early part of the essay (for the essay itself is a general defense, and, in one other place Mr. Picton seems unsatisfied with his initial effort, and gets at it again), is found another illustration of the fact that even the best gifts will refuse to accomplish the impossible. His only arguments for the use of such an incongruity seem to be, first, a love of Christianity; secondly, that Christianity must rest upon a consciousness of our relation to the Infinite; thirdly, that the spirit of Christianity is immortal. From these he is able to say that the seeming contradiction is only a paradox; that the paradox is only apparent; that, at any rate, the possibility of a Christian Pantheism is an

"issue fairly raised, not only by the speculative tendencies of modern philosophy, but also, and far more forcibly, by the enormous expansion of scientific generalizations, which have not only enlarged, but have, in some respects revolutionized our idea of the universe."[1] That it is an "issue fairly raised," as any question, under the sun, however absurd, nobody will doubt; and it will not meet with "the treatment appropriate to moral corruption or arrogant self-will;"[2] if even we shall not be able to see what these arguments have to do with it.

We are thus brought face to face with the question, is Pantheism Christian? Carlyle's joke is quoted. The signs of the times, as seen by the essayist, are quoted also. They might, perhaps, be more accurately called the signs of present-day and rather hasty science. Neither prove anything. The question still stands, believing that Christianity is immortal, is Christianity any sort of Pantheism? Will Christian Pantheism be the creed of

[1] Page 321.
[2] Ib.

the future? To settle these will be, since firm reliance is placed in human nature, to settle the question, is Pantheism true?

That it is not, logically, the creed of the future is maintained, and more, that all the vagaries, which, with an art so true as to be unconsciously used, are put to the proof of its truth, are the results of great error with respect to the truth of Theism, or great error with respect to the nature of Pantheism, coupled with a tendency to make dogma out of the unproved assumptions of contemporary science.

And to enter into the work of estimating the weight of Mr. Picton's arguments, it may be said that, so far as the "growing intolerance of the old meaning attached to the word *creation*"[1] is concerned, Theists, as he knows, are not satisfied and do not seek to hide their discontent. With the state of things and the nature of the facts which it, however incompletely, asserts, or even hints, Mr. Picton has agreed, we can not and need not demand to be perfectly ac-

[1] Page 322.

quainted. Indeed, as the true "philosophy of ignorance," which hardly assents to his theories, would suggest, we are to prefer and to owe allegiance to that which in itself and in its results is the most rational, leaving whatever is less rational as in this sense untrustworthy. The upshot of all serious discussion leaves us with this principle. Now, any school, from the most earnest dogmatist to the Agnostic, must admit that the question as to the origin of things, as related to any supposed or known existence, must be forever food for speculation; indeed, that it lies beyond our finest sight. He is wise, here, who asserts least. If he must assert, let him hold to what, in itself and in its consequences, has the most of reason and carries with it the most of the the authority of the known. There are some assumptions which carry with them the whole nature of things. There are some "winds of doctrine" whose power must be measured by the energy with which their appearance sends the roots of the trees down and out into the world. The weight of some things is known

from the weight of all things else. What carries with it the most of reason—what contradicts least the method imposed by the universal order—is to be believed rather than that which in its stead is offered. To believe in human nature is to believe that the creed of the future will carry with it the most of reason, as compared with other creeds proposed to it. The question, then, turns upon this, which has the most of reason? Right here, it would be most pleasant to insert a discussion of the fact that, as eminent examples as well as sound reason prove, *no Theist need fear to deny the creation of the world out of nothing.*[1] But for the reason that this discussion grows longer than was intended, and especially that the folly of Pantheism may appear, it will be maintained that even the assertion of the old theory has better ground in the nature of things than the assertion which Pantheism, though it bear the cross as an ensign, must make.

Suppose, then, that it is a fight be-

[1] Knight in Con. Rev., Oct., 1876, "Personality and The Infinite," and J. G. Fichte's "Die Spekulative Theology."

tween the old notion and this, as defended by Mr. Picton, must we not, in thus speculating out upon this coast-line between what is to be understood and what can not be understood, trust ourselves, our noblest instincts, our most authoritative intuitions, those primal truths? Can reason operate without them? Does not reason, in every act, treat them sacredly? Does not reason attain the present height by their use? Is she, having reached the awful summit, to forget, in her desire to go higher, her invaluable help? Is she to scorn them? Would not such a course of reason be unreasonable? To all of these, Yes. Is it not then the veriest folly to preach an assumption involving Pantheism? Pantheism sets its denial upon the universal. It is a protest against the entire nature of things. It abolishes personal existence. It annihilates freedom. It strangles duty. It dashes morality into pieces. It drags into its own abyss of absurdity the possibility of man. Must we trample into dust the very surest intuitions we have, the strongest persuasions which come to

us, the highest authority we possess under God, to determine what, confessedly, we can not define? Can this be reconciled with any "philosophy of ignorance?"[1] Is it not dogmatism run mad? And yet this is "Christian Pantheism!" To believe in its assumption is, obviously, not only to uproot all the truths of which one is possessed but to outrage the policy of the soul. That this is nothing new, we have already seen. But that this alternative has been approached by Christian thinkers, and that it has even been defended by some of them has no more appositeness than that a Christain founded the Inquisition, with regard to the assumption that, therefore, it ought to be called "Christian." If Christian Pantheism stands upon no sounder base than this, it will hardly be the creed of the future. For the reason that no one "now hopes for a complete and adequate conception of the universe; but rather that the ideas we cherish must harmoniously combine to form one germinal notion, capable of

[1] See essay by Mr. Picton. "The Philosophy of Ignorance," page 61.

equal and congruous expansion in all directions, in accordance with the advance of knowledge"[1]—for this very reason, which Mr. Picton has urged, are we compelled to reject his conception.

Neither can we conceive of the philosophy of evolution, as of any assistance, as yet, in dogma-building. If, as he says, "we can not treat vital force as fundamentally and finally different from material force in its relation to the infinite divine energy,"[2] neither are we quite able to treat it as wholly identical. It must be regarded as a little like overworking a very small child, when Mr. Picton is compelled to press into the service this plea, when, as is well known, the first men of science are not at all sure but that it may die before it is dressed.

Mr. Picton will fail of convicting any Theist of anthropomorphism. He will agree with his assertion that "we may still say of the Almighty that we are His offspring;" and may still recognize in the consciousness which thinks and says

[1] P. 323.
[2] Ibid.

this, a phenomenon manifesting more of the fullness of God than any apparently mechanical operation of nature. But, to insist that the difference is precisely of the same character as that which distinguishes a man's handiwork from the children of his body, is to adopt an analogy, which our present knowledge of the connection between human history and physical evolution makes manifestly untenable and false."[1] He will repeat this with Mr. Picton, because, in any logical sense, it is Christian Theism. He may do what he will with the "evolution," as his Theism stands none the less secure.

But he will not agree, that, because he does not understand his own system, he has none. Mr. Picton grounds his claim for Christian Pantheism on exactly the ground which has not been explored. The truth of creation he does not know. He must admit this with the most dogmatic of the Orthodox. The difference lies here, that one produces a system which does not explain everything, and

[1] Pp. 323, 324.

is, so far as the human mind can see, irrational and false, while the other produces a system which does not explain everything, and is, so far as the human mind can see, rational and true. And it must be added, if the Bible does not contain any clear word upon the subject, that so long as he has respect for such truth and the Bible, he can not avoid meeting with statements which are not thoroughly understood.

To proceed upon the well-prepared ground of this accomplished essayist, to take his own words, as they come, that we may not seem guilty of building a man of straw, if we agree that the essential nature of religion involves no merely historical opinion that, therefore, the loss of any historical opinion will not harm religion, we can not excuse him of sophistry when he thus tries to save Christian Pantheism from the charge of irreligion; for, since religion "rests," with him, "in a present consciousness of our relation to the Infinite,"[1] which, with his or any other interpretation does not

[1] Page 326.

involve a personal Infinite at all, since to break in upon the personal God is to break in upon personal man, we have no such thing as religion, and the whole affair is Pantheism approving itself.

No one can doubt but that, as he hints, he can prove that what he calls religion is entirely consistent with "all the generalizations which mingle in one common germ of *evolution*, the origin of man and the world."[2] The description of this religion is as vague as that of any Pantheism. Believing in the sentiment of worship, that there is worthy object of devotion, it is a little strange to behold his picture, and to see Fenelon excusing himself from the society of the Ineffable Person, and seeking rapture in "the oneness of things." We can hardly think of Cromwell beseeching simply "a Totality of Power," and Wordsworth is truly no Christian Theist if he communes with the "underlying substance" alone. The fact is these men were Theists, pure and simple, and in the worship

[1] P. 326.

of Jehovah they had all these and much more.

Life has, it will be admitted, a more accurate logic than the closest thinker. If the soul postulates a personal God, much more does life, the soul's disposition of its environment. If, therefore, these "indefinite glories are insufficient in themselves to form a practical religion,"[1] are we to believe that the "essential nature" of religion consists in them? Indeed, are we not to say that its essential nature consists rather in what seizes such lifeless elements, and by shedding over them the unutterable glory of the Infinite Person, transform them into the energies of the world? They may be, and are, in that communion with God which gives to all practical religion its life. But, if this is admitted, the *vis vitæ* of religion is agreed to be communion with the Personal One. What, therefore, could be more absurd than to stand in the face of man and the nature of things, and close this paragraph with the following: "This itself is sufficient to

[1] P. 326.

force on our attention the probability of some particular issue to the spiritual conflict of our time."[2]

In his fight against Anthropomorphism we are with him to the end. But this is not to assent to what is far less reasonable and just, the sublimation by the disintegrating influence of Idealism of the Eternal One into the figure of Pan. Criticism is quite sick of much of Mr. Arnold's bare protesting against the Personal One, who "thinks and loves," for all admit, that, help it if we could, it would still be the best way to God. Criticism is, however, totally disgusted when he advises instead, what to those from whom he takes One who "thinks and feels," is a far more material conception, a something whose uncovered lungs can be felt to be our own world, and the companions in space, as it is described with a height of Anthropomorphism exceeding that of the Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol, as a "*power that breathes and feels.*"

We are glad that "generic experience"

[2] Page 327.

has been called up, because this will put the argument upon its merits. It is truthfully announced that it "means more than any traditional opinion."[1] Now, "generic experience" proves that, in our conscious relations to the Infinite, we touch a reality which can not be pictured otherwise than as a Personal Being. We are led to inquire, is this picture the true one? Which is to inquire, is "generic experience" to be believed? So that, in the forms which this argument takes, it comes to this, are we to believe our faculties or our assumptions?

Now, with regard to the "argument of design," which it is the fashion to criticise, all will admit, with Mr. Picton, that Cicero's objection to the "Opifex Deus"[2] may be well founded; that if Paley's "watch argument" were pressed to its results it might not prove anything; but even if, as we are told, "the essence of design signifies compliance with inevitable conditions, *apart from which the end*

[1] Page 329.
[2] Page 330.

would be unattainable"[1] (which, after all, is only true of God, from the most anthropomorphic conception of Him), and if it only "proves the existence not only of a designer, but of a designer working under difficulties which can only be overcome by ingenuity," and that the degree of simplicity or directness in the means used, as compared with the possibilities of the case, is a measure of the knowledge, the fertility of the resource, or the care concerned in the production of the work,"[2] if, indeed, it would prove the existence of a mind limited by inevitable conditions, and overcoming difficulties by an effort of deliberate thought,[3] the mind would not be kept from asking—*who designed the conditions?*

We do not stop to argue the force of this, because the Being of God by no means depends upon the argument from design, and the criticism which follows is, upon the whole, well taken. But it does not help the case of Pantheism. Be-

[1] Page 331.
[2] Page 322.
[3] Page 333.

cause the illustration of the watch can not walk on four feet, is the absurdity of the scheme which makes the statement healed? We agree to the Eternal Power in the world. This is Theism. We agree to "force by Him." This is also Theism. And it is Theism which points to the certainties of exact science as unfolded by the progress of to-day, as the testimony of human investigation to the fact that "in Him we live, and move, and have our being." So far as science and reason go, they prove that the mystery of being, as held by Theism, is not a contradiction, but belongs to those truths above us, to which we are invited by all our faculties, and which are the glorious heritage of the sons of men. "*The gates thereof are open continually.*" Theism, without such sublime truths, would be the earth without its limitless, yet tender, heights of blue.

From this point we are asked to go to the religious nature of man and its history. Mr. Picton says: "If the view maintained, concerning the essential nature of religion, be at all correct, we

might as well look for hints of Pantheism in the religious emotions themselves."[1] But the view was seen to destroy itself. Yet we may look at some of the positions taken, which, if it could have stood alone, were to help its stability.

Paul did say "in Him we live and move and have our being." "In most of his references to the Divine Being, the Apostle appears to assume a personal nature, defined according to the analogy of our own consciousness."[2] This is true; but to say that Paul was a Pantheist because his analogy was not large enough for the Ineffable One, while Mr. Picton has so often admitted that any analogy is only partial and is not to be used to the destruction of other known truth, is to play fast and loose to manufacture dogma. Paul simply hinted one side of the truth of God—His immanence. The mistake for which the essayist censures theology is his own. To tell people that they must not push the anal-

[1] Page 318.
[2] Page 348.

ogy of Paul into Deism is not to justify the pushing of the analogy of Paul into Pantheism. He who understands Paul understands a Christian Theist.

It will be evident, therefore, without any treatment, that Paul is preaching Christian Theism—which uses the truth contained in both Deism and Pantheism—when he says: "The Son Himself also shall be subject unto Him that put all things under Him, that God may be all in all;" when he speaks of "the fullness of Him that filleth all in all;" as also John, when he conceived God as "Infinite Light," and Jesus, when he gives the interpretation of the 82d Psalm.[1] Without seeking to show that these are the highest utterances of Theism, we will let Mr. Picton care for his own use of them, as he admits the language to be "mystical and indefinite," thus agreeing that they are not quite literal dogma. He surely can not do what he condemns in everybody else.[2]

Furthermore, if such men are worthy

[1] Pages 349, 350.

[2] Pages 346, 347, 348, especially page 366.

of being heard, Paul was quite aware of his speech; John was conscious of what he said; Jesus felt himself to be the teacher of the race. If this is so, Paul did not preach Pantheism, which must now be quite contrary to all else that he wrote; John did not preach Pantheism, when all that he said must be understood as involving the very opposite of its scheme; much less did Jesus, who gave dignity and outline to duty; who was the herald of personal immortality; who taught prayer to a personal One; who glorified by his speech and life the whole scheme of philosophy, in every sense the opposite of Pantheism. In fact, whatever the mistakes of orthodoxy, this theory is absurd.

Nevertheless, we must follow Mr. Picton to the end. It is simply the continual retreat of a fine soul into the question of which Mr. Knight speaks: "If God is everywhere, how could there be any room for us?" Mr. Picton says: "The notion of a merely mechanical pervasion, or of the luminiferous ether in atmospheric air, in water, or in glass,

could not possibly diminish the mere externality of Divine relations to the world. Unless such point of being, so to speak, is at its heart divine, the only relations possible between it and the Creator, are essentially external and mechanical."[1] This does not make against Theism nor for Pantheism, as pure Theism does not hold that spirit occupies space. But it does reveal this—that there is, in fact, no difference, logically, between the "higher Pantheism" and the "lower Pantheism." We are, by Mr. Picton's statement, made able to entertain, in the same thought, Erigena and Spinoza, with him who looks at matter and spirit as one.

In the Theistic sense, "I am not my own; I am needed, or I should not be here; for each thing serves all else; my life-work is to play my part according as the divine forces without and within one teach; not for myself, but for the widest good that I can conceive,"[2] are words pre-eminently Christian. In the

[1] Page 354.
[2] Page 368.

Pantheistic sense, they reduce to the poetry of Emerson:

> "All are needed by each one;
> Nothing is fair or good alone.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> "O'er me soared the eternal sky,
> Full of light and deity;
>
> . . . . . .
>
> "Beauty through my senses stole;
> I yielded myself *to the perfect whole*,"[1]

which has a more logical strain in the elder song:

"There is no difference in the texture fine
That's woven through organic rock and grass,
And that which thrills man's heart in every line,
As o'er its web God's weaving fingers pass.

"The timid flower that decks the fragrant field,
The dawning star that hints the solemn dome
From one propulsive force to being reeled,
Both keep one law and have a single home.

"The river and the leaf, the sun and shade,
The bird and stone, the shepherds and their flocks,
Are all of one primeval substance made—
A single key their common secret locks.

"Each atom holds the boundless God concrete,
Beside whose abstract Being nothing is;

[1] "Each and All."

Each mind, each point of dust, is God complete;
Who knows but this, the magic key is his."[1]

Shall we say that this was what Tennyson meant when he has also sung:

"That each who seems a separate whole
Should move his rounds, and fusing all
The skirts of self again, should fall
Re-merging in the general soul,

"Is faith as vague as all unsweet.
Eternal form shall still divide
The eternal soul from all beside,
And I shall know him when we meet."

This poem, says David Masson, "is a manual for many of the latest hints and questions in British Metaphysics. He that would exclude "*In Memoriam*" and "*Maud*" from a conspectus of the philosophical literature of our time, has yet to learn what philosophy is."[2] Thus, to use words which Mr. Picton has applied to "Pantheistic devotion," we may say "that that the modern perception of the unity, wonder, and transcendental vastness of

[1] "All is each, and each is all." Alger's Poetry of the Orient.

[2] Recent British Philosophy, page 19.

the material world,"[1] give to "*Theistic devotion*" such a thrilling meaning and overawing dignity as it never had before.

Let Mr. Picton define. "What we mean, then, generally, by Christian Pantheism, is that theory of the word which, while acknowledging that human thought and language are not articulately expressive of anything more than phenomenal knowledge, yet sees in phenomena the fragmentary and partial manifestation of an unutterable unity beyond them."[2] Why "fragmentary and partial" if this "unutterable unity" is free?

All objection to the personal God on the score of Anthropomorphism is silenced by an admission of the impossibility he finds in speaking about his own "unutterable unity." We say, therefore, to use his words, "if our noblest words and thoughts are inadequate, it does not follow that others should be used; for this, by hypothesis, would make the incongruity greater."[3] If, as he avers,

[1] Page 393.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.

"our thoughts of personal life, of will, and counsel, and love, and mercy, and justice are the warmest and brighest that we know," and if, as he also asserts, "the laws of thought, themselves a part of the universal order, compel us to think of one Absolute Being as the ultimate reality of the phenomenal world,"[1] yet "forbid our regarding this Being as identical with, or fully manifested by, any mere class of impressions,"[2] can we take any special class? Why not unite our impressions of reality with our impressions of the personal One? Why not allow the impressions of this *personal God, who is God over all and in all,* to be met with "the warmest and brighest thoughts that we know"—over whose unity, as within it, shall stand One to whom of old the name of JEHOVAH was given?

Pantheism makes "an approximation" which is opposed to reason. Theism makes an "approximation" in which reason finds its most enraptured delight. True, "what we feel, it may be we can

[1] Pages 393, 394.
[2] Ibid.

not speak." Wordsworth could express it neither in words nor in tears. This Christian Theist found that the mystery was of

"Thoughts which do often lie too deep for tears."

He quotes Tennyson's beautiful verses of melody, and says: "Only the Pantheism, which looks through the creature, and worships the eternal goodness as the unimagined fullness from which the fairness of the creature flows, can give adequate meaning to such emotions of the heart."[1] What is the goodness of an unfree "unutterable unity?" Is "goodness" God? Tennyson did give "adequate meaning to such emotions of the heart," but only, as we have shown, by taking Arthur Henry Hallam out of the dreamy sleep of Brahma and leaving him with "Him whose eye never sleeps"—the Eternal God.

God was in him as Tennyson saw him—

"Who, but hung to hear
The rapt oration flowing free

[1] Page 402.

"From point to point, with power and grace,
And music in the bounds of law.
To those conclusions when we saw
The God within him light his face,

"And seem to lift the form, and glow
In azure orbits heavenly-wise;
And over those etherial eyes
The bar of Michael Angelo."

He leaves him in God, calling him

"That friend of mine who lives in God;

"That God, which ever lives and loves—
One God, one law, one element.
And one far-off divine event,
To which the whole creation moves."

His personal life goes on forever. For his "ransomed reason" there are new ranges of activity. He may love, and, being

"A Lord of large experience, train
To riper growth the mind and will."

He is not "lost in God" personally. To him his friend on earth looks, saying, "I shall not see thee," and yet believing that

"He, the Spirit himself, may come
Where all the nerve of sense is numb;
Spirit to Spirit, Ghost to Ghost."

So far is Tennyson, indeed, from ac-

cepting Pantheism, that, in spite of his trust that

> "Somehow good
> Shall be the final goal of ill,"

he prays to one who hears such words as these:

> "Be near me when my light is low,
> When the blood creeps, and the nerves prick
> And tingle; and the heart is sick
> And all the wheels of being slow."

Thus does the present laureate step into the shoes of his illustrious predecessor. Wordsworth was the Christian Theist—with such eccentricities as his environment suggested. His time did not know its deepest feelings. He was its poet nevertheless. Tennyson is the Christian Theist–with such eccentricities as his environment suggests. His time is more conscious of its profoundest life. He is the poet thereof.

All of the qualities to which Mr. Picton calls attention, as worthy our love in Pantheism, are involved in Christian Theism, and are made glorious by the presence of the personal God. He at last speaks of it plainly as "regarding all

things as the phenomenal manifestation of God,"[1] "that in man such manifestations produce the phenomena of self-consciousness;"[2] "that the true mode of regarding special objects is to consider them as different manifestations of the universal Substance."[3] Now, to seek to make a distinction as he does, between "the thoughts that arise in us, we know not how, amid the forces that play upon us from an infinite realm," is to seek to do the impossible. He says, notwithstanding, "we are not God; and our thoughts can not be thoughts of God, for our minds are full of seeming separateness and finiteness." If we are "manifestations of the universal substance," if "such manifestations will produce the phenomena of self-consciousness," so far as thoughts are at all, they are manifestations of God. Whether, therefore, God is free or unfree, since He is more than we are, we are not responsible for our lives within more than for our lives without. This may be the "higher

[1] Page 418.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Page 429.

Pantheism;" it is also the "lower Pantheism."

When Mr. Picton leaves this to make Jesus a manifestation of God, as all men are, or some special form of the "universal substance," as he does,[1] with elaborate art, we have only to say that this has already been proved to be Pantheism, and the Pantheist, therefore, is just calling Pantheism good. The scene to which Mr. Picton seeks to draw attention[2]—Christ losing his personality—is the story of Brahma's cup repeated with western terminology.

But to all this it may be said, as he has suggested, that Pantheism does not seek to explain the problem of evil any more than Theism; that it has no fear of the idea of sin, and does not seek to ascertain its force. He agrees that "there is a very prevalent idea that Pantheism, so far from giving any satisfactory account of evil, must necessarily explain it away; that it must set at naught the convictions of conscience, and treat the whole moral na-

[1] Pp. 422, 423.
[2] Pp. 469–482.

ture of man as an organized lie." "Yet," he proceeds to say, "it is difficult to see why this should be the case with Pantheism more than with any other theory which makes the being and attributes of a beneficent God to be the only eternal facts.[1]" This, even admitting that Theism is not satisfactory, will not help Pantheism as the creed of the future. It is only the assertion that Pantheism is unsatisfied with itself. But he goes further, and says: "Pantheism does not labor under greater difficulties than any other theory, while at the same time it furnishes stronger ground for the faith that, on the scale of infinity, all is well." After pointing out the fallacies of Theist and Pantheist, he says again to his critics: "The difficulties they see in our position exist equally in their own." We have said that the admission of this would not help his cause; but his idea is not true, and if Pantheism admits this, Theism will claim the privilege of becoming the creed of the future. If Mr. Picton understands his own Panthe-

[1] Pp. 437, 443.

ism, it, as has been shown, relieves man of all personal responsibility and of duty. There can be no sin where there is no freedom. And in his system there is no freedom. It will not do, therefore, to say that Pantheism has no more difficulties than Theism, when it is at war with human nature. It will not do to say that Pantheism is not less apt to become the creed of the future than Theism, while Pantheism outrages the conscience, and Theism sanctifies it. "Belief in an Omnipotence enthroned above the world" is Deism; but its errors do not palliate the offense of Pantheism. What can be more absurd than the claim, that, if anything, a change "gives greater fearlessness in condemning evil in man," when it leaves man incapable of doing or avoiding evil? What absurdity is it, to describe him, who believed Christ, when he said that the Holy Spirit would come "to reprove the world of sin," as regarding sin, "a dark negative—an emptiness of God?" Is the creed of the future to touch civilization with the theory, quoted approv-

ingly, that, "so far as the Devil exists at all, is he good?"

Much the same treatment is given to immortality.[1] He says: "What has been said of sin and evil may be repeated, though more briefly, of immortality. Pantheism does not re-open the question, but leaves it just where it was, to be answered by the human sense of incongruity between death and the consciousness of God." Are we, then, to be left here? Is our only "life to come" the "consciousness of God?" Is personal immortality gone? Sin is absence of God. Pantheism makes Him in all things by its own confession. Therefore, sin is not. Has human nature also dreamed vainly of personal existence beyond? Yes; for, says our essayist, "it seems as though this finite consciousness were but a bubble filled with nothingness, which finds its true substance once again in its return to its infinite source." Let us then cease to sing:

[1] Pp. 482–484.

"This cheerful tribute will I give
Long as a deathless soul shall live.
A work so sweet, a theme so high,
Demands and crowns eternity."

Let us rather learn the song of the future—

"I lift the cup of Brahma high!—
The cup and liquor both are his;
That flowing draught is perfect rest,
For Brahma's self the liquor is.

"Let endless kalpas still revolve,
Who quaffs, no grief shall e'er befall;
For he shall dream the dream of God,
And never know he dreams at all.

"My transmigrating days are o'er;
God's hand presents the sacred cup;
I eager grasp the chalice now,
And drink the God-head's liquor up.

"And while the sacred wine I quaff,
Two souls are mingled on the brim:
I drink of Brahma in the cup,
And he receives me into him."[1]

Solemnly he says: "Our conclusion, therefore, is, that while our knowledge of the phenomena which manifests the Infinite, yearly makes more difficult, and threat-

[1] Frederic R. Marvin, in the "Journal of Speculative Philosophy."

ens to make impossible, the notion of God as one Being amongst others, our growing recognition of the oneness of the universe, and, we must add, of its infinity, compels us to identify Deity with that absolute existence which involves all in itself." [1] We have shown that victory over Deism is not, by any means, victory over Theism. We are left with the mere assertion of the truth of Pantheism. And all will agree that these words mean just this: that the as yet unproved assumption of science must banish our knowledge of the nature of things; that the truths which make science, as distinguished from hypothesis, possible, are made extinct; that the authority which comes from the powers of the mind is a thing of the past. Is not this mental suicide? Was not Daniel Webster right? *Is not suicide confession?*

[1] Page 485.

CHAPTER IV.

CONCLUSION.

Our task is well nigh done. In it we have not aimed at controversy. We have attempted to show that the history of the Unitarian Church has not been written, nor has Mr. Frothingham done his whole duty with regard to Transcendentalism in New England. We have not attempted to satisfy this great want, if, indeed, any system of the universe so faulty and contradictory to human nature is worthy of a chronicle. Good taste, so far as it can be divorced from a passion for truth, has dictated the omission of any reference to Pantheism in these works; but truth demands not only a reference to Pantheism, but an exposition of the intimate relation subsisting between one form of Idealism and others. This is no hint that the reader is yet to be asked to read any account we may give of the history of Pantheism. The desolation which this the-

ory of being makes is seen in the outrage which its principles commit upon every noble sentiment and fine feeling in human nature. This chronicle has been made by other hands, who have found delight in unveiling such horrors as can spring from a creed in open defiance to civilization, the future of man, and the glory of God. We have shown that these forms of Idealism, Unitarianism and Transcendentalism, can never be separated from Pantheism, such as is opposed to reason, scripture, the nature of things, and any desirable future. If such an awful alternative is, by a fit of desperation, called preferable to a religion, which, whether found in the creeds or not, is at one with reason, scripture, the nature of things, and any desirable future—that is a proposition which is the best statement of its own absurdity, and with which it would be foolish to deal.

All that orthodoxy means, in the present effort, is *right doctrine.* That any positive statement which has been made with regard to the superiority of the orthodox scheme, involves the acceptance

of orthodoxy, so-called, as an entirety, is an unwarranted notion, to which it is desirable to assert our opposition. We frankly confess that the Trinitarianism so often heralded as the saving tenet of right doctrine, is simply Tri-theism, and logically, of course, Polytheism. Thus it comes, that, with some justice, have Unitarians and others called attention to many of the assertions of their antagonists as the expressions of this spirit. Certainly neither Pantheism nor Polytheism is right doctrine. Orthodoxy is clear of the taunts of both.

This essay does not claim to have any lease upon right doctrine other than every such attempt has, nor does it desire to be thought of as possessed of the egotism of either school with which it can not agree, and to the logical errors of one of which it has called attention. While it is a showing of the facts against Unitarianism as resulting in Pantheism, it is no showing for a Trinitarianism as resulting in Polytheism. It is simply an effort toward Orthodoxy. It has used that word as it seemed applicable to various ideas

which it, as the writer thinks, must embody. And if it should seem that the claim of orthodoxy is made too often, by one who, on the one hand, has written of the Metamorphosis of the Spirit of Unitarian Theology into Idealism, and thence into Pantheism, and, on the other, believes an equally strong essay might be written of the Metamorphosis of the Spirit of popular Trinitarian theology into Realism, and thence into Polytheism, the writer can only say, that nobody can desire the acceptance of one absurdity to escape another, nor can it be thought strange if, in the days of rampant dogmatism, one should prefer to say "*I do not know*," even though the usages say "*you must know*."

Cui bono? And to what result, then, are we brought? To this:

I. Unitarianism has no right to ask support, or to assume a dogmatic air and claim the allegiance of humanity on the ground of its being true.

II. Unitarianism has no right to assert its control of the future, and no prospect of becoming a permanent scheme of doc-

trine from which practice shall spring, on the ground of its being friendly to freedom. When its history is written, men shall find on pages what is already in fact—that New England Unitarianism fled the intellectual neighborhood of old Calvinism in fear of Fatalism and of a Tyrant. Its first work was to justify to itself its name by denying Godhead to Jesus Christ. We have seen its failure to attract Orthodoxy into its communion, and the most rigid Calvinism of to-day, freshly inspired by recent gains and losses, flings out its banner on the waste places of Unitarianism. Not more certain is it that in fact of numbers it has failed, than in realizing its theological aim. It broke from fatalistic Theism, and cried for liberty. Noble were some of its protests. The history of eloquence will not be complete without many of these splendid pleas. Much of Theodore Parker, as an instance, ought to be forgotten, but those manly words of indignant eloquence which announced the antagonism of human nature to the "Five

Points," can not pass from the history of the human soul.

But Unitarianism is not a negative. It has crystalized its yearnings into a system of theology, and as soon as it begins to postulate dogma, its utterances for liberty grow vapid and insignificant. It has escaped the arms of Calvin by being locked in the embrace of Spinoza. It ridiculed Jonathan Edwards, but welcomed Strauss. It has indeed rushed from Scylla upon Charybdis. Both are of the same geologic formation, as the fatalism of the old Calvinism and the fatalism of Pantheism are one. Liberty is the last word that can fall from the lips of those who write for "Freedom and Fellowship in Religion." "Freedom from Creeds," so lustily advertised, is bought at a fearful cost—that of intellectual and moral liberty. The Pantheism of Emerson and Frederic H. Hedge are professions of freedom from the Calvinism of Hodge and Henry B. Smith, as the slavery of the Carolinas was not that of the Queen's Castle, while a proclamation of freedom from either place would be written in sight of chains.

Unitarianism has fled, and successfully, but by buying theological license at the expense of philosophical liberty.

The very straws on the current point in this way, as they ever have. The cry for "freedom" has been so prolonged a cry that it has been seen to signify what it really meant all the years—*license*. The clarion which rung with the enthusiasm of Channing and Priestly, has been crying for an abnegation of responsibility and duty. The fulminating of such words as "tolerance," "liberty," and "catholicity," has gone on in the midst of the things of which they are the names, until the truth was apparent, that what was meant was to proclaim the unimportance of evil; that, after all, it is only a mode of life and being; that obeying is right enough, if one does not have to go out of his way to do it; that one needs not to "rise above nature," as things are doing well and executing themselves, while the publishing of Omnipotence forever goes on. From the days of Faustus Socinius unto those of "The Ways of the Spirit," Unitarianism has been proclaiming her

tendencies and heralding her march toward Pantheism; thus not allowing those persons who have looked into her face thus long to be surprised when her lips quiver with its poetry, and her tongue speaks eloquent words of eulogy over the apostles.

III. Unitarianism has no right to ask for the leadership of the race on the ground of its suitableness to present ideas of progress, or on the ground of its ability to furnish inspirations and thoughts for the future such as shall tend to the highest civilization. Unitarianism is Pantheism in theology, the literature of which is the husk of its life. Its seeds falling into human life and thought should stir a profounder fear than the encroachments of anthropomorphism, and we can not think that any theology which by any means leads to such a philosophy, is worthy the acceptance of any branch of the vine, Christ, or that those persons who teach it can be regarded as the apostles of a fair civilization, a noble philanthrophy, or the high possibility of human nature.

The souls which glorify it have lived in most eloquent opposition to its principles. They have even plead for what would be impossible under its regime. They have, however, failed to save it from the just criticism of men.

IV. Unitarianism has no right to seek a home in the souls of men, on the ground of affording any play for his divinest faculties, or, indeed, anything but an opportunity for them to see their own dishonesty, infidelity, and incompetency.

The historian of Pantheism will have hard pages to write, as the centuries gather about him, and the carnage of the human soul falls into the words of his story.

Pantheism would leave no temple standing, since its God is not a hearer of prayer, nor does he answer any of the religious feelings of the race. The deep, abiding inspirations which gives to society its lift heavenward, and the grander ideas of life which restrain the desolating tides of wrong have no relation to the eternal Pan. "Possibility" and "faith," with more such words, have no meaning, as

through the ether the currents of Being interflow.

To look toward Pantheism and pronounce the words of morality, much more those of religion, is to talk of the mixture of night and day. Penitentiary walls are one form of God, while in the brain of the murderer last admitted, God had another moment of self-consciousness.

Crime is God's tragedy. The contriving of the thief is His soliloquy, as is also Paradise Lost. And it is practical philanthrophy, to advance this cause!

To reinstate the religion of the Hindu in all our life and activity; to make men despise life, and by such result to introduce suicide and murder; to clip the wings of ambition, to dethrone noble aspiration, and to destroy the ideal of moral excellence—this is progress! Only the other day, in another land, was a speech so applicable that it has found its place in literature,[1] and the effect of the effort was to prove the Pantheism of Hartmann,

[1] New Englander, 1878. The Philosophy of the Unconscious in Court.

which is logically true enough to be pessimistic, the soil upon which grew a foul murder. Can we think of a noted criminal being edified with some classic of Pantheism before his execution? The one fact excludes the other. If this philosophy were accepted, no such use could be made of its literature. "Acts of vice . . . are movements of universal nature, and in conformity with the divine intelligence." "One side of God is what men call evil."

The hopes of humanity are as foolish as their fear of sin. The immortality of men is a new form of existence, as a chunk of coal has life and being in the smoke and ashes. The idea of a Father-spirit is true, but only in poetry. To hope that God will care for one is most foolish.

But no less inconsistent is it for any band of thinkers to offer Pantheism on the ground of respect for man and the faculties of the soul. The whole nature of Pantheism is opposed to the nature of man, and it is strange that in one sentence a reference is made to great *Human Nature* and its authority, and Pantheism

is advertised as a cure-all in the next. Nothing so outrages the conscious soul as Pantheism. Freedom so lustily cried for is protested against as the Infinite throbs through the finite. All distinction between right and wrong which the soul so bravely proclaims is broken over as the Deity turns Himself about. It demands the constitutionally religious being to be irreligious, as it asks the seeker to become the sought. Duty is a dream, and sorrow for sin is the renewal of some other life-fragment. Life is unreal. Death is the plunge of unreality into unreality.

"The earth disolves, the stars grow dark, the sun expires,
An ashy hue comes o'er the sky; all spirits fade;
Retreat chaotic glooms and cosmogonic fires;
Absorbing boundlessness claims all that has been made.
The elements re-seek their transcendental deep—
The Kalpa ends. Great Brahma is about to sleep."

Great human nature which has been appealed to and called upon to witness, and lauded, that this theology might be established, has remained, and, quietly gazing into the face of liberalism, begins to see that liberalism has been conquered

by these eyes of meditative but earnest lustre. As now it seems that human nature grows sick of dogma to the exclusion of inspiration, and seems also about beginning anew to live, agreeing to "know only in part," "until that which is perfect is come," the confessions of faith are more and more tried by life, and conduct sits upon the question of their "right doctrine."

The Trinity is a truth not to be held upon one's tongue. We can write about it—no one can write it. In life, it presents no contradiction, but is the grand fact focalizing all the rays of eternity. So of the Atonement; so of the doctrine of Providence; so of all great and highest truth. Human nature lives them, but does not explain them. Upon Unitarianism, or any other theory which assaults the soul either by flattery or open opposition, it looks unwearily and charitably until conquered thus silently, but, no less valiantly, it seeks its ancient companionship and home, leaving man alone with God, whose angel has said:

BEHOLD! I MAKE ALL THINGS NEW.

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